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INTRODUCTION 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)1 authorized the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) to impose civil penalties in proceedings before 
an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) against any person who violated 
any provision of the federal securities laws or any rule promulgated 
under those statutes.  Prior to Dodd-Frank, the SEC’s authority to 
impose civil penalties in an administrative proceeding (“AP”) was lim-
ited to registered entities and persons associated with registered enti-
ties—primarily broker-dealers and investment advisers.   For all other 
defendants the SEC was required to file a civil enforcement action in 
federal court.  One consequence of this limitation was that the SEC 
historically commenced only 60% of its new cases as APs.2  Subse-
quent to Dodd-Frank that percentage has increased significantly.  
More than 80% of the SEC’s new enforcement actions in the first 
three quarters of fiscal year 2016 were filed as administrative proceed-
ings3 and this was consistent with the pattern in 2015 and 2014.4  The 
trend is even more dramatic with respect to public company defend-
ants.  The proportion of SEC enforcement actions commenced as 
APs against such defendants more than tripled from 21% in fiscal 
year 2010 to 76% in fiscal year 2015.5  In the first half of fiscal year 
 
 1 Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 2 Sara Gilley, Heather Lazur & Alberto Vargas, SEC Focus on Administrative Proceedings: Mid-
year Checkup, LAW360 (May 27, 2015, 10:25 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
659945/sec-focus-on-administrative-proceedings-midyear-checkup (citing SEC data show-
ing the use of administrative APs for 63-64% of enforcement actions in fiscal years 2010-
2012, 69% in 2013, and a sharp increase to 81% and 82% in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, 
respectively). 
 3 CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY DIPS IN 2016 (2016), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Research/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-Dips-in-
2016 (showing that 81% of SEC enforcement actions filed in the first three quarters of 
fiscal year 2016 were filed as APs). 
 4 Gilley, Lazur & Vargas, supra note 2. 
 5 Stephen Choi, Sara E. Gilley & David F. Marcus, SEC Enforcement Activity Against Public 
Company Defendants: Fiscal Years 2010–2015, N.Y.U. POLLACK CTR. FOR LAW & BUS. & 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, at 6 (2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/
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2016, the SEC commenced 88% of its enforcement actions against 
public company defendants and related subsidiary defendants as ad-
ministrative proceedings.6 The Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (“CFTC”) has announced that it too will pursue an increasing 
number of enforcement actions in administrative proceedings.7 
SEC ALJs are SEC employees and are paid by the agency.  They 
are hired by the SEC’s Office of Administrative Law Judges, with in-
put from the Chief Administrative Law Judge, human resource func-
tions, and the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), rather 
than by the President, a court of law, or the head of a federal de-
partment.  SEC ALJs—like other federal ALJs—arguably are insulated 
from the President by dual layers of for-cause removal protection.  If 
an SEC enforcement action is assigned to an ALJ, rather than to a 
federal judge, there are major adverse procedural consequences for 
respondents.  There is very limited discovery, neither the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Evidence apply, 
there is no opportunity to assert counterclaims, there is no right to a 
jury trial on any issue, and the time frame for completion of the ad-
ministrative proceeding is both rigid and truncated. 
Coincidentally or not, the SEC has been much more successful in 
administrative proceedings conducted on its home court than it has 
been in federal court.  During the time period October 2010 to Sep-
tember 2015 the SEC prevailed against 86% of respondents in con-
tested cases heard by ALJs.8  During the same period the SEC had a 
considerably lower success rate of 70% in federal court.9  The statis-
 
5c823caf-b6b7-47b5-ba2f-1c991fef68c7/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-Against-Public-
Company-Defendants.pdf (presenting data showing that 21% of the thirty-eight SEC ac-
tions against public companies in 2010 were administrative proceedings, increasing to 
76% of thirty-four enforcement actions in 2015). 
 6 Stephen Choi et al., SEC Enforcement Activity Against Public Companies and Their Subsidiaries: 
Midyear FY 2016 Update, at 4 (2016), N.Y.U. POLLACK CTR. FOR LAW & BUS. & 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/1a6f93a7-3859-
4e7e-841f-65241c49c123/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-against-Public-Companies.pdf (show-
ing that 88% of the forty-three SEC actions against public companies and related subsidi-
aries in the first half of fiscal year 2016 were brought as administrative proceedings). 
 7 See Jimmy Hoover, CFTC Closer to In-House Enforcement Actions, Official Says, LAW360 (Mar. 
12, 2015, 7:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/630881/cftc-closer-to-in-house-
enforcement-actions-official-says (“CFTC Enforcement Director Aitan Goelman said the 
agency will ‘very soon’ follow the SEC’s shift to litigating enforcement actions in-house 
. . . .”). 
 8 Jean Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2015, 9:25 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fairness-of-sec-judges-is-in-spotlight-1448236970 (“The SEC 
won against 86% of defendants in contested cases in its own courts from October 2010 
through September 2015 . . . significantly higher than the agency’s 70% win rate in feder-
al court.”). 
 9 Id. 
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tics concerning appeals are even starker.  The first level of appeal in 
an SEC administrative proceeding is to the five SEC Commissioners, 
who also authorize the initiation of enforcement proceedings.10  The 
Commissioners decided in the agency’s favor concerning 95% of ap-
peals taken during the period October 2010 to March 2015.11 
The foregoing picture has prompted numerous respondents to 
file constitutional challenges to SEC administrative proceedings.12  
Many of those cases were filed in 2014 and 2015, and by April 2016 
appeals were pending in multiple federal circuits.13  In 2016 the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari in two such cases,14 but the Court is 
widely expected to ultimately resolve one or more of the constitu-
tional issues.15 
 
 10 See Daniel R. Walfish, The Real Problem with SEC Administrative Proceedings, and How to Fix it, 
FORBES (July 20, 2015, 7:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/07/
20/the-real-problem-with-sec-administrative-proceedings-and-how-to-fix-it/ (noting that 
“[t]he Commissioners insist on authorizing all enforcement proceedings, whether filed in 
district court or administratively”). 
 11 Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 (highlighting 
that “the commissioners decided in their own agency’s favor concerning 53 out of 56 de-
fendants in appeals—or 95%—from January 2010 through [March 2015].”). 
 12 Carmen Germaine, 11th Circ. Won’t Lift Order Blocking SEC In-House Suit, LAW360 (Oct. 7, 
2015, 9:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/711691/11th-circ-won-t-lift-order-
blocking-sec-in-house-suit (noting that approximately a dozen defendants have asserted 
constitutional challenges in federal court). 
 13 See Carmen Germaine, Justices Reject Another Challenge to SEC In-House Court, LAW360 (Apr. 
25, 2016, 9:49 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/788362/justices-reject-another-
challenge-to-sec-in-house-court.  By September 2016, all four federal circuits to have ruled 
on the issue agreed that federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to hear consti-
tutional claims raised by respondents in on-going administrative proceedings, and review 
of such claims can only be provided on appeal from final decisions by the SEC.  See Hill v. 
SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 291 (2d Cir. 
2016); Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2015); and Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 775 
(7th Cir. 2015).  An examination of the jurisdictional issue is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle. 
 14 Pierce v. SEC, 786 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Apr. 25, 
2016) (No. 15-901); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 
3438 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2016) (No. 15-997). 
 15 See, e.g., Jason M. Halper, Robert M. Loeb, Kelsi Corkran & Marc R. Shapiro, SEC In-House 
Forum Is Constitutionally Uncertain, NAT’L L.J., May 30, 2016, 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202758804344/SEC-InHouse-Forum-Is-
Constitutionally-Uncertain?slreturn=20160817064919 (“[E]ventual resolution by the Su-
preme Court seems likely.”); Ed Beeson, SEC’s 7th Circ. Win Won’t End War on Admin 
Courts, LAW360 (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/696738/sec-s-7th-circ-
win-won-t-end-war-on-admin-courts (citing Andrew Vollmer, Professor, University of Vir-
ginia School of Law, for the proposition that the Supreme Court is likely to take up a 
constitutional challenge to the SEC’s use of ALJs, even if no circuit split on the issue 
emerges). 
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This Article examines five of the most common constitutional ar-
guments asserted by respondents: denial of due process, denial of 
equal protection, violation of the Seventh Amendment, and two dis-
tinct violations of Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  It then exam-
ines two common normative arguments concerning the use by the 
SEC and CFTC of administrative proceedings—the process impedes 
the balanced development of the federal securities laws and even if 
the process is constitutional it is fundamentally unfair, or at least rais-
es a substantial perception of unfairness.  Finally, this Article exam-
ines four potential solutions to the multiple problems that have been 
identified.  This Article concludes that (1) SEC and CFTC adminis-
trative proceedings likely are constitutional in most, but not all, re-
spects and (2) there is a sound normative basis for reforming the 
process.  The Article recommends that the SEC modify its practices 
for hiring ALJs and that the SEC and CFTC make major revisions to 
their respective Rules of Practice. 
I.  ADMINISTRATIVE CREEP AT THE SEC AND CFTC 
The first Part of this Article examines what prominent United 
States District Judge Jed S. Rakoff has described as a classic case of 
administrative creep16—the recent trend for the SEC to utilize an 
administrative forum for enforcement actions.  As will be seen, this 
trend is unmistakable at the SEC and the CFTC has declared its in-
tent to follow suit.  This Part also will examine the SEC’s home court 
success and key aspects of the administrative process at the SEC and 
CFTC. 
A.  The SEC Shift 
The federal ALJ position was created by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act of 1946 (“APA”)17 and in the seven decades since then has 
 
 16 Judge Jed S. Rakoff, PLI Securities Regulation Institute Keynote Address, Is the S.E.C. Becoming a 
Law Unto Itself?, at 6 (Nov. 11, 2014), https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2014/
11/rakoff-pli-speech.pdf (“[I]t is hard to find a better example of what is sometimes dis-
paragingly called ‘administrative creep’ than this expansion of the S.E.C.’s internal en-
forcement power.”). 
 17 Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).  When the APA was enacted ALJs were called “hearing 
examiners.”  The title was changed by Congress to “Administrative Law Judge” in 1978.  
See Pub. L. 95-251, 92  Stat. 183 (1978); United States Government Accountability Office, 
GAO-10-14, Results-Oriented Cultures: Office of Personnel Management Should Review Adminis-
trative Law Judge Program to Improve Hiring and Performance Management 4 n.9 (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-14 (stating that the APA established the position 
of hearing examiner, which was changed to administrative law judge in 1978). 
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become extraordinarily important.  The more than 1600 federal ALJs 
significantly outnumber Article III judges, preside over all formal ad-
judications within the executive branch, and annually decide more 
than 250,000 cases.18  Many of these cases are decided by SEC ALJs.  
The SEC has been using administrative proceedings for more than 
forty years—even before its Division of Enforcement (“Division”) was 
created in August 1972.19  But their use was limited.  Prior to the en-
actment of Dodd-Frank in 2010 the SEC was restricted in both the 
types of cases it could bring administratively and in the remedies it 
could obtain in such proceedings.20  In large part as a function of the-
se restrictions the SEC annually commenced only approximately 60% 
of its new enforcement cases as administrative proceedings.21  During 
fiscal years 1998–2009 this proportion remained relatively stable, 
ranging between 47% and 62%.22 
Dodd-Frank § 929P(a) authorized the SEC to obtain in adminis-
trative proceedings remedies that are essentially identical to those it 
can obtain in federal district court actions.23  This was the most signif-
 
 18 Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 799, 852 (2013) (noting 
that the number of ALJs is almost double the 874 Article III judges, that these ALJs de-
cide more than 250,000 cases each year, and that they “hear evidence, decide factual is-
sues, and apply legal principles in all formal administrative adjudications under the 
[APA]”). 
 19 Andrew Ceresney, Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section Fall Meeting 
3 (Nov. 21, 2014) [hereinafter, Ceresney Remarks], http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/
Detail/Speech/1370543515297 (“[W]e have been using administrative proceedings 
throughout the 42-year history of the Division of Enforcement, and the Commission used 
them even before its enforcement activities were consolidated in one division.”). 
 20 This Article refers to administrative proceedings and cease-and-desist proceedings collec-
tively as “administrative proceedings,” but they are distinct enforcement actions.  In a ma-
jority of cases, an SEC enforcement action is commenced as both forms.  Douglas Da-
vison, Mathew Martens, Nicole Rabner, John Valentine & Natalie Rastin, Litigating with—
and at—the SEC, 48 REV. SEC. & COMMOD. REG. 103, 104–105 (2015) (explaining that 
there are two kinds of enforcement actions, administrative proceedings and cease-and-
desist proceedings, collectively known as administrative proceedings, and that most en-
forcement actions are initiated as both). 
 21 Gilley, Lazur & Vargas, supra note 2; cf. Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC “Monetary Penal-
ties Speak Very Loudly,” But What Do They Say?  A Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement 
Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209, 226 (2014) (noting that SEC civil cases “outnumbered admin-
istrative proceedings as recently as 2005”). 
 22 MARC B. DORFMAN & KENNETH B. WINER, SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT: COUNSELING AND 
DEFENSE § 19.01 (2014) (“During fiscal years 1998 through 2009, the number of adminis-
trative proceedings as a percentage of total enforcement actions initiated remained rela-
tively stable, ranging between 47% and 62%”).  Cf. Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Per-
formance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 964 (2016) 
(stating that during the last fifteen years the SEC commenced approximately half of its 
enforcement actions as APs). 
 23 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012).  One remaining difference is that if the SEC seeks an order is-
sued pursuant to Section 21(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibiting a person 
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icant expansion of the SEC’s authority to use administrative en-
forcement in its more than eighty-year history.24  Why did Congress 
include § 929P(a) in the statute?  The scant legislative history indi-
cates that the SEC and Congress primarily hoped to enhance the Di-
vision’s efficiency25—and administrative enforcement generally is 
both quicker26 and less expensive27—but Congress devoted little or no 
time to considering the multiple ramifications of § 929P(a) when 
Dodd-Frank was being shaped.  Neither the House nor the Senate 
debated the inclusion of this section.28 
The SEC has taken advantage of its new authority, although it did 
not do so right away.  Post-Dodd-Frank, the percentage of new en-
forcement actions the SEC has commenced administratively in-
creased from 63% in fiscal year 2010 to 69% in fiscal year 2013, 81% 
 
from serving as an office or director of a public company it can only obtain that order 
from a federal judge.  GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, The Dodd-Frank Act Reinforces and 
Expands SEC Enforcement Powers (July 21, 2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/pages/Dodd-FrankActReinforcesAndExpandsSECEnforcementPowers.aspx. 
 24 Chris Cox, The Growing Use of SEC Administrative Proceedings: An Historical Perspective from 
Congress and the Agency, at 3, Speech Presented at Securities Enforcement Forum West 
(May 13, 2015), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015-
05-13-Speech-to-Securities-Enforcement-Forum-West-San-Francisco.pdf (noting that “the 
most significant expansion of AP authority in the SEC’s 81-year history” was § 929P(a)). 
 25 Rakoff, supra note 16 (observing that SEC enforcement actions brought internally are 
more efficient because discovery is much more limited). 
 26 See Cox, supra note 24, at 6 (“In an AP, the whole thing normally does get wrapped up 
within 300 days, which would be very difficult to achieve in a civil trial.”); Peter J. Hen-
ning, Choosing the Battlefield in S.E.C. Cases, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 11, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/choosing-the-battlefield-in-
sec-cases.html?_r=0 (“The benefit of an administrative proceeding is a quicker resolution 
because  the S.E.C.’s rules generally mandate an initial decision within no more than 300 
days of filing, far quicker than federal court cases that can take years to resolve.”).  But see 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, Examining U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission Enforcement: Recommendations on Current Processes and 
Practices 16 (July 2015), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/07/021882_SEC_Reform_FIN1.pdf (“[T]he overall period for completion of an 
administrative proceeding is likely slower than the time required to complete a trial in 
district court.”). 
 27 See Andrew Ceresney, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement, Keynote Speech at New 
York City Bar 4th Annual White Collar Institute (May 12, 2015) [hereinafter, Ceresney Key-
note Speech], http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-nyc-bar-4th-white-collar-key-
note.html (noting that the SEC expends fewer resources in administrative proceedings 
than it does in judicial proceedings). 
 28 Cox, supra note 24, at 3 (noting that § 929P(a) “was not even debated in either the House 
or the Senate consideration of the bill”).  Cf. QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN,  
LLP, Circuit Courts Align to Shield SEC Administrative Proceedings from Collateral Attack (Aug. 
2016), http://www.quinnemanuel.com/the-firm/news-events/article-august-2016-circuit-
courts-align-to-shield-sec-administrative-proceedings-from-collateral-constitutional-attack/ 
(“The intent was clear—make the SEC’s authority in administrative proceedings ‘coex-
tensive with its authority to seek penalties in Federal court.’”). 
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in fiscal year 2014, and 81% in the first three quarters of fiscal year 
2016.29  These percentages translate to hundreds of new administra-
tive proceedings each year—in fiscal year 2015 the SEC commenced a 
total of 807 new enforcement actions, up from 755 new actions in 
2014.30 
The SEC’s shift to an administrative forum has been reflected in 
three areas that it has designated as high priority for enforcement: 
insider trading, violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(“FCPA”), and financial reporting fraud.  The SEC announced its de-
cision in 201431 to increase its use of APs in insider trading cases soon 
after it lost two such cases in federal district court.32  In fiscal year 
2013 the SEC filed only 2% of its insider trading cases in-house, but 
this figure increased to 23% in fiscal year 2014 and 35% in the first 
half of fiscal year 2015.33  This translates to dozens of in-house pro-
ceedings—in fiscal year 2015 the SEC brought a total of eighty-seven 
insider trading cases.34  The SEC’s preference to litigate insider trad-
 
 29 CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY DIPS IN 2016 (Aug. 2016), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Research/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-Dips-in-
2016; 
   Gilley, Lazur & Vargas, supra note 2. 
 30 Jimmy Hoover, SEC Predicts Record Enforcement Levels Will Continue in 2016, LAW360 (Mar. 
10, 2016, 3:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/769941/sec-predicts-record-
enforcement-levels-will-continue-in-2016 (observing that the 807 new enforcement ac-
tions in 2015 topped the prior record high of 755 such actions in 2014). 
 31 Sarah N. Lynch, SEC to File Some Insider Trading Cases in its In-House Court, REUTERS (June 
11, 2014, 4:12 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/11/us-sec-insidertrading-
idUSKBN0EM2DI20140611 (“The SEC’s planned shift follows a string of recent trial loss-
es involving insider trading.”). 
 32 Michael S. Piwowar, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at the 
“SEC Speaks” Conference 2015: A Fair, Orderly, and Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015-spchcmsp.html (commenting that 
“[a]nnouncement of this plan to increase the use of administrative proceedings in insider 
trading cases followed the Commission’s loss in two insider trading cases in federal 
court”). 
 33 Gilley, Lazur & Vargas, supra note 2.  The statistics are less compelling if one considers 
the venue for litigated insider trading cases.  Since the beginning of fiscal year 2014 ap-
proximately 90% of the SEC’s litigated insider trading cases have been filed in federal 
court.  Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 25 (noting that, beginning in fiscal year 2014, 
approximately 90% of the SEC’s litigated insider trading cases were filed in federal 
court). 
 34 John C. Wander, New Records in SEC Enforcement Actions, HARV. LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. 
GOV. & FIN. REG. (Nov. 14, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/11/14/new-
records-in-sec-enforcement-actions/.  See also Robert Anello, Addressing the SEC’s Adminis-
trative “Home Court” Advantage in Enforcement Proceedings, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2015, 4:40 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2015/09/07/addressing-the-secs-administrative-
home-court-advantage-in-enforcement-proceedings/ (“[I]nsider trading cases, tradition-
ally heard by federal district judges, now routinely are brought before SEC administrative 
law judges (ALJs).”). 
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ing in-house is understandable.  Such cases “are virtually the only cas-
es that the SEC frequently litigates based simply on circumstantial ev-
idence.”35  The Division probably assumes, correctly, that an SEC ALJ 
will be more receptive to such evidence than would a federal jury.  
Indeed, from June 2013 to August 2014, twenty-one individuals pre-
vailed against the SEC in thirteen insider trading cases commenced 
in federal court, either on summary judgment or at trial.36  During 
the same period, the SEC had only one trial win and prevailed only 
once on summary judgment in insider trading cases.37 
The SEC’s preference to litigate insider trading in-house was wide-
ly expected to intensify38 following the Second Circuit’s 2014 decision 
in Newman v. United States,39 which raised the bar for the government 
to prove that an offense occurred.40 
In recent years enforcement of the FCPA has been a priority for 
both the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the SEC,41 but the 
 
 35 Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where is the Line?, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 330, 
362–63 (2013).  Accord Joel M. Cohen, Mary Kay Dunning & Darcy Harris, SEC Plans to 
Play Insider-Trading Cases on Home Court, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 16, 2014) (“The SEC rarely has 
the type of ‘smoking gun’ evidence presented in criminal insider-trading prosecutions; 
there generally are no cooperating witnesses and no wiretaps or other directly incriminat-
ing evidence.”). 
 36 MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP, 2014 Insider Trading Annual Review (Jan. 2015),  
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2015/02/150211InsiderTradingAnn
ualReview.pdf (contrasting wins against the SEC by twenty-one individuals in thirteen in-
sider trading cases in federal court with the SEC’s one trial victory and one summary 
judgment victory). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See, e.g., Michael R. McPhail & Daniel R. Kelley, Life After Newman: The SEC May Shift To-
ward Administrative Proceedings in Insider-Trading Cases, 47 BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. 2238 (Nov. 23, 2015), (anticipating increase in SEC use of administrative proceed-
ings to litigate insider trading). 
 39 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, No. 15-628, 2016 WL 
7078448 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2016). 
 40 Newman held that in order to sustain a conviction for insider trading, the government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tippee knew that an insider disclosed in-
side information and that he did so in exchange for personal benefit.  Id. at 450.  To 
prove personal benefit the government must prove “a meaningfully close personal rela-
tionship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at 
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”  Id. at 452. 
 41 SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, FCPA DIGEST, 
Jan. 2016, at iv, http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/
2016/01/FCPA-Digest.pdf (“DOJ and SEC officials have made clear that the FCPA will 
remain a priority for both agencies and we see no reason to question those officials’ sin-
cerity.”).  In 2015 the number of resolved FCPA enforcement actions dropped to its low-
est level since 2006, but this decline appears to have been an outlier.  The pace of en-
forcement activity increased sharply in 2016.  Marc Alain Bohn & Michael Skopets, Uptick 
in FCPA Enforcement Suggests 2015 Drop Was Outlier, LAW360 (May 18, 2016, 11:25 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/795489/uptick-in-fcpa-enforcement-suggests-2015-drop-
was-outlier. 
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Commission rarely utilized administrative proceedings in such cases 
prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank.  Because it lacked authority to 
impose civil monetary penalties in administrative actions, the SEC not 
infrequently utilized a bifurcated approach, suing in federal court for 
civil penalties while simultaneously seeking both disgorgement and a 
cease-and-desist order from an in-house ALJ.42  Post-Dodd-Frank the 
landscape has changed.  In fiscal year 2011 the SEC filed only 20% of 
its FCPA cases in-house, but this figure increased to 57% in fiscal year 
2014 and 89% in the first half of fiscal year 2015.43  Many of the re-
cent FCPA administrative proceedings exceed prior proceedings in 
both size and scope.44  The SEC has described its use of administrative 
proceedings in FCPA cases as “the new normal.”45 
The situation regarding financial reporting fraud is similar.  Fi-
nancial reporting has long been one of the SEC’s core focus areas.  
But after a period of extensive enforcement activity in the early 2000s, 
and a brief resurgence featuring stock option backdating cases,46 the 
SEC’s focus in this area began to wane.  During the period 2006–2012 
the number of open SEC investigations concerning financial report-
ing or disclosure dropped from 304 to 124, while the number of cases 
filed by the SEC in this subject area plummeted almost 70%, from 
219 in 2007 to sixty-eight in 2013.47  The tide turned again in 2013, 
 
 42 Bruce E. Yannett, Andrew M. Levine & Steven S. Michaels, The Total S.A. Action: Are Ad-
ministrative Orders the SEC’s FCPA Resolution of Choice for the Future?, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, 
LLP, 4 FCPA UPDATE, July 2013, at 1–2, 5–6, http://www.debevoise.com/~/
media/files/insights/publications/2013/07/fcpa%20update/files/view%20fcpa%20
update/fileattachment/fcpa_update_july_2013.pdf. 
 43 Gilley et al., supra note 2.  See also SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP, supra note 41, at v (“[T]he 
majority of the SEC’s FCPA enforcement actions have been resolved using administrative 
proceedings . . . .”). 
 44 Marc Alain Bohn, Are Administrative Proceedings the New Civil Complaint?, FCPA BLOG (May 
6, 2014, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/5/6/are-administrative-
proceedings-the-new-civil-complaints.html#. 
 45 COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-CORRUPTION 
ENFORCEMENT, 12 (Winter, 2015), https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/
publications/2015/01/trends_and_developments_in_anti-corruption_enforcement_
winter_2015.ashx. 
 46 See Quinn Curtis & Minor Myers, Do the Merits Matter?  Empirical Evidence on Shareholder 
Suits from Options Backdating Litigation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 306–10 (2016) (describing 
the backdating scandal). 
 47 Randall J. Fons, SEC Investigations and Enforcement Related to Financial Reporting and Account-
ing, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV’T AND FIN. REG. (Feb. 16, 2014), 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/02/16/sec-investigations-and-enforcement-
related-to-financial-reporting-and-accounting/; MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP, Annual Re-
view 2013, FIN. REPORTING + ACCT., Jan. 2014, at 1, http://media.mofo.com/files/
Uploads/Images/140123-Financial-Reporting-Accounting-Enforcement-Annual-
Review.pdf. 
Oct. 2016] ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 55 
 
when Mary Jo White became SEC chairwoman and the agency estab-
lished a twelve-member Financial Reporting and Audit Task Force 
dedicated to proactively detecting fraudulent or improper financial 
reporting.48  The SEC doubled the number of its financial reporting 
and disclosure enforcement actions between 2013 and 2015.49  In fis-
cal year 2015 these often complex actions represented 20% of the 
SEC’s enforcement docket—the largest percentage in many years and 
the single largest component of the agency’s 2015 docket.50  The 
SEC’s renewed focus in this area—no doubt aided by new technology 
that enables the agency to “review terabytes of information in finan-
cial statements almost simultaneously”51—has been accompanied by a 
shift toward the use of administrative proceedings.  Whereas during 
the period 2011–2013 the SEC filed only 57% of its enforcement ac-
tions for financial reporting fraud and issuer disclosure violations as 
administrative proceedings, this figure increased to 88% in fiscal year 
201452 and the trend continued in 2015.53 
For multiple reasons the foregoing raw numbers overstate the 
case.  First, the SEC continues to try many cases in federal court.  In-
deed, in fiscal year 2014 the SEC tried more cases (thirty) in federal 
court than in any of the prior ten years.54  The agency is likely to con-
tinue pursuing numerous enforcement actions in federal court, be-
cause such actions are more visible and function as an important de-
 
 48 See William R. McLucas et al., Update: SEC’s Financial Reporting and Audit Task Force, 
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP (Feb. 20, 2014), 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?
NewsPubId=10737423412 (describing the objectives, operations, and initiatives of the 
Task Force); Marc J. Fagel & Courtney M. Brown, SEC Picks Up the Pace on Financial Report-
ing Fraud Efforts, LAW360 (Oct. 26, 2015, 11:03 AM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/717743/sec-picks-up-the-pace-on-financial-reporting-fraud-efforts (“The SEC’s 
recent wave of filings should leave little doubt that the Division of Enforcement is intense-
ly focused on identifying and bringing financial reporting cases.”). 
 49 Stewart Bishop, SEC Official Talks Up Sharp Accounting Fraud Focus, LAW360 (June 3, 2016, 
9:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/803600/sec-official-talks-up-sharp-accounting
-fraud-focus. 
 50 Marc J. Fagel, SEC Enforcement by the Numbers, LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2016, 10:05 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/768287/sec-enforcement-by-the-numbers. 
 51 Robert F. Carangelo, Paul A. Ferrillo & Andrew Cauchi, Guest Post: The SEC’s Renewed Focus 
on Financial Reporting and Financial Fraud, D&O DIARY (May 19, 2016), 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2016/05/articles/securities-laws/the-secs-renewed-focus-
on-financial-reporting-and-financial-fraud/. 
 52 Gilley et al., supra note 2. 
 53 The SEC’s accounting and auditing enforcement releases (“AAERs”) serve as a prime in-
dicator of enforcement activity in this area.  In the first half of fiscal year 2015, 93% of the 
SEC’s AAERs were filed as administrative proceedings, compared with 74% in the first six 
months of fiscal year 2014 and 63% in the first six months of fiscal year 2013.  Id. 
 54 Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19. 
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terrent.  Second, contrary to claims by some critics that the SEC has 
shifted to administrative enforcement partly because it keeps losing 
in federal district court,55 by May 2015 the SEC had won twelve of its 
fourteen most recent jury trials.56  In fiscal year 2015 the SEC won all 
six of its jury or bench trials.57 
Third, many SEC administrative proceedings are routine—they 
include, for example, actions to suspend trading in companies whose 
filings are not current, as well as follow-on actions to sanction brokers 
or investment advisers previously found liable for securities laws viola-
tions.58  A 2015 report concluded that the large number of these 
mostly ministerial APs “has an enormous distorting impact on annual 
statistics,”59 and it is difficult to quibble with that conclusion.  In cal-
endar year 2014 SEC ALJs issued 183 initial decisions.  Of these, 119 
terminated the registration of public companies for failure to file pe-
riodic reports (113 of which were resolved by a default order), and 
forty-four were follow-on APs (all of which were resolved without a 
hearing, in the form of default judgments or motions for summary 
disposition).60  More recently, the percentage of SEC enforcement ac-
tions filed as follow-on actions declined significantly in fiscal year 
2015,61 but so did the percentage of contested cases sent in-house by 
the SEC.  In fiscal year 2015, the SEC used its home court for 28% of 
its contested cases, compared with 43% in 2014.62 
Fourth, the bulk of the post-Dodd-Frank increase in administrative 
enforcement by the SEC is explained by an uptick in cases that are 
filed as settled.  This is true generally63 and with respect to the high 
 
 55 See, e.g., Eaglesham, supra note 11 (quoting Joseph Grundfest, Professor, Stanford Law 
School, for the proposition that by shifting to in-house enforcement the SEC “is not only 
increasing its chances of winning but giving itself greater control over the future evolu-
tion of legal doctrine”). 
 56 Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 27. 
 57 Wander, supra note 34. 
 58 Henry Engler, SEC’s “Administrative Proceedings” Enforcements Dwarf Court Cases in 2015, 
REUTERS (July 9, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2015/07/
09/secs-administrative-proceedings-enforcements-dwarf-court-cases-in-2015/. 
 59 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, 
at 12. 
 60 Id. at 13. 
 61 Ed Beeson, SEC Enforcement Surged to Record High in Fiscal Year 2015, LAW360 (Oct. 22, 
2015, 3:13 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/717586/sec-enforcement-surged-to-
record-high-in-fiscal-year-2015. 
 62 Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of Its In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2015, 9:00 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-trims-use-of-in-house-judges-1444611604. 
 63 Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 27 (“The vast majority of the uptick in the numbers of 
actions we have brought as administrative proceedings are settled actions.”). 
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priority subject areas of insider trading and FCPA violations.64  In-
deed, in the first half of fiscal year 2016, 98% of public company and 
related subsidiary defendants resolved their SEC enforcement actions 
on the same day they were initiated, compared with 78% in 2010.65  
Resolving actions by filing them on the SEC’s home turf as settled 
yields clear advantages for respondents.  The dual risks that a federal 
judge will reject the settlement or that a downstream contempt pro-
ceeding will stem from a federal injunction are negated, and there is 
a public relations benefit arising from the perception that an admin-
istrative settlement is a less severe sanction than the settlement of 
federal litigation.66  The SEC also benefits from enhanced efficiency67 
and negation of the risk that a federal judge will demand changes to 
negotiated settlements, dismiss charges, or otherwise limit claims.  
Moreover, the imposition of a cease-and-desist order in an FCPA ad-
ministrative proceeding requires only that the SEC establish a likeli-
hood that respondent will violate federal securities laws, as opposed 
to the more stringent “reasonable likelihood” standard applicable to 
issuance of an injunction.68  It is no surprise that “the settled action is 
the SEC’s preferred technique in enforcement matters,”69 and during 
the period 2002–2014 the SEC’s settlement rate remained constant at 
about 98%.70 
While the raw numbers of administrative proceedings may over-
state the case, the SEC has undeniably shifted enforcement to its 
home court, and it has done so in areas it has designated as high pri-
ority for enforcement.71  The Division has almost unlimited discretion 
 
 64 Of the six insider trading cases filed by the SEC in the first half of fiscal year 2015, five 
settled on the same day they were filed, whereas only five of the eleven cases commenced 
in federal court during the same period settled on the same day.  Gilley et al., supra note 
2.  Similarly, all of the FCPA cases commenced by the SEC as administrative proceedings 
in 2013, 2014, and the first half of 2015 settled on the same day they were filed.  Id. 
 65 Stephen Choi et al., supra note 6, at 5. 
 66 COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, supra note 45. 
 67 See Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19 (“For settled matters, we often, but not always, choose 
to file in an administrative forum, largely because of efficiency.”). 
 68 Yannett et al., supra note 42, at 3–5. 
 69 Cox, supra note 24, at 6.  See also U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets 
Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 24 (“Historically, the overwhelming majority of SEC 
enforcement actions have been settled prior to filing.”). 
 70 Priyah Kaul, Note, Admit or Deny: A Call for Reform of the SEC’s “Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny”  Poli-
cy, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM  535, 536 (2015). 
 71 But cf. Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: 
An Empirical Assessment 1 (NYU Ctr. For Law, Econ. and Org., Working Paper No. 16-10, 
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737105 (“[I]t does appear 
that the SEC is using administrative proceedings to expand its enforcement efforts 
against public companies.  Post-Dodd Frank, the SEC has shifted toward costlier-to-
prosecute actions that may reflect weaker and/or less salient cases relative to pre-Dodd 
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to choose where to litigate a case, subject to approval by the Commis-
sion.72  No provision of Dodd-Frank, the federal securities laws, or the 
SEC’s Rules of Practice identifies the circumstances in which the SEC 
“must, should or may select one forum or the other.”73  How does the 
SEC exercise its discretion?  Prior to 2015 the SEC provided few pub-
lic clues about its choice of venue.  In May 2015 the Division provided 
the first formal guidance when its staff issued a four-page memoran-
dum that outlines the Division’s approach to forum selection in con-
tested matters.74 
The widely criticized memorandum, which was not issued by the 
Commission and thus does not represent Commission-level policy,75 
identifies four broad factors that the Division may consider in decid-
ing whether to pursue an enforcement action in federal district court 
or as an administrative proceeding before an SEC ALJ.  The four fac-
tors are: (1) the “availability of the desired claims, legal theories, and 
forms of relief in each forum”; (2) whether “any charged party is a 
registered entity or an individual associated with a registered entity”; 
(3) the “cost-, resource-, and time-effectiveness of litigation in each 
forum”; and (4) the “fair, consistent, and effective resolution of secu-
rities law issues and matters.”76 
For multiple reasons the 2015 memorandum is of limited guid-
ance to parties seeking clarity about the choice of forum.  The Divi-
 
Frank administrative proceedings.”). See also Shaswat Das & Samuel Wolff, The Trump Ad-
ministration’s Impact on Financial Regulation, LAW360 (Nov. 23, 2016, 9:58 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/865105/the-trump-administration-s-impact-on-financial-
regulation (speculating that use of SEC administrative enforcement will decline during 
the Trump presidency). 
 72 Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 27 (noting that “there is no rigid formula dictating the 
choice of appropriate forum” and that the Division “recommends a choice of forum in 
each case but the Division’s recommendations are in all cases subject to review and ap-
proval by the Commission”). 
 73 Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Constitutional Challenges to SEC Administrative Pro-
ceedings, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=
1202722840733/Constitutional-Challenges-to-SEC-Administrative-Proceedings?slreturn=
20150827215456.  Accord Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 2016) (observing that 
the choice of forum “belongs to the SEC without express statutory constraint”). 
 74 SEC, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO FORUM 
SELECTION IN CONTESTED ACTIONS (May 8, 2015) [hereinafter, SEC Approach], 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-approach-forum-selection-
contested-actions.pdf.  The SEC’s guidance does not apply in settled enforcement ac-
tions.  Randall J. Fons, Administrative Proceedings vs. Federal Court: The SEC Provides Limited 
Transparency into Its Choice of Forum, MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP 1 n.1 (May 11, 2015), 
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2015/05/150511SECChoiceofForum
.pdf. 
 75 Cox, supra note 24, at 4. 
 76 SEC Approach, supra note 74. 
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sion has indicated that the foregoing factors are not exhaustive, some 
or all of them may be considered in a particular instance, and a single 
factor may be dispositive.77  Accordingly, the document establishes no 
fundamental limitations on the SEC’s exercise of discretion.78  Profes-
sor Joseph Grundfest noted the plasticity of the four factors and con-
cluded that “the Commission could, as a practical matter, bring many 
cases in either the administrative or federal forum while citing the 
same four factors as support for its decision.”79 
The memorandum has sparked some controversy on additional 
grounds.  The fourth factor, which refers to the Commission’s “ex-
pertise” in securities matters,80 is a clear allusion to the SEC’s expecta-
tion that its rulings interpreting the federal securities laws are enti-
tled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.81  The Supreme Court held in Chevron that courts must 
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes,82 
and the post-Dodd-Frank SEC intends to take full advantage of Chev-
ron by commencing enforcement actions as administrative proceed-
ings which result in in-house rulings interpreting the federal securi-
ties laws.  Public statements by the Division’s Director have confirmed 
this intention.83 
 
 77 See Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 27 (explaining the new guidance); Thomas A. 
Hanusik, What’s Missing from the SEC’s Forum Selection Guidance, LAW360 (May 21, 2015, 
10:34 AM), http://www.crowell.com/files/Whats-Missing-From-The-SECs-Forum-
Selection-Guidance.pdf (describing the factors as non-exhaustive, non-mandatory, and 
un-weighted); Cox, supra note 24, at 9 (“[T]he listing of some factors doesn’t exclude 
other factors which aren’t listed.  So the actual factors that matter most in your case 
might not appear in this guidance at all.”). 
 78 See, e.g., LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, Client Alert: SEC Enforcement Division Issues Guidance on 
Venue Selection, (May 18, 2015),  https://www.lw.com/thoughtleadership/lw-sec-guidance-
choice-of-venue (“The Division’s Guidance does not appear to constrain meaningfully the 
scope of the Division’s discretion in seeking—or the full Commission’s prerogative in de-
ciding upon—a particular venue.”); Fons, supra note 74, at 1 (“The guidance, however, 
ultimately provides the Division with virtually complete discretion in choosing the playing 
field that will be most advantageous to its case and to its view of the ‘proper development 
of the law.’”); Thomas O. Gorman, SEC Publishes a Memo on Forum Selection, SEC ACTIONS 
(May 10, 2015, 7:48 PM), http://www.secactions.com/sec-publishes-a-memo-on-forum-
selection/ (“[T]his memorandum misses the mark.  It offers virtually no insight into what 
can only be viewed as a ‘black box’ process used by the agency to make these critical deci-
sions.”). 
 79 Joseph A. Grundfest, Fair or Foul?  SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for Reform 
Through Removal Legislation,  13–14 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 
212, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2695258. 
 80 SEC Approach, supra note 74. 
 81 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 82 Id. at 842–43. 
 83 See, e.g., Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 27 (“If a contested matter is likely to raise unset-
tled and complex legal issues under the federal securities laws, or interpretation of the 
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B.  The CFTC Follows the Leader 
The narrative of the CFTC’s use of administrative proceedings dif-
fers in important respects from that of the SEC.  From its inception in 
the mid-1970s to 1992, the CFTC was authorized to impose civil pen-
alties for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”)84 
through administrative proceedings and to commence proceedings 
in federal court to enjoin violations.85  But it was not until the CEA 
was amended by the Futures Trading Practices Act of 199286 and fed-
eral courts were authorized to impose civil penalties87 that the CFTC 
had an effective choice of forum.  Historically, the CFTC was signifi-
cantly more likely to choose an administrative forum than a federal 
one.  During the 1990s, for example, the CFTC filed more adminis-
trative actions than district court actions every year, with the annual 
percentage ranging between 55 and 80% of the CFTC’s filings.88  
Thereafter, the CFTC abandoned the use of contested administrative 
proceedings.  Prior to 2016, the last contested enforcement case filed 
before a CFTC ALJ was in 2001.89  In late 2014 the CFTC reversed 
course again when it announced its intent to follow the SEC’s lead 
and move a portion of its contested enforcement docket in-house.90 
What factors explain the CFTC’s shifting strategy?  The CFTC’s 
Division of Enforcement (“CFTC Division”) has never publicly ex-
plained why it abandoned contested administrative proceedings in 
 
Commission’s rules, it may make sense to file the case as an administrative proceeding so 
a Commission decision on the issue, subject to appellate review in the federal courts, may 
facilitate development of the law.”).  See also William F. Johnson, Is it Time to Reconsider 
“Chevron” Deference for SEC Proceedings?, N.Y.  L.J. (July 2, 2015) (“The SEC has made clear 
that in certain cases it specifically chooses an administrative forum to influence the de-
velopment of the law.”). 
 84 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1992). 
 85 Dan M. Berkovitz, The Resurrection of CFTC Administrative Enforcement Proceedings: Efficient 
Justice or a Biased Forum?, 35 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 2, 5–7 (Mar. 2015), 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/D
ocuments/the-resurrection-of-cftc-administrative-enforcement-proceedings.pdf. 
 86 Pub. L. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992). 
 87 Id. at § 221. 
 88 Geoffrey F. Aronow, Back to the Future: The Use of Administrative Proceedings for Enforcement at 
the CFTC and SEC, 35 FUTURES AND DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1–2 (Jan./Feb. 2015),  
http://www.sidley.com/~/media/publications/fdlr_aa_aronow.pdf. 
 89 Berkovitz, supra note 85. 
 90 See Hoover, supra note 7 (“CFTC Enforcement Director Aitan Goelman said the agency 
will ‘very soon’ follow the SEC’s shift to litigating enforcement actions in-house . . . .”); 
Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Cash-Strapped CFTC Faces Troubled Return to Admin Court, LAW360 
(Nov. 14, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/595182/cash-strapped-cftc-
faces-troubled-return-to-admin-court (reporting that the CFTC would soon bring en-
forcement actions in administrative forum). 
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2001, but it is widely believed that its almost decade-long losing streak 
before one of its own ALJs prompted it to throw in the towel.91  The 
CFTC’s late-2014 announcement that it plans to resume administra-
tive enforcement appears to be primarily a function of the agency’s 
limited resources.  While Dodd-Frank greatly expanded the CFTC’s 
responsibilities, Congress has failed to provide the agency with the re-
sources it requires to fulfill its mandate.92  In 2015 the CFTC Division 
had fewer staff than it did in 2002, when the agency’s responsibilities 
did not include over-the-counter foreign currency transactions or the 
$400 trillion93 swaps market.94  The CFTC’s enforcement staff and 
budget are both much smaller than their counterparts at the SEC—
even though the futures, options, and swaps markets regulated by the 
CFTC are much larger than the securities market regulated by the 
SEC95—and the CFTC’s budget remained flat for fiscal year 2016.96 
 
 91 Todd Mullins & Chris McEachran, Adjudication of FERC Enforcement Cases: “See You in 
Court?”, 36 ENERGY L.J. 261, 289 (2015) (“The CFTC did not have the best success rate be-
fore its administrative courts, and has not brought an enforcement action administrative-
ly in over ten years . . . .”); Berkovitz, supra note 85; Ben James, Outgoing CFTC Judge Blasts 
Colleague, Alleges Bias, LAW360 (Oct. 15, 2010, 6:54 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/201915/outgoing-cftc-judge-blasts-colleague-alleges-bias (recounting prior report 
that in nearly 180 cases during an eight-year period, CFTC ALJ Bruce Levine ruled 
against investors every time, except in a handful of cases in which defunct firms default-
ed). 
 92 See, e.g., Sharon Bowen, Commissioner, CFTC, Speech Before the Futures Industry Asso-
ciation Expo 2014 (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
opabowen-1 (“[T]he Commission continues to face a crisis that has lasted for years: 
chronic under-funding compared to the scope of its mission. . . . Our budget is insuffi-
cient, and the Commission and staff consistently have to make difficult choices about how 
to allocate scarce resources amongst our many regulatory priorities.”); Ed Beeson, CFTC’s 
Paltry Budget Spurs Quick End to Forex Probe, LAW360 (Nov. 12, 2014, 7:30 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/595407/cftc-s-paltry-budget-spurs-quick-end-to-forex-
probe (reporting that the budget crunch at the CFTC helped force the agency’s hand in 
quickly settling with five banks concerning the manipulation of foreign currency ex-
change rates). 
 93 Timothy G. Massad, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Testimony Before 
U.S. Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition & Forestry (May 14, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-22 (stating that the U.S. swaps market ex-
ceeds $400 trillion, measured by notional amount). 
 94 Sung-Hee Suh & Amanda Jawad, The ABCs of CFTC Enforcement Actions, 46 BLOOMBERG 
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1447 (Jul. 28, 2014) (explaining the scope of CFTC jurisdiction); 
Paul M. Architzel et al., CFTC Enforcement Alert: 2014 CFTC Enforcement Year-in-Review, and a 
Look Forward, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP (Feb. 10, 2015), 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/
WH_Publications/Client_Alert_PDfs/2014-cftc-enforcement-year-in-review.pdf. 
 95 See Zach Brez & Jon Daniels, The New Financial Sheriff: CFTC Anti-Fraud Authority After Dodd-
Frank, 44 BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1209 (2012) (“The CFTC has received on-
ly a fraction of the resources that have been provided to the SEC.”). 
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This unresolved resource issue helps explain the low level of en-
forcement activity at the CFTC97—during the period 2000–2013 the 
agency initiated a mere fifty-seven enforcement actions per year on 
average,98 and in fiscal year 2015 the number increased only to sixty-
nine.99  The resource deficit also is driving the CFTC’s enforcement 
shift.  The CFTC’s Division Director has stated that the overwhelming 
reason for the move to administrative enforcement is the agency’s 
lack of resources and “bandwidth for discovery-intense litigation.”100  
Administrative enforcement typically is much cheaper for an agency 
than federal litigation.101  But it is quite likely that the CFTC also has 
been encouraged by the SEC’s excellent track record on its home 
court.102 
More than a decade after the CFTC abandoned contested admin-
istrative enforcement it also ceased to employ ALJs.  The agency last 
employed an ALJ in 2012.103  The CFTC has stated that when it re-
sumes in-house enforcement it will use ALJs borrowed from other 
agencies.104  Initially, it appeared likely that the CFTC would borrow 
ALJs from the SEC, at least in part because those judges are familiar 
with the fraud standard provided to the CFTC in Dodd-Frank—a 
standard very similar to the one used in SEC enforcement proceed-
 
 96 Daniel Siegel, CFTC Chair Slams Congress for Denying Budget Bump, LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2015, 
8:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/740471/cftc-chair-slams-congress-for-denying-
budget-bump. 
 97 See, e.g., John Kennedy, Slim CFTC Staffing Delays Enforcement Reviews, Report Says, LAW360 
(Aug. 17, 2015, 9:43 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/691617/slim-cftc-staffing-
delays-enforcement-reviews-report-says (reporting that inadequate staffing has hampered 
CFTC enforcement reviews of derivatives exchanges). 
 98 Gregory S. Kaufman & Lillian A. Forero, Return to Normal?  Dodd-Frank Authority Has Not 
Resulted in More Enforcement Actions . . . Yet!, 47 BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 605 
(Mar. 23, 2015). 
 99 Ed Beeson, CFTC Enforcement Earns New Stripe After Besting SEC Haul, LAW360 (Nov. 6, 
2015, 10:43 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/724227/cftc-enforcement-earns-new-
stripe-after-besting-sec-haul. 
100 Hoover, supra note 7; Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Cash-Strapped CFTC Faces Troubled Return to 
Admin Court, LAW360 (Nov. 14, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
595182/cash-strapped-cftc-faces-troubled-return-to-admin-court. 
101 Jean Eaglesham, CFTC Turns Toward Administrative Judges, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2014, 5:49 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-turns-toward-administrative-judges-1415573398. 
102 Kaufman & Forero, supra note 98 (“How could the CFTC not be attracted to a process 
that has seen the SEC win 219 decisions before its ALJs?”). 
103 See Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Cash-Strapped CFTC Faces Troubled Return to Admin Court, 
LAW360 (Nov. 14, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/595182/cash-
strapped-cftc-faces-troubled-return-to-admin-court (noting that, unlike in the 1990s, the 
CFTC no longer employs ALJs). 
104 Id.  (“[T]he CFTC will be ‘renting’ or ‘borrowing’ ALJs from other agencies that have 
‘extra bandwidth.’”). 
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ings.105  The CFTC would not have been the only federal agency to 
borrow SEC ALJs.  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”)—another product of Dodd-Frank—has the option of 
commencing enforcement actions in state or federal court or as ad-
ministrative proceedings before an ALJ,106 but it has no ALJs of its 
own and thus it has borrowed from the SEC.107 
However, by late 2015 the CFTC was stymied.  It had not been 
able to borrow SEC ALJs, as a collateral consequence of constitution-
al attacks on the SEC’s enforcement program, and thus the CFTC 
had not resumed administrative proceedings.108  The situation re-
mains static in 2016. 
C.  Home Court Advantage? 
The SEC has enjoyed its home court advantage.  It has been con-
siderably more successful in administrative proceedings than in fed-
eral court.  During the period October 2010 to September 2015, the 
SEC prevailed against 86% of respondents in contested cases in ad-
ministrative proceedings,109 whereas it had a much lower success rate 
of 70% in federal court during the same period.110  The SEC’s in-
 
105 Kaufman & Forero, supra note 98; Zach Brez & Jon Daniels, The New Financial Sheriff: 
CFTC Anti-Fraud Authority After Dodd-Frank, 44 BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1209 
(June 18, 2012), (“The Dodd-Frank Act significantly strengthened the CFTC’s authority 
to prohibit fraudulent and manipulative behavior by adopting an approach similar to 
Rule 10b-5.”). 
106 LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, Client Alert White Paper No. 1782: CFPB Enforcement by the Numbers 
(Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-cfpb-enforcement-by-
numbers. 
107 Jon Eisenberg, We’ve Only Just Begun—Lessons from the CFPB’s First 35 Enforcement Cases, 
K&L GATES, LLP (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.klgates.com/weve-only-just-begun-lessons-
from-the-cfpbs-first-35-enforcement-cases-03-05-2014/  (“[T]he CFPB will request the SEC 
to assign one of the three SEC administrative law judges to preside over the CFPB admin-
istrative proceeding.”). 
108 Ed Beeson, CFTC Enforcement Chief Bemoans Lack of In-House Judges, LAW360 (Oct. 16, 2015, 
8:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/715444/cftc-enforcement-chief-bemoans-
lack-of-in-house-judges (“‘It became much more difficult to source ALJs from other agen-
cies because [of] all the sturm und drang around the SEC’s program . . . .’”) (quoting Ai-
tan Goelman, Director of Enforcement, CFTC). 
109 Eaglesham, supra note 8.  But cf. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Judges are Finding Against Agency 
More Often Lately, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2015, 9:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-
judges-are-finding-more-often-for-agency-lately-1448243785 (reporting that the SEC’s suc-
cess rate in APs declined in 2015 to 67%, with some cases still undecided); Joshua M. 
Newville & Samantha Springer, Who Wins in Administrative Proceedings?, NAT’L L. REV. 
(Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/who-wins-sec-administrative-
proceedings (“Our analysis of ALJ opinions from October 2014 through the present re-
veals the SEC had only an 81% win rate in contested ALJ matters, while it prevailed in 
91% of federal court trials over the same period.”). 
110 Eaglesham, supra note 8. 
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house success rate is not purely a recent phenomenon—the SEC pre-
vailed in fifty-eight out of sixty-two administrative proceedings con-
ducted during the period 1983–1988.111  The recent statistics concern-
ing appeals also are glaring.  As noted, the first level of appeal in an 
SEC administrative proceeding is to the SEC Commissioners.  They 
found in the agency’s favor in 95% of appeals during the period Oc-
tober 2010 to March 2015.112 
The raw statistics set forth above overstate the case, in a couple of 
respects.  First, the SEC records as a trial victory any case in which it 
secures a finding of liability on any claim against any respondent, 
even if it fails to secure such a finding with regard to the majority of 
claims.113  Second, many of the SEC’s victories occur in such routine 
matters as delisting proceedings.114  In calendar year 2014, SEC ALJs 
issued 183 initial decisions, 119 of which terminated the registration 
of public companies for failure to file periodic reports.  The SEC pre-
vailed in all 119 of these APs,115 which means that 65% of the SEC’s 
success rate in 2014 APs is attributable to its success in routine delist-
ing actions. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is undeniable that the SEC en-
joys considerably more success on its home court than it does in fed-
eral court.116  The same cannot be said of the CFTC.  As noted, since 
the early 2000s the CFTC has filed all of its contested enforcement 
cases in federal court, and one common explanation is that the 
Commission had become discouraged by its long losing streak in 
 
111 Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Report of Task Force on the SEC Administrative Law Judge Process, 
47 BUS. LAW. 1731, 1734 (1992) [hereinafter, Task Force Report]. 
112 Eaglesham, supra note 11.  See also Adam M. Wolper & Heidi VonderHeide, The SEC’s In-
creased Use of Administrative Proceedings in Enforcement Actions: Background, Controversies, and 
Future Outlook, 17 J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 17, 19 (2016) (“ALJ findings against re-
spondents who appeal to the Commission are rarely reversed; in fact, respondents are far 
more likely to see their sanctions or penalties increased on appeal, rather than reduced.”).  
But cf. Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19, at 3 (“I would challenge anyone to identify a case in 
which an ALJ erroneously ruled for us where the Commission did not reverse the deci-
sion.”). 
113 See Ceresney Keynote Speech, supra note 27; Davison et al., supra note 20, at 104 n.4.  See also 
Jean Eaglesham, Senior SEC Official Calls Claims of Advantage at In-House Tribunal ‘Garbage,’ 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2016, 5:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/senior-sec-official-
calls-claims-of-advantage-at-in-house-tribunal-garbage-1455922322 (noting that in many 
in-house cases that are not dismissed, the SEC fails to obtain all of the remedies that it 
seeks). 
114 Davison et al., supra note 20, at 104. 
115 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, 
at 13. 
116 See Aronow, supra note 88 (“[I]t would be hard to deny that, generally speaking, there is a 
significant ‘home-court advantage’ to the administrative route.”). 
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front of one of its own ALJs.117  Additional evidence suggests that the 
CFTC has not enjoyed home court success.  A 1995 study by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office found that the CFTC ruled on forty-eight ap-
peals of ALJ enforcement decisions during the period 1989–1993, 
modified sanctions in almost 40% of those cases, and reduced sanc-
tions in almost 80% of the cases in which modifications occurred.118  
Finally, one review of the CFTC’s handling of complex market ma-
nipulation cases in the 1970s and 1980s found that the record does 
not support the view that the agency enjoys any home court ad-
vantage when bringing such cases.119 
D.  SEC and CFTC Procedures 
In order to understand the constitutional arguments concerning 
the use of administrative proceedings by the SEC and CFTC it is es-
sential to first understand the process used by those two agencies.  
The next part of this Article examines the administrative process.  As 
will be seen, the agencies enjoy a number of procedural advantages.  
The SEC uses its superior position as leverage during settlement dis-
cussions with potential respondents.120 
1.  SEC 
SEC administrative proceedings are governed by the SEC’s Rules 
of Practice (“SEC RoP”),121 which prior to 2016 had not been amend-
ed since 2006122—four years before Dodd-Frank greatly expanded the 
 
117  See text accompanying notes 88–91 supra. 
118 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFF., ADMIN. LAW JUDGES: COMPARISON OF SEC AND CFTC 
PROGRAMS 29, Report No. GGD-96-27 (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter, GAO Report], 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/221858.pdf. 
119 Berkovitz, supra note 85, at 8. 
120 See, e.g., Peter Hardy, Abe Rein & Carolyn Kendall, SEC ALJs: An Enforcement Fast-Track is 
Hitting the Constitutional Skids, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2015/08/sec-aljs-an-
enforcement-fast-track-is-hitting-the-constitutional-skids.html (“Anecdotal reports also 
strongly suggest that the SEC has invoked its perceived advantages before ALJs during set-
tlement negotiations with potential respondents.”); Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Ceresney De-
fends In-House Courts to Skeptical Lawmakers, LAW360 (Mar. 19, 2015, 3:47 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/631232/ceresney-defends-in-house-courts-to-skeptical-
lawmakers (“[T]he SEC has threatened defendants with administrative proceedings be-
fore settling.”). 
121 Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  The SEC RoP are codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 
201.100 et seq. (2006). 
122 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Adoption of Amendments to the Rules of Prac-
tice and Related Provisions and Delegations of the Authority of the Commission, Release 
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SEC’s authority to use an administrative forum.  Neither the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”)123 nor the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence (“FRE”)124 apply. 
The SEC administrative procedures outlined below governed APs 
initiated on or before September 27, 2016. Amendments to the SEC 
RoP took effect the next day, and they made incremental changes to 
the process, as described in Part IV.D below. The SEC commences an 
administrative proceeding with an Order Instituting Proceedings 
(“OIP”), which contains the Division’s allegations against the re-
spondent(s) and serves as the charging document.  A respondent has 
thirty days from service of the OIP to file an answer. 
There is no provision in the SEC’s RoP for making a motion to 
dismiss, asserting a counterclaim, or moving for summary judgment.  
The closest analogue to a summary judgment is a motion for sum-
mary disposition under Rule 250(b).125  Either side may make such a 
motion, but in general the facts alleged in the pleadings of the party 
against whom the motion is made “shall be taken as true”126 and the 
comment to Rule 250 suggests that summary disposition prior to 
hearing would rarely be appropriate.127  The SEC disfavors summary 
disposition even where the sole question presented is legal, rather 
than factual.128  In practice, respondents’ motions are very rarely 
granted.129  Summary disposition in favor of the Division is often 
granted in uncontested proceedings or in a follow-on action by the 
Division seeking such relief as an industry bar, after a respondent has 
already been enjoined or convicted.130  Apart from a Rule 250 motion, 
 
Nos. 34-52846, File No. S7-05-05 (Nov. 29, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-
52846.pdf (indicating effective date of Jan. 4, 2006). 
123 Davison et al., supra note 20, at 109 (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply 
in SEC administrative hearings.”). 
124 Id. at 110 (“The Federal Rules of Evidence also do not apply in SEC administrative hear-
ings.”). 
125 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.250(b) (2016). 
126 Id. at § 201.250. 
127 SEC Rules of Practice, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,767, 32,768, cmt. (June 23, 1995) (codified as 17 
C.F.R. 201.250). 
128 DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(12). 
129 Theodore B. Olson,  Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Amendments to the Com-
mission’s Rules of Practice, 14, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP (Dec. 4, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-8.pdf (noting that since 1995 ALJs have 
granted only a handful of motions for summary disposition filed by respondents); Luke 
T. Cadigan, Litigating an SEC Administrative Proceeding, 58 BOSTON BAR J., Winter 2014, 
http://bostonbarjournal.com/2014/01/07/litigating-an-sec-administrative-proceeding/ 
130 Cadigan, supra note 129. 
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there is very little other motion practice in SEC administrative pro-
ceedings.131 
The SEC RoP provide that an administrative proceeding can be 
heard by the Commission or by a hearing officer duly designated by 
the Commission.132  In virtually all cases the OIP specifies that the case 
is assigned to an SEC ALJ.133  There is no right to a jury trial.134  The 
2003 amendments to the SEC RoP require the OIP to state whether 
the SEC ALJ has 120, 210, or 300 days from the OIP service date in 
which to complete his or her initial decision.  There are no other op-
tions.  The selection of one of the three options is based on the “na-
ture, complexity, and urgency of the subject matter.”135  The majority 
of contested SEC administrative proceedings are sufficiently complex 
to warrant the 300-day timeline.136  When that timeline does apply, 
the ALJ is required by the SEC RoP to schedule the hearing for a date 
approximately four months from service of the OIP.  If the timeline is 
210 days then the hearing must be scheduled for a date approximate-
ly two and a half months from service of the OIP, and if it is 120 days 
then the hearing must occur within approximately one month from 
service.137 
There is very limited discovery during an SEC administrative pro-
ceeding.  In general, neither interrogatories nor discovery deposi-
tions are allowed.138  This is true even in complex cases where the Di-
vision may have conducted dozens of on-the-record examinations of 
 
131 Id. (“[M]ost motions are disfavored or not even permitted . . . .”).  One exception is that a 
respondent may file a motion for a more definite statement with an answer.  SEC Rules of 
Practice, 17 C.F.R. 201.220(d) (2016). 
132 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. 201.100 (2016) (specifying procedures when an ALJ has 
been selected as the hearing officer). 
133 DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(1). 
134 Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1298 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
135 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. 201.360(a)(2) (2016). 
136 Cadigan, supra note 129.  One review found that the SEC has largely reserved the 120-day 
track for proceedings designed to suspend or revoke the registration of stock where the 
issuer had failed to file annual or periodic reports, whereas the 210-day track has been 
utilized by the SEC for follow-on APs to sanction brokers or investment advisers previous-
ly found liable for securities laws violations.  See Christian J. Mixter, Defending an SEC Ad-
ministrative Proceeding, ALI-ABA BUSINESS L. COURSE MATERIALS J. 51, 53 (June 2008), 
http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep/articles/CMJ0806-
Mixter_thumb.pdf. 
137 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. 201.360(a)(2) (2016). 
138 DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(6) (2014); SEC Rules of Practice, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 32,738, 32,765, cmt. (June 23, 1995) (codified as 17 C.F.R. § 201.233) (depositions 
“are not allowed for purposes of discovery”).  Rule 221(c) of the SEC RoP, which con-
cerns subjects to be discussed at the prehearing conference, suggests the possibility that 
written interrogatories could be authorized, but this is not a matter of right.  U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 59 n.74. 
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fact witnesses before the OIP was filed.  Depositions upon oral or 
written examination may be allowed after the OIP has been filed if a 
party believes the witness will be unable to attend or testify at the 
hearing,139 but the ALJ retains discretion to deny such requests.  ALJs 
seldom allow depositions.140 
The scope of permissible discovery is primarily defined by Rule 
230(d), which requires the Division to commence turning over its in-
vestigative files to respondents within seven days of service of the 
OIP.141  The Division may withhold four categories of documents, in-
cluding documents protected by a privilege or by the attorney work 
product doctrine and documents disclosing the identities of confi-
dential sources.142  Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland,143 which the SEC has 
chosen to apply in administrative proceedings, the Division may not 
withhold documents containing material exculpatory evidence.  In 
addition, Rule 232 provides for the pre-hearing production of docu-
ments pursuant to subpoena.144  A party may serve subpoenas for 
documents on anyone, including a third-party or the SEC.  The SEC 
RoP require issuance unless the subpoena is “unreasonable, oppres-
sive, excessive in scope, or unduly burdensome,”145 but in practice 
ALJs often decline to issue subpoenas or choose to significantly nar-
row their scope.146 
As noted, the FRE do not apply to SEC administrative proceed-
ings.  The FRE serve as a general guide for the admission of evi-
dence,147 but SEC ALJs are expected to admit all evidence which “can 
conceivably throw any light upon the controversy.”148  Hearsay is ad-
 
139 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.233 (2016). 
140 Arthur F. Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC Administrative Enforcement Proceedings, 29 
CATH. U. L. REV. 215, 253 (1980). 
141 SEC Rules of Practice, 60 C.F.R. §201.230(d) (2016). 
142 Id. at § 201.230(b); SEC Rules of Practice, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,738, 32,762, cmt. (b), (1995). 
143 373 U.S. 83, 91 (1963). 
144 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.232 (2016). 
145 Id. 
146 See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 
26, at 20 (“[T]he rigorous deadlines for completion of a proceeding often result in ALJ 
reluctance to delay a hearing by approving the issuance of subpoenas.”); Ryan S. Stippich, 
Constitutional and Strategic Considerations Regarding SEC Enforcement Actions Following Dodd-
Frank, ASPATORE (Apr. 2016), 2016 WL 2989433, at *6 (“[S]ubpoenas are often limited 
strictly to information limited by the allegations in the charging document.  It is common 
for ALJs to limit the scope of document subpoenas on their own accord, even without ob-
jection by the Division or the subpoenaed party.”).  But see DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 
22, at § 19.04(10) (describing issuance of subpoenas by SEC ALJs as “liberal”). 
147 GAO Report, supra note 118, at 19. 
148 Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (citations and quotations omit-
ted), vacated on other grounds, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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missible and can provide the basis for a finding that a securities viola-
tion has occurred.149  ALJs are required to exclude all evidence that is 
“irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious,”150 but this restriction 
has no practical significance—ALJs “tend to admit the vast majority of 
evidence offered by the parties,”151 with most evidentiary battles con-
cerning credibility and weight, rather than admissibility.152 
The ALJ issues the initial decision on the merits and the requested 
relief approximately two months after post-hearing briefing is com-
pleted.153  Any party may appeal the initial decision.  The first level of 
appeal is to the SEC itself,154 and this is known formally as a petition 
for Commission review.  The Commission has the discretion to de-
cline to grant most petitions for review,155 but apparently it has never 
denied a timely petition.156  Alternatively, it can decide sua sponte to 
review an initial decision even if no party seeks review.157  There is no 
statutorily prescribed standard for Commission review of ALJ deci-
sions.158  In practice, the Commission conducts a de novo review of 
both conclusions of law and findings of fact159 and may accept or hear 
additional evidence.160  Because the review is de novo the Commission 
may make its own credibility determinations.161  In short, under the 
APA, the SEC is omnipotent when it comes to ALJ decisions.162  The 
ALJ’s initial decision becomes final if no appeal has been filed, the 
 
149 See, e.g., Guy P. Riodan, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-9085, 34-61153, 97 SEC Docket 
1337, 1348 (Dec. 11, 2009); Scott Epstein, Exchange Release No. 34-59328, 95 SEC Dock-
et 285, 295 (Jan. 30, 2009). 
150 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (2016). 
151 Davison et al., supra note 20, at 110. 
152 Id. 
153 Cadigan, supra note 129. 
154 See Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explaining the SEC AP process). 
155 SEC Rules of Practice § 201.411(b)(2) (2016) (stating that the Commission may decline 
all petitions for review other than those listed in § 201.411(b)(1)). 
156 See Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15006, Securities Exchange Act 
Rel. No. 75837, at 30 (Sept. 3, 2015), pet. denied, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-
1345, 2016 WL 4191191 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016)  (“[W]e are unaware of any cases which 
the Commission has not granted a timely petition for review.”). 
157 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.410, 201.411(c) (2016). 
158 GAO Report, supra note 118, at 20. 
159 DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.06(2). 
160 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.411(a), 201.452 (2016). 
161 Davison et al., supra note 20, at 112.  However, the SEC will accept the ALJ’s credibility 
finding, absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary.  Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 
146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1298 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
162 James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1191, 1225 (2006).  In practice, however, the Commission typically does not second-
guess credibility determinations by ALJs.  See, e.g., Robert Thomas Clawson, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-48143, 80 SEC Docket 1767, 1769 (July 9, 2003) (“We accept a fact find-
er’s credibility finding, absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary . . . .”). 
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Commission has not ordered review on its own initiative, and the 
Commission has issued an order of finality.163 
The Commission alone possesses the authority to issue a final or-
der.164  When review by the Commission does occur it is not unduly 
delayed.  For the six-month period ending March 31, 2016, the medi-
an age of initial decisions by ALJs was 385 days at the point of disposi-
tion by the Commission.165  This represented a slight improvement 
from the 399 days for the comparable period in 2015.166 
Any respondent may appeal an adverse final order by the Com-
mission to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
or for the circuit in which the respondent resides or has his or her 
principal place of business.167  An initial appeal to the Commission is 
a prerequisite to a subsequent judicial appeal.168  The Division cannot 
seek judicial review of an adverse ruling.169  On appeal, the findings of 
fact by the Commission are conclusive if supported by substantial evi-
dence.170  This means that the findings need only be supported by ev-
idence sufficient to support a reasonable fact-finder’s decision.171  
This is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.172  The 
standard is “extremely deferential,”173 requires an appellate court to 
uphold the Commission’s findings unless the evidence presented 
would compel a reasonable finder of fact to reach a contrary result,174 
 
163 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d)(2) (2016). 
164 Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bennett v. SEC, 151 F. Supp. 3d 632, 
641 (D. Md. 2015) (noting that the SEC alone possesses authority to issue a final order). 
165 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Report on Administrative Proceedings for the Period 
October 1, 2015 through March 31, 2016, Rel. No. 77733 (Apr. 27, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/special-studies/34-77733.pdf. 
166 Id. 
167 See Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 13 (stating that according to the Exchange Act, review may be 
sought in the D.C. circuit, or the circuit court where defendant either resides or has a 
principal place of business); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015); 15 U.S.C. § 
78y(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77i (2012). 
168 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.410(e) (2006). 
169 DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.06(1). 
170 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a) (2012); Montford & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 81 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). 
171 Birkelbach v. SEC, 751 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2014). 
172 Gebhart v. SEC, 595 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010). 
173 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Façade of SEC 
Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE (2013), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/11/Ryan__The-Equity-Fa%C3%A7ade-of-SEC-Disgorgement.pdf (describ-
ing appellate review  of SEC administrative enforcement as limited and deferential).  The 
appellate court’s review is slightly less deferential where the Commission has reached a 
conclusion contrary to that of the ALJ.  Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015). 
174 Gebhart, 595 F.3d at 1043. 
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and helps explain why successful appeals are rare.175  The Commis-
sion’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo176 and may be set aside 
only if they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law.177  The penalties imposed by the 
Commission also are reviewed under an abuse of discretion stand-
ard.178  The court of appeals has the option to remand for further fac-
tual development.179 
2.  CFTC 
The SEC’s RoP have served as a model for other federal agencies, 
including the CFPB,180 and they are similar to the CFTC’s Rules of 
Practice (“CFTC RoP”),181 which govern CFTC administrative pro-
ceedings and were last amended in 1998.182  CFTC APs begin with a 
complaint and notice of hearing, authorized by the CFTC Commis-
sioners on recommendation of the CFTC staff.183  The CFTC RoP 
permit depositions only if the prospective witness will be unable to at-
tend or testify at a hearing, the testimony is material, and it is neces-
sary to take the deposition in the interests of justice.184  Any party may 
apply to a CFTC ALJ for issuance of a subpoena requiring testimony 
 
175 Russell G. Ryan, The SEC as Prosecutor and Judge, WALL. ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-ryan-the-sec-as-prosecutor-and-judge-1407195362 
(“But appeals rarely succeed because the law requires courts to defer to the agency’s 
judgment, especially on disputed facts.”). 
176 Gebhart, 595 F.3d at 1040. 
177 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); Rapoport v. SEC, 682 F.3d 98, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2012); KPMG, 
LLP v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
178 World Trade Fin. Corp. v. SEC, 739 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2014). 
179 See, e.g., Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in the event that 
an appellate court finds the administrative record inadequate it always has an option of 
“remanding to the agency for further factual development”); John Doe, Inc. v. DEA, 484 
F.3d 561, 569–70 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that “where an insufficient administrative rec-
ord is crippling, a court of appeals always has the option of . . . remanding to the agency 
for further factual development”). 
180 The CFPB release adopting its Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings references 
the SEC RoP sixty-six times.  Jon Eisenberg, We’ve Only Just Begun—Lessons from the CFPB’s 
First 35 Enforcement Cases, K&L GATES LLP (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.klgates.com/weve-
only-just-begun-lessons-from-the-cfpbs-first-35-enforcement-cases-03-05-2014/. 
181 The CFTC RoP appear in 17 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-10.114 (2010).  The CFTC’s Rules relating to 
Investigations appear in 17 C.F.R. §§ 11.1-11.8 (2015). 
182 See 63 Fed. Reg. 55784 (CFTC Oct. 19, 1998) (indicating the amendments adopted in 
1998 were intended to facilitate communication and enhance other administrative duties 
of the CFTC). 
183 ALAN R. BROMBERG, LEWIS D. LOWENFELS & MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, 6 BROMBERG & 
LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD § 12:157 (2d ed. database updated Nov. 2014). 
184 17 C.F.R. § 10.44(a) (2015). 
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at hearing or the production of documents, but the CFTC lacks in-
dependent authority to enforce subpoenas.185 
The AP is conducted before an ALJ, with staff members (usually 
from the CFTC Division) acting as prosecutors.186  There is no jury.187  
Although the CFTC is not bound to follow the FRE, it looks to those 
rules for guidance in determining whether certain evidence is admis-
sible.188  Any party may appeal a final disposition by an ALJ.  The first 
level of appeal is to the CFTC Commissioners, who determine sanc-
tions de novo.189 
A further appeal may be taken to a federal court of appeals if the 
proceeding results in an order for the imposition of a civil penalty, 
the suspension of trading privileges, or the suspension or revocation 
of a registration.190  Pre-Dodd-Frank the standard of review for factual 
findings by the CFTC was whether they were supported by the weight 
of the evidence.  This standard, which was set forth in Section 6(c) of 
the CEA, was deleted when Congress amended 6(c) with Dodd-
Frank.191  Post-Dodd-Frank the standard of review is likely to be sup-
plied by the APA, which sets forth a substantial evidence standard.192  
The standard of review for legal questions is plenary,193 subject to 
Chevron deference for those questions within the CFTC’s area of ex-
pertise.194 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants have launched a broad array of constitutional attacks 
on the use by the SEC and CFTC of administrative proceedings.  Five 
of the primary areas of attack concern due process, equal protection, 
the Seventh Amendment, and two distinct aspects of Article II of the 
U.S. Constitution.  The multiple areas of attack are examined sepa-
rately below. 
 
185 Berkovitz, supra note 85. 
186 BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 183, at § 12:157. 
187 Id. 
188 Berkovitz, supra note 85, at 6. 
189 In re Grossfeld, CFTC No. 89-23, 1996 WL709219 at ¶26,921 (Dec. 10, 1996). 
190 7 U.S.C. § 9(11) (2012). 
191 Berkovitz, supra note 85. 
192 Id. 
193 See, e.g., Lehoczky v. CFTC, 125 F.3d 844, at *1 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Armstrong v. CFTC, 
12 F.3d 401, 403 (3d Cir. 1993). 
194 See, e.g., DiPlacido v. CFTC, 364 Fed. App’x 657, 661 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]here a question 
implicates Commission expertise, we defer to the Commission’s decision if it is reasona-
ble.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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A.  Due Process 
1.  Combination of Functions 
Due process arguments against the use of administrative proceed-
ings by the SEC have taken several forms.  One common form is that 
the vesting of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions 
in a single agency constitutes a due process violation.195  Criticism of 
the SEC’s combination of functions has been asserted for decades,196 
but the constitutional argument has no merit.  To begin, the combi-
nation of functions does not create a statutory violation.  The APA 
prohibits agency staff from combining prosecutorial and adjudicative 
functions in the same case, but it expressly exempts both the agency 
and agency members from this prohibition.197  The original rationale 
for this carve-out was that, in order to set agency-wide policy, agency 
governing bodies must be able to weigh in on both prosecutions and 
adjudications.198 
The absence of a statutory violation is mirrored by the absence of 
a constitutional violation.  Both the Supreme Court and federal ap-
pellate courts have repeatedly held that the vesting of multiple func-
tions in a single agency does not, without more, constitute a due pro-
cess violation.  The leading case is Withrow v. Larkin,199 decided in 
1975.  In Withrow the Supreme Court rejected a claim that a state 
agency’s power to investigate and adjudicate the same matter created 
a due process violation.  The Court stated: “The initial charge or de-
termination of probable cause and the ultimate adjudication have 
different bases and purposes.  The fact that the same agency makes 
them in tandem and that they relate to the same issues does not re-
sult in a procedural due process violation.”200  Withrow either strongly 
 
195 See Stephen Bainbridge, Should the SEC be Prosecutor, Judge, Jury, and Executioner?, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM, Oct. 21, 2014, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2014/10/should-the-sec-be-prosecutor-judge-jury-and-
executioner.html (suggesting that the combination of functions may constitute a due 
process violation).  See also John Falvey & Daniel Tyukody, Duka Will Slow, Not Stop, SEC’s 
In-House Court Trend, LAW360 (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/699283/
duka-will-slow-not-stop-sec-s-in-house-court-trend (“[D]efendants have complained that in 
its in-house courts, the SEC acts as prosecutor, judge, jury, and the first line of appellate 
review.”). 
196 See Walfish, supra note 10 (noting intermittent criticism for nearly seventy years). 
197 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012). 
198 Walfish, supra note 10. 
199 421 U.S 35, 36–37 (1975). 
200 Id. at 58.  See also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231, 1249 (1994) (“The post-New Deal Supreme Court has never seriously ques-
tioned the constitutionality of this combination of functions in agencies.”); Kevin M. 
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suggested or settled the permissibility of the APA-sanctioned multiple 
function regime under the U.S. Constitution.  In Blinder, Robinson & 
Co. v. SEC,201 the D.C. Circuit, citing Withrow, rejected a due process 
challenge to the SEC’s use of administrative proceedings.202 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is another federal agency 
which serves as an investigator, prosecutor, and judge.  Apart from 
requests for preliminary injunctions filed in federal district court to 
enjoin proposed mergers pending administrative adjudication,203 
most of the FTC’s cases are adjudicated by an FTC ALJ,204 whose find-
ings may be appealed to the five FTC Commissioners, who also au-
thorize investigations and the issuance of complaints.205  The FTC’s 
multiple roles have prompted criticism very similar to that which has 
been leveled against the SEC,206 but judicial challenges have failed.  In 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC,207 the Tenth Circuit rejected a due pro-
cess challenge to the FTC’s structure.  The court noted that Congress 
designed the FTC to combine the functions of investigator, prosecu-
tor, and judge and “the courts have uniformly held that this feature 
does not make out an infringement of the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.”208  The D.C. Circuit also has rejected a due pro-
cess challenge to the FTC’s multiple roles.209 
 
Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2397 (2011) (“The 
Court has consistently rejected challenges to combination of functions in federal admin-
istrative agencies as violating due process.”). 
201 837 F.2d 1099, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
202 Id. at 1104–07. 
203 See Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, The FTC: Court of the Star Chamber?, N.Y. L.J. (July 15, 
2008), https://www.skadden.com/insights/ftc-court-star-chamber (describing generally 
the merger challenge process). 
204 Bert Foer, The Fairness Debate in the U.S., at 2 (June 28, 2014),  
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/foer-presents-ascola-conference-warsaw). 
205 See, e.g., David A. Balto, The FTC at a Crossroads: Can it Be Both Prosecutor and Judge?, 28 (No. 
12) LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, 1, 1–3 (Aug. 23, 2013),  http://www.dcantitrustlaw.com/08-
23-13Balto_LB.pdf (“The FTC acts as both prosecutor and judge in administrative litiga-
tion. . . . [T]he FTC’s almost two decade history of always ruling in its own favor creates a 
strong impression of unfairness.”).  The FTC’s decisions can be appealed to the federal 
court of appeals.  Shepard Goldfein & James A. Keyte, Merger Review at FTC and Department 
of Justice, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/
publications/070121417Skadden.pdf. 
206 See, e.g., Nicole Durkin, Essay, Rates of Dismissal in FTC Competition Cases from 1950–2011 
and Integration of Decision Functions, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1684, 1686 (2013) (“One criti-
cism in particular has persisted throughout the years: that the FTC’s role as both prosecu-
tor and adjudicator compromises the fairness of its adjudicatory functions.”). 
207 Kennecott Cooper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 79 (10th Cir. 1972). 
208 Id. at 79. 
209 FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs., 404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“It is 
well settled that a combination of investigative and judicial functions within an agency 
does not violate due process.”); see also J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Federal Trade 
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Given the settled nature of this issue, it is unsurprising that the 
combination in a single administrative authority of rulemaking, en-
forcement, and adjudicative power is the most common regulatory 
scheme of the federal government.210  In short, the initial aspect of 
the due process attack on SEC administrative proceedings should fail.  
There are, however, other aspects.  Due process arguments have also 
been made concerning specific administrative procedures used by 
the SEC and CFTC in adjudications by the agencies. This Article next 
considers those arguments. 
2.  Limited Discovery 
One contentious aspect of the SEC RoP that has prompted due 
process arguments is the very narrow discovery allowed in SEC ad-
ministrative proceedings.  The Administrative Conference of the 
United States (“ACUS”), an independent federal agency established 
in 1968 and dedicated to improving the agency process,211 has advo-
cated for broader discovery in SEC administrative proceedings for 
more than forty years212 but the SEC has vigorously resisted.213 
There are a number of key points regarding the discovery argu-
ment, which cut in different directions.  First, it is well established 
that there is no constitutional right to discovery depositions—or any 
other pretrial discovery—in administrative proceedings.214  Second, 
 
Commission, Remarks Before the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum, 
Three Questions About Part Three: Administrative Proceedings at the FTC 12 n.34 (Nov. 8, 2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/three-questions-
about-part-three-administrative-proceedings-ftc/121108fallforum.pdf (“The federal appel-
late courts have likewise repeatedly recognized that, by functioning in a quasi-
prosecutorial, quasi-judicial dual role, the FTC does not violate litigants’ procedural due 
process.”). 
210 See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1991) 
(noting predominance of this regulatory scheme).  See also William Scherman, John 
Shepherd & Jason Fleischer, The New FERC Enforcement: Due Process Issues in the Post-EPACT 
2005 Enforcement Cases, 31 ENERGY L.J. 55, 70 (2010) (noting that the Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission “is the prosecutor, judge, and jury”). 
211 See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, About the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States (ACUS), https://www.acus.gov/about-administrative-
conference-united-states-acus (explaining mission of the ACUS). 
212 Mathews, supra note 140, at 250–51, 251 n.162. 
213 See Peter J. Henning, New Criticism Over the S.E.C.’s Use of In-House Judges, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (July 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/business/dealbook/
new-criticism-over-the-secs-use-of-in-house-judges.html?_r=0 (quoting Andrew Ceresney, 
Director, SEC Enforcement Division, for the proposition that expanded discovery in SEC 
APs “would significantly weaken the commission’s ability to protect investors through 
strong and effective enforcement of the federal securities laws”). 
214 Kelly v. EPA, 203 F.3d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2000); Myers v. Norfolk Livestock Mkt., 696 F.2d 
555, 557 (8th Cir. 1982); Sims v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 662 F.2d 668, 671–72 (10th Cir. 
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limited discovery is not unique to SEC administrative enforcement.  
The APA, which is applicable to all federal administrative agencies, 
contains no provision for pretrial discovery in the administrative pro-
cess.215  The result is that discovery is generally denied by agencies in 
federal administrative proceedings.216 
Third, the SEC RoP’s restrictions on discovery apply equally to all 
parties to SEC proceedings.  Both respondents and the SEC are gen-
erally unable to pursue discovery once the OIP has been filed, and a 
feasible outcome is that the SEC will be saddled with a seriously in-
complete investigative record.217  Conversely, before the OIP has been 
filed, the SEC has enjoyed the luxury of conducting unilateral discov-
ery for months or even years during the course of its investigation.218  
The luxury is not theoretical.  Approximately 40% of the SEC’s cases 
are filed more than two years after the agency begins an investiga-
tion219 and during those years the SEC—aided by an expansive sub-
poena power220—is able to take sworn testimony from dozens of wit-
nesses and collect millions of documents.221  This aspect of the 
 
1981); Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 549 F.2d 28, 33 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
215 Kelly, 203 F.3d at 523.   
216 See, e.g., William J. Scherman, Brandon C. Johnson & Jason J. Fleischer, The FERC Enforce-
ment Process: Time for Structural Due Process and Substantive Reforms, 35 ENERGY L.J. 101, 118 
(2014) (under rules of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the “subjects of investiga-
tions have no discovery rights at all”). 
217 Davison et al., supra note 20, at 108 (“[O]nce the OIP is filed, the Enforcement Division 
trial lawyers face the same constraints; to the extent they discover holes in their case after 
the OIP is filed, they too are limited in their efforts to fill them.”); see also SHEARMAN & 
STERLING, LLP, Securities Enforcement 2014 Year-End Review, Jan. 2015, at 1, 4  
http://www.shearman.com/en/newsinsights/publications/2015/01/securities-
enforcement-2014-year-end-review (noting that absence of discovery in SEC APs may 
“equally impact both sides”). 
218 See Bromberg et al., supra note 183, at  § 12.55 (“The SEC staff has had the benefit of dis-
covery through its extensive investigative powers.”); see also Falvey & Tyukody, supra note 
195, at 2, 4 (“[T]he SEC will often have developed its investigative record, including ex-
tensive witness testimony, over a period of years.”). 
219 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, 
at 39 (“This statistic likely understates the length of a typical investigation.”). 
220 See Adam L. Sisitsky, Fear is Not Sufficient Grounds to Duck SEC Subpoena, LAW360 (Sept. 3, 
2015, 10:57 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/698673/fear-is-not-sufficient-grounds-
to-duck-sec-subpoena (“[T]here are few restrictions on the SEC’s subpoena power.”). 
221 See Stippich, supra note 146, at 5 (“[T]he Division will, in most cases, collect tens or hun-
dreds of gigabytes of data comprising millions of pages of documents.”); see also Richard 
Foster, Comment Letter from the Financial Services Roundtable regarding the SEC’s 
Rules of Practice, to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, Dec. 
4, 2015, at 4 https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815.shtml (“In the course of an 
investigation, the Division frequently collects millions of pages of electronic documents 
spanning many years from multiple parties.”); and Gretchen Morgenson, Crying Foul on 
Plans to Expand the S.E.C.’s In-House Court System, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), 
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discovery process may be most objectionable to respondents.  One 
review noted: “The lack of pre-hearing discovery adversely affects the 
respondent rather than the SEC staff. . . . In effect, the staff is able to 
conduct its pre-hearing discovery before beginning the proceed-
ing.”222 
Fourth, the SEC has supported the propriety of narrow discovery 
in administrative proceedings by comparing the process to criminal 
cases.  Whereas the prosecutor has the benefit of grand jury discov-
ery, strictly limited discovery is available to criminal defendants.223  
The SEC is factually correct but its analogy is flawed.  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is no general constitu-
tional right to discovery in criminal cases.224  Depositions are allowed 
in such cases but they are not intended as discovery devices.225  Rule 
15(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the 
court to grant a motion for a deposition only to preserve for use at 
trial the testimony of a prospective witness,226 and this is the same iso-
lated scenario in which depositions are allowed by the SEC RoP.  
However, the SEC’s analogy is undercut because criminal defend-
ants enjoy certain protections unavailable to respondents in SEC en-
forcement actions—in particular, no adverse inference can be drawn 
from the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination,227 the government has the burden of proving its case 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/business/secs-in-house-justice-raises-
questions.html?_r=0  (noting recent AP in which the SEC’s investigation lasted five years 
and the agency collected 2.4 million pages of documents and took sworn testimony from 
nineteen witnesses). 
222 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, 
at 15. Accord Adam M. Wolper & Heidi VonderHeide, The SEC’s Increased Use of Administra-
tive Proceedings in Enforcement Actions: Background, Controversies, and Future Outlook, 17 J. INV. 
COMPLIANCE 17, 19 (2016) (“By the time the OIP is filed, the SEC has its case virtually 
complete.”). 
223 See, e.g., Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19, at 5 (“The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
allow for depositions only in ‘exceptional circumstances,’ which is similar to what the 
Commission’s Rules of Practice allow.  If that approach is acceptable when someone’s lib-
erty is on the line, then it is hard to see how due process requires more for respondents 
in administrative proceedings.”). 
224 See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general constitu-
tional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.”). 
225 In re Application of Eisenberg, 654 F.2d 1107, 1113 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981). 
226 FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(1).  To demonstrate that exceptional circumstances necessitate a 
Rule 15 deposition, the party seeking the deposition must show the materiality of the tes-
timony and the unavailability of the witness to testify at trial.  United States v. Kelley, 36 
F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
227 See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (permitting adverse inference to 
be drawn in civil action); LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“[W]hile the Fifth Amendment precludes drawing adverse inferences against defendants 
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beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendants have the right to a jury 
trial.228 
Fifth, the discovery problem is compounded because the SEC of-
ten makes broad assertions of both the work product doctrine229 and 
the deliberative process privilege,230 and those assertions are typically 
upheld.231  The Division discloses as part of the investigative file only 
transcribed testimony232 and invokes the work product doctrine to jus-
tify non-disclosure of its staff notes of informal witness interviews.233  
The SEC invokes the deliberative process privilege—the most fre-
quently invoked governmental privilege234—to justify non-disclosure 
of a range of pre-decisional and deliberative documents concerning 
 
in criminal cases, it does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions 
when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.”) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
228 Kenneth B. Winer & Laura S. Kwaterski, Assessing SEC Power in Administrative Proceedings, 
LAW360 (Mar. 24, 2011, 1:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/233299/assessing-
sec-power-in-administrative-proceedings. 
229 Randall R. Lee & Timothy C. Perry, A “Cop on the Beat”?: Why the SEC Should Adopt the Brady 
Standard, 83 U.S.L.W. 1097 (Jan. 27, 2015) (“[T]he SEC asserts a work product protection 
that is, as a practical matter, broader than what even a criminal prosecutor can claim.”). 
230 See WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP, Securities Litigation and Enforcement 
(Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Edito
rial/Publications/WH_Publications/Client_Alert_PDfs/Securities-Litigation-Enforce
ment-Update.pdf. (“[T]he SEC often invokes privilege—particularly deliberative process 
privilege—as a complete bar to discovery of its internal documents.”). 
231 See, e.g., Lee & Perry, supra note 229 (noting that courts “have generally supported the 
SEC’s assertion of work product protection”).  But see SEC v. Kovzan, No. 11-2017-JWL, 
2012 WL 4819011, at *6 (D. Kan. Oct. 10, 2012) (rejecting the SEC’s blanket assertion of 
deliberative process privilege); SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 415–17 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same); Jonathan Tuttle, How to Level the Playing Field in SEC Civil Actions, 
LAW360 (Jan. 8, 2013, 12:34 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/403848/how-to-level-
the-playing-field-in-sec-civil-actions (“The rejection [in Kovzan] of the SEC’s overly broad 
and oft-asserted claims of deliberative process and work product privileges should give 
those facing SEC civil actions some comfort that there are potential ways to ensure a level 
playing field and to discover the factual bases for the SEC’s asserted claims.”). 
232 Barry R. Goldsmith, SEC Proposed Amendments to Rules for Administrative Proceedings, HARV. 
LAW SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Oct. 15, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2015/10/15/sec-proposes-amendments-to-rules-for-administrative-proceedings/; Why the 
SEC’s Proposed Changes to its Rules of Practice are Woefully Inadequate—Part II, SEC. DIARY 
(Nov. 5, 2015), http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/11/05/why-the-secs-proposed-changes-
to-its-rules-of-practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-ii/ (“The SEC staff is rarely required 
to provide access to its non-transcribed interviews . . . .”). 
233 Davison et al., supra note 20, at 107; SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(b) (2016). 
234 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Government’s Increasing Reliance on—and Abuse of—the Delibera-
tive Process Evidentiary Privilege: “[T]he Last Will be First”, 83 MISS. L.J. 509, 512 (2014) (“In 
the short period of its existence, the deliberative process doctrine has become the most 
frequently invoked governmental privilege.”). 
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agency policies.235  An off-setting factor is that SEC ALJs may be will-
ing to grant respondents’ requests that the SEC produce relevant ma-
terials that are outside the investigative file.236 
A sixth key point concerns Brady.  The SEC often attempts to de-
flect the due process argument by noting that when it discloses to re-
spondents material exculpatory evidence under Brady the Division 
provides more expansive discovery in administrative proceedings 
than it does in federal court.237  In Brady the Supreme Court held that 
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused violates due process where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or punishment.238  The Supreme Court has never considered 
whether Brady should apply to the government in civil cases.239  A few 
lower courts have held that Brady does apply civilly,240 but the SEC 
does not impose Brady obligations on its staff in civil cases.  The SEC 
does impose such obligations in administrative proceedings,241 as does 
the CFTC,242 even though most other federal agencies do not243 and 
courts have held that due process does not require application of 
 
235 See Michael N. Kennedy, Comment, Escaping the Fishbowl: A Proposal to Fortify the Deliberative 
Process Privilege, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1772–73 (2005) (identifying elements of the privi-
lege). 
236 See, e.g., Harding Advisory, LLC, Admin. Proc. Rulings Rel. No. 1256, 2014 SEC LEXIS 
636 at *6 (Feb. 24, 2014) (granting in part respondents’ requests for documents outside 
the SEC’s investigative file). 
237 See, e.g., Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19, at 5 (“We also have affirmative Brady obligations 
to disclose material, exculpatory information and Jencks Act obligations to turn over 
statements of our witnesses—neither of which apply in our district court proceedings.”); 
Dennis K. Berman, Mary Jo White Explains the New SEC Rules, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2015, 
7:28 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/mary-jo-white-explains-the-new-sec-rules-
1448302777 (quoting SEC Chairman Mary Jo White for proposition that whereas SEC 
must turn over Jencks and Brady material in APs, there is no similar requirement in fed-
eral district court). 
238 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  Brady was extended ten years later by Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), which held that Brady requires prosecutors to 
disclose evidence affecting the credibility of witnesses. 
239 United States ex rel. Redacted v. Redacted, 209 F.R.D. 475, 481 (D. Utah 2001) (collecting 
cases). 
240 See Brodie v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 951 F. Supp. 2d 108, 118 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(“With only three exceptions . . . courts uniformly have declined to apply Brady in civil 
cases.”). 
241 17 C.F.R. § 201.230 (2014). 
242 See, e.g., In re First Guar. Metals Co., CFTC No. 79-55, 1980 WL 15696, at *9 (July 2, 1980) 
(adopting Brady rule by decision of CFTC ALJ). 
243 See Justin Goetz, Note, Hold Fast the Keys to the Kingdom: Federal Administrative Agencies and 
the Need for Brady Disclosure, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1424, 1431 (2011) (“[M]ost agencies do not 
include the [Brady] rule in their procedures for formal adjudication.”). 
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Brady in APs.244  Pursuant to Rule 231(a)245 the SEC also makes availa-
ble documents that could be used to impeach a trial witness, in ac-
cord with the principles of the Jencks Act,246 even though the Jencks 
Act applies only to discovery in criminal cases.247 
The SEC’s Brady argument has superficial appeal.  By applying 
Brady in their administrative proceedings the SEC and CFTC provide 
more expansive disclosure than do many other agencies.  The FTC, 
for example, has declined to apply Brady in its administrative pro-
ceedings.248  Similarly, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) 
and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), whose 
proceedings are treated as the equivalent of administrative agency ac-
tion, have chosen not to apply Brady.249  Indeed, a recent survey found 
that the SEC and CFTC are two of only five federal agencies that have 
adopted Brady.250 
Nevertheless, the SEC’s argument ultimately is unconvincing.  
First, the Division and defense counsel may have widely divergent 
views of what constitutes Brady material, with the possible result that 
some or even much material exculpatory evidence is withheld.251  The 
experience of the few other federal agencies that have adopted the 
case suggests that this is a common problem.  A recent review of the 
adoption of Brady by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
 
244 See, e.g., NLRB v. Nueva Eng’g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 969 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e find Brady 
inapposite and hold that the ALJ properly denied Nueva’s demand for exculpatory mate-
rials.”). 
245 17 C.F.R. § 201.231 (2016). 
246 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012).  The Jencks Act is a statute that applies in criminal proceedings, 
but “the SEC has imported its basic principles to administrative proceedings.”  DORFMAN 
& WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(6) n.34.  Cf. Silverman v. CFTC, 549 F.2d 28, 34 (7th 
Cir. 1977) (holding that Jencks Act does not apply to CFTC AP). 
247 Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 486 (5th Cir. 1962). 
248 Amrep Corp., 102 F.T.C. 1362, 1371 (1983). 
249 See, e.g., Mister Disc. Stockbrokers, Inc. v. SEC, 768 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding 
no right to exculpatory evidence in proceedings of National Association of Securities 
Dealers, which was predecessor to FINRA); NLRB v. Nueva Eng’g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 969 
(4th Cir. 1985) (holding the Brady rule inapplicable to NLRB proceedings); Zandford v. 
Nat’l Ass’n Sec. Dealers, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 n.12 (D.D.C. 1998) (“NASD procedures do 
not require the disclosure of exculpatory evidence.”). 
250 See Goetz, supra note 243, at 1425 n.11 (identifying the SEC, CFTC, Federal Maritime 
Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission). 
251 See Why the SEC’s Proposed Changes to its Rules of Practice are Woefully Inadequate—Part IV, SEC. 
DIARY (Dec. 3, 2015), http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/12/04/why-the-secs-proposed-
changes-to-its-rules-of-practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-iv/ (“[T]he SEC staff’s de-
termination of what is Brady and Jencks material is notoriously narrow.  In the staff’s view, 
if a document does not itself say that the respondent is innocent, it is not exculpatory—
which leaves out many documents that  are building blocks in proving the respondent’s 
innocence . . . .”). 
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(“FERC”) found that FERC enforcement staff “routinely fails to pro-
duce exculpatory documents, either in response to general requests 
for Brady materials or in response to requests for particular categories 
of documents.”252  Second, the SEC has adopted a relaxed form of the 
Brady rule.  As applied in criminal cases, Brady requires that prosecu-
tors disclose exculpatory or potentially exculpatory materials known 
to them and it imposes an affirmative duty on prosecutors to search 
for such evidence in their own files.253  But whereas SEC RoP 
230(b)(2) prohibits the Division from withholding documents that 
contain material exculpatory evidence, the rule does not impose an 
affirmative duty to identify or disclose such evidence.254 
Overall, while the major arguments concerning limited discovery 
in SEC (and CFTC) APs cut in different directions, the bottom line is 
that such limitations are not unconstitutional but they are unfair.  
Possibly the most salient issue is that whereas before the OIP has 
been filed the SEC has enjoyed the luxury of conducting unilateral 
discovery for many months during the course of its investigation, a 
reciprocal opportunity is unavailable to respondents.  This seems 
fundamentally unfair, especially when considered in conjunction with 
the SEC’s AP timeline. 
3.  Compressed Timeline 
A common argument is that the strict timeline for completion of 
an SEC administrative proceeding denies due process to respond-
ents.255  The specific point is that the Division often commences an 
 
252 William S. Scherman, Brandon C. Johnson & Jason J. Fleischer, The FERC Enforcement Pro-
cess: Time for Structural Due Process and Substantive Reforms, 35 ENERGY L.J. 101, 117 (2014).  
Accord William Scherman & Jason Fleischer, 2014 FERC Enforcement Year in Review, LAW360 
(Dec. 22, 2014, 11:52 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/605676/2014-ferc-
enforcement-year-in-review (noting that FERC “has a poor, virtually nonexistent, record 
of producing exculpatory information to the subjects of investigations.”).  See also Todd 
Mullins & McEachran, supra note 91, at 279 (observing that when FERC staff produces 
documents that arguably constitute Brady material, it does so too late in the investigative 
process for subjects of investigation to effectively use the material).  But see Allison Mur-
phy, Todd Hettenbach & Thomas Olson, The FERC Enforcement Process, 35 ENERGY L.J. 283, 
308–09 (2014) (“It is not uncommon for counsel representing investigative subjects to 
characterize many categories of information as Brady material when, in fact, such infor-
mation does not fall within the Brady doctrine and counsel are attempting to use 
[FERC’s] policy as a discovery device.”). 
253 United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
254 Goetz, supra note 243, at 1436–37.  But cf. Mixter, supra note 136, at 57 (“Nevertheless, 
Rule 230(b)(2) is treated in practice as granting full-fledged Brady rights.”). 
255  See, e.g., Dearlove v. SEC, 573 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (rejecting due process claim); 
Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 426–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting due process claim that 
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enforcement proceeding after it has spent years investigating the facts 
and collecting documents, whereas respondents have only a few short 
months after the OIP is filed to review potentially millions of pages of 
documents.256  In fiscal year 2015 the mean time between the com-
mencement by the SEC of an investigation and the commencement 
of an enforcement action was twenty-four months.257  And as noted, 
under the commonly used 300-day timeline, the hearing must be 
scheduled for a date approximately four months from service of the 
OIP.  Extensions may be granted, but the SEC has adopted an explic-
it policy of strongly disfavoring extensions, postponements, or ad-
journments.258 
Several points are key.  First, the D.C. Circuit has examined and 
rejected the due process argument concerning the SEC’s compressed 
time frame.  In Dearlove v. SEC259 the court rejected a claim, asserted 
by an accountant debarred from practice before the SEC, that he was 
denied due process because (a) he had only four months in which to 
review a massive record compiled by the Commission during several 
years of investigation and (b) his request for a sixty-day postpone-
ment of his administrative hearing had been denied.260 
Second, it is inaccurate to state that respondents in SEC adminis-
trative proceedings have only the few months between the filing of an 
OIP and the date of the hearing in which to review relevant docu-
ments and ascertain the relevant facts.  Respondents do not receive 
their first inkling of an enforcement action with the filing of an OIP.  
Rather, first notice usually is received during the Wells submission 
process,261 which has been described as the SEC’s “central due process 
mechanism in enforcement matters.”262  For more than forty years the 
SEC has had a policy requiring, in most cases, that Division staff con-
 
SEC dumped 22 million documents on respondents in a 300-day case), aff’d, No. 15-461, 
2016 WL 7036830 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2016). 
256 See Aronow, supra note 88, at 4 (“While the staff has often taken years, the defendants sel-
dom have more than months to prepare.”). 
257 Jonathan N. Eisenberg, 13 Observations About the SEC’s Enforcement Program, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOV. AND FIN. REG. (Apr. 18, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/
04/18/13-observations-about-the-secs-enforcement-program/.  See also Choi & Pritchard, 
supra note 71, at 14 (“[M]ost investigations will last more than a year, and several years is 
not uncommon.”). 
258 17 C.F.R. § 201.161 (2016). 
259 573 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
260 Id. at 807. 
261 DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(1). 
262 Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Security 
Traders Ass’n of New York 71st Annual Conference (Apr. 19, 2007), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch041907psa.htm. 
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ducting an investigation give notice to prospective defendants of the 
staff’s plan to recommend that they be sued and of the potential 
charges.263  The so-called Wells notice, which typically is cursory,264 al-
so advises prospective defendants of their opportunity to respond by 
making a written Wells submission to tell their side of the story and 
argue against charges or for a reduction of charges before the SEC 
decides whether to commence an adjudicative proceeding.265  The 
Wells process also provides for the discretionary disclosure to the sub-
jects of an investigation of non-privileged portions of the Division 
staff’s investigative file.266 
In addition to disclosures made during the Wells process, Division 
staff will usually notify prospective respondents when the SEC has au-
thorized the OIP filing and the initiation of settlement discussions.267  
The Wells process and this advance notice can expand the actual 
time frame that respondents in SEC APs have for reviewing key evi-
dence, if the SEC shares such evidence during the Wells process.  In 
any event, respondents may already be familiar with much of the crit-
ical evidence, especially in the form of testimony from their own em-
ployees provided to the SEC during the pre-filing investigation.268 
 
263 Marc J. Fagel, Reassessing the SEC Wells Submission, 47 REV. SEC. & COMMOD. REG.  17, 17 
(2014). 
264 Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Law360’s SEC Survival Guide: The Wells Notice and Beyond, LAW360 
(July 31, 2014, 7:26 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/561108/law360-s-sec-survival-
guide-the-wells-notice-and-beyond. 
265 Jean Eaglesham, SEC Drops 20% of Probes After ‘Wells Notice,’ WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2013, 8:02 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304500404579125633137423664; 
see also Joshua A. Naftalis, Note, “Wells Submissions” to the SEC as Offers of Settlement Under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and Their Protection from Third-Party Discovery, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1912, 1913 (2002) (“Prospective defendants use . . . ‘Wells Submissions’ . . . after the 
conclusion of a staff investigation but before the [SEC] brings formal charges.”). 
266 OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, SEC DIV. OF ENF’T, Enforcement Manual, at 21 (June 4, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf (“On a case-by-case ba-
sis, the staff has discretion to allow the recipient of the notice to review portions of the in-
vestigative file that are not privileged.”). 
267 See DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, § 19.04(1) (explaining that prospective respondent 
will ordinarily receive advance notice of OIP). 
268 Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19 (“[I]n many cases respondents know full well what the im-
portant evidence is, either because they produced it to us themselves, because it was tes-
timony from their own employees or someone else to whom they have access before the 
hearing, or because we have shared it with them in testimony or in the course of Wells 
discussions.”); see also Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Ceresney Rebuts Rakoff’s Critique Of SEC Ad-
min. Actions, LAW 360 (Nov. 7, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/594489/
ceresney-rebuts-rakoff-s-critique-of-sec-admin-actions (citing Ceresney for the proposi-
tions that “the SEC’s evidence in administrative proceedings often comes from the de-
fense,” and that “[b]y the time defendants get to trial, ‘they know almost exactly what our 
case is going to be . . . .’”). 
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The same is true with regard to the CFTC.  The CFTC has infor-
mal procedures269 for providing notice of charges that are very similar 
in substance, but not identical, to the SEC’s Wells process.270  Histori-
cally, the CFTC Division viewed its Wells process as discretionary,271 
but in recent years that view has changed so now prospective CFTC 
respondents can more safely assume that Wells notice will be provid-
ed to them.272 
The SEC and CFTC Wells processes, and advance notice of filings, 
can help moderate the harsh effect of the compressed AP timelines, 
but they fail to solve the problem.  First, the expanded window in 
which to learn the relevant facts has an upper limit of six months, be-
cause Dodd-Frank requires an enforcement action to be brought, if at 
all, within 180 days after submission of a written Wells notice to a pro-
spective defendant.273  Second, the disclosure by the SEC staff of the 
non-privileged portions of its investigative file is entirely discretion-
 
269 In 1986 the CFTC rejected a petition to adopt a rule that would have assured parties un-
der investigation of the right to make Wells submissions.  Charles R. Mills & Benjamin J. 
Oxley, Comparing the “Wells Processes” of the SEC, CFTC, and FERC: Is There Room for Improve-
ment?, A.B.A. COMM. ON REG. OF FUTURES & DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS (Jan. 31-Feb. 2, 
2008), at 9 n.26, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/business_law/
2008/1/derivatives/enforcement-developments-200801.authcheckdam.pdf. 
270 The CFTC’s “Wells process” is outlined in Informal Procedures Relating to the Recom-
mendation of Enforcement Proceedings, 17 C.F.R., pt. 11, app. A (2016). 
271 See Mills & Oxley, supra note 269, at 9 (“[T]he CFTC Wells process has suffered in a 
number of cases from a seeming aversion of the Enforcement staff to identify and share 
the evidentiary basis for and legal theories that support a contemplated enforcement rec-
ommendation.”). 
272 See Deborah Heilizer, Gregory Kaufman & Jae Yoon, The CFTC Flexes its Enforcement Mus-
cles: Some Tips for Handling CFTC Administrative Proceedings, BLOOMBERG L. REPS. (Jan. 9, 
2012), http://www.sutherland.com/portalresource/lookup/poid/Z1tOl9NPluKPtDNIqL
MRV56Pab6TfzcRXncKbDtRr9tObDdEv0JEo0!/fileUpload.name=/Heilizer%20-%20
Bloomberg%20Securities%20Law%2001.09.2012.pdf (indicating that CFTC’s Division of 
Enforcement did not make Wells notices available to prospective respondents as a matter 
of course); Amanda Jawad & Sung-Hee Su, The ABC’s of CFTC Enforcement Actions, 46 
BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1447, 1447 n.2 (July 28, 2014) (noting that histori-
cally CFTC Wells notices have not always been provided as a matter of course). 
273 MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, 25 SEC. PRAC. FED. & STATE ENFORCEMENT § 3.56 
(database updated Sept. 2015).  However, the Division may obtain one or more exten-
sions of the six-month period if an investigation is sufficiently complex.  15 U.S.C. § 78d-
5(a)(2) (2012).  Another relevant factor is that increasingly the Division makes greater 
use of voluntary “white paper” submissions by defense counsel which frequently focus on 
specific factual or legal questions that are significant to the investigation.  See Ronald S. 
Betman & Scott M. Ahmad, Understanding and Navigating the Use of Pre-Wells Notice White 
Papers in Formal SEC Investigations, 2014 BANKING L.J. 444, 446–47 (discussing differences 
between white papers and Wells submissions).  The Division does not treat white papers 
as subject to the 180-day time limit for commencing proceedings after submission of a 
written Wells notice, a document which is not defined in either Dodd-Frank or the feder-
al securities laws.  U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitive-
ness, supra note 26, at 22. 
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ary, and the informal CFTC Wells process does not provide for any 
disclosure.  The SEC Enforcement Manual identifies three factors to 
guide the exercise of discretion: (1) whether access would be produc-
tive for assessing the strength of evidence, (2) whether the person has 
been cooperative in providing evidence, and (3) the stage of the in-
vestigation, with respect to testimony from other witnesses or the 
pendency of criminal investigations or prosecutions.274  Some evi-
dence suggests a recent trend by SEC staff to deny requests for access 
to the investigative file.275  Third, while SEC staff typically provides de-
fense counsel with advance notice of the date when settled actions will 
be filed, “[t]here is no comparable presumption for filing litigated 
actions.”276 
4.  Evidence Rules 
Another due process argument is that process is denied because 
the FRE do not apply in SEC administrative proceedings.  This argu-
ment is unpersuasive for multiple reasons.  First, the SEC is not 
unique in this regard—the FRE generally do not apply to federal ad-
ministrative proceedings.277  Second, agencies enjoy no specific ad-
vantage simply because the FRE are inapplicable.  No party to an SEC 
administrative proceeding has an inherent advantage regarding the 
admission or exclusion of evidence, and the SEC’s evidentiary mo-
tions are often denied.278  As noted, the SEC RoP permit the admis-
sion of hearsay, and such evidence can furnish the basis for finding a 
violation of securities law.  Critics of SEC administrative enforcement 
highlight this fact.279  The use of hearsay evidence has a long history 
 
274 OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, SEC DIV. OF ENF’T, supra note 266, at 22. 
275 See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 
26, at 24 (“[T]he trend in recent years has been away from providing access.”). 
276 Id. 
277 See, e.g., William Scherman, John Shepherd & Jason Fleischer, The New FERC Enforcement: 
Due Process Issues in the Post-EPACT 2005 Enforcement Cases, 31 ENERGY L.J. 55, 69 (2010) 
(“It has long been the case at the FERC that the [FRE] do not apply . . . .”). 
278 See, e.g., Thomas C. Gonnella, Admin. Proc. Rulings Release No. 1579, 2014 SEC LEXIS 
2349, at *5–6 (July 2, 2014) (denying SEC’s motion to exclude testimony of character 
witnesses). 
279 See, e.g., Joel M. Cohen, Mary Kay Dunning & Darcy Harris, SEC Plans to Play Insider-
Trading Cases on Home Court, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 16, 2014 (“[E]vidence deemed too unrelia-
ble to be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence—most notably hearsay evi-
dence—is admissible in administrative proceedings.  This, too, plays unfairly to the SEC’s 
advantage.”); AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD, LLP, SDNY Judge Berman Enjoins SEC 
Administrative Proceeding as “Likely Unconstitutional,” Litigation Alert (Aug. 14, 2015), 
https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/sdny-judge-berman-enjoins-sec-
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in administrative proceedings, but this history began in an era when 
agencies—including the SEC—used APs for more limited, largely 
regulatory purposes.  Nevertheless, critics may be overstating the im-
pact of hearsay’s admissibility, because in practice SEC ALJs often 
conclude that hearsay statements are unreliable, especially where 
they lack traditional indicia of trustworthiness.280  CFTC ALJs also 
have required that hearsay statements be reliable.281  In any event, the 
less formal evidentiary practice in APs can operate to respondents’ 
advantage, by permitting the admission of helpful evidence that 
might have been excluded under the FRE.282 
In summary, federal courts have generally rejected due process 
challenges used by the SEC and CFTC in adjudications by the agen-
cies.283  These outcomes have been appropriate, for the reasons noted 
above.  But certain aspects of the process are fundamentally unfair.  
The next Part of this Article considers a different line of attack by re-
spondents—that the selective use of APs constitutes an equal protec-
tion violation. 
B.  Equal Protection 
A number of respondents in SEC administrative proceedings have 
alleged that they received uniquely unfavorable treatment compared 
with other similarly situated defendants who were sued by the SEC in 
federal court, rather than on the SEC’s home turf.284  This “class-of-
one” equal protection argument was first litigated by a defendant 
sued by the SEC in 2011 in Gupta v. SEC.285  The SEC had issued an 
OIP against Rajat K. Gupta, alleging that he had knowingly disclosed 
material, nonpublic information about Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 
 
administrative-proceeding-as.html (asserting that introduction of hearsay during SEC APs 
places respondents at a disadvantage). 
280 Davison et al., supra note 20, at 110.  But cf. Olson, supra note 129, at 10 (“[R]eliability is a 
‘malleable’ concept.  Practice and precedent suggest that ALJs will construe it loosely so 
that it will fail to offer meaningful protection.”). 
281 See, e.g., In re Abrams, CFTC No. 88-10, 1995 WL 455791, at *6–7 (July 31, 1995) (holding 
that evidence of trader’s activities was double hearsay and there was insufficient basis for 
establishing its reliability). 
282 See Aronow, supra note 88, at 4 (“The less formal, less rule-bound procedures of the ad-
ministrative hearing can often facilitate defendants’ efforts to introduce into evidence po-
tentially relevant information that might be more problematic under a strict application 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 
283 See, e.g., Berkovitz, supra note 85, at 8 (analyzing unsuccessful due process challenges to 
CFTC administrative proceedings). 
284 See, e.g., Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting equal protection and due 
process arguments raised by respondent). 
285 796 F. Supp. 2d 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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and Procter & Gamble Co.—on whose boards he served—to Raj Raja-
ratnam, the principal of Galleon Management, LP, who then traded 
on the basis of Gupta’s inside information.286  In the eighteen months 
prior to filing the OIP the SEC filed complaints in federal district 
court against twenty-one other individuals and seven entities accused 
of Galleon-related insider trading (many of whom were subject to di-
rect regulation by the SEC), using language substantially similar to 
the language in the OIP and seeking remedies similar to the relief it 
sought against Gupta.287  The Galleon scheme has been described as 
the largest-ever insider trading scheme.288 
Gupta sued the SEC in federal district court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  He al-
leged, inter alia, that the SEC’s decision to deprive him, alone, of the 
opportunity to contest the SEC’s insider trading allegations in federal 
court singled him out for uniquely unfavorable treatment in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.289  Gupta further alleged that the 
SEC’s administrative action deprived him of the procedural safe-
guards of federal court, including the right to a trial by jury.290 
The SEC moved to dismiss Gupta’s complaint, but Judge Jed 
Rakoff denied the motion,291 writing: “[W]e have the unusual case 
where there is already a well-developed public record of Gupta being 
treated substantially disparately from 28 essentially identical defend-
ants, with not even a hint from the SEC, even in their instant papers, 
as to why this should be so.”292 
 
286 Joan E. McKown, Administrative Proceeding against Rajat Gupta Marks a Turning Point in SEC 
Enforcement Actions, 5 BLOOMBERG L. REP. (2011).  The SEC could have pursued the ad-
ministrative action against Gupta even if its authority had not been expanded by Dodd-
Frank, because he was charged as someone associated with a regulated entity (Goldman 
Sachs).  Id. 
287 Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 506. 
288 See Lawrence J. Zweifach & Eric M. Creizman, Defending Parallel Proceedings: Basic Principles 
& Tactical Considerations, SEC. LITIG. REP., Feb. 2010, at 1, 3 (noting that prosecutors have 
deemed Galleon’s insider trading scheme the “largest-ever insider trading scheme”). 
289 Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 506–07. 
290 Id. at 507.         
291 Porter Wright, Gupta Complaint Against the SEC Survives Motion to Dismiss On Equal Protec-
tion Grounds, FED. SEC. L. SOURCE (July 12, 2011), http://www.fedseclaw.com/2011/07/
articles/sec-news/gupta-complaint-against-the-sec-survives-motion-to-dismiss-on-equal-
protection-grounds/. 
292 Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 514.  Prior to issuing his decision Judge Rakoff characterized 
the SEC’s disparate treatment of Gupta as “bizarre.”  Patricia Hurtado, Gupta Administra-
tive Action by SEC is “Bizarre,” Judge Says, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Mar. 16, 2011, 6:05 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-03-16/galleon-case-judge-calls-bizarre-
sec-decision-not-to-sue-insider-gupta. 
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The SEC did not seek reconsideration and—possibly fearing an 
adverse appellate ruling on the equal protection issue—did not seek 
certification to take an interlocutory appeal.  Understandably reluc-
tant to sit for depositions in Gupta’s federal action, the SEC instead 
opted to dismiss the administrative proceeding against Gupta, who in 
exchange agreed to dismiss his federal action against the agency.293  
Gupta was subsequently indicted on several counts of securities fraud.  
Gupta was convicted following a jury trial before Judge Rakoff in June 
2012, sentenced to twenty-four months in prison, fined $5 million, 
and ordered to pay restitution of $6.2 million.294  Gupta’s criminal 
conviction was affirmed on appeal295 and the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.296 
The day after Gupta was indicted, the SEC filed a civil complaint 
against Gupta and Rajaratnam in federal court, based on the same in-
sider trading scheme described in the indictment.  The SEC success-
fully moved for summary judgment against Gupta.  Judge Rakoff im-
posed a civil penalty of $13.9 million and granted a permanent 
injunction barring Gupta from serving as an officer or director of a 
public company, associating with brokers, dealers or investment advi-
sors, and further violating securities law.297  The Second Circuit af-
firmed298 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.299 
A number of defendants—probably emboldened by Judge 
Rakoff’s denial of the SEC’s motion to dismiss in Gupta—have since 
asserted similar equal protection claims based on class-of-one theo-
ries.300  These claims are defective, and denial of the SEC’s motion to 
dismiss in Gupta likely constituted a rare misstep by Judge Rakoff. 
The class-of-one doctrine provides that a plaintiff can assert an 
equal protection claim alleging discrimination against her in her in-
 
293 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, 
at 13–14. 
294 United States v. Gupta, 925 F. Supp. 2d 581, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); United States v. Gupta, 
904 F. Supp. 2d 349, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
295 United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111, 140 (2d Cir. 2014). 
296 Gupta v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1841 (2015).  Judge Rakoff subsequently denied a habe-
as corpus motion by Gupta to vacate his sentence and the judgment.  United States v. Gup-
ta, 111 F. Supp. 3d 557, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
297 SEC v. Gupta, No. 11 Civ. 7566 (JSR), 2013 WL 3784138, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013). 
298 SEC v. Gupta, 569 F. App’x 45 (2d Cir. 2014). 
299 SEC v. Gupta, 135 S. Ct. 976 (2015). 
300 See, e.g., Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing appellants’ class-of-one 
theory alleging that appellee’s decision to charge appellants in agency proceeding was 
motivated by animus); Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (remarking 
that plaintiffs do not purport to belong to a protected class but instead raise a class-of-one 
claim), aff’d, No. 15-461, 2016 WL 7036830 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2016). 
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dividual capacity, in contrast to the standard template in which a 
plaintiff alleges discrimination based on her group status—for exam-
ple, as a member of a particular racial group or as a member of the 
female sex.  The theory has been recognized, but not fully articulat-
ed, by the United States Supreme Court in two cases—Village of Wil-
lowbrook v. Olech301 (decided in 2000) and Engquist v. Oregon Department 
of Agriculture302 (decided in 2008).  In those cases the Court held that 
a class-of-one equal protection claim is cognizable where an individu-
al alleges that she has been “intentionally treated differently from 
others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the dif-
ference in treatment.”303 
The Seventh Circuit has noted that the law concerning class-of-
one equal protection claims “is in flux.”304  This is charitable.  The 
theory has also been described as a “doctrinal morass.”305  However, 
some aspects of the theory are clear.  In order to establish a class-of-
one equal protection violation, a plaintiff must first show that she was 
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated.306  Ap-
pellate courts have strictly construed this requirement by holding that 
plaintiff and her comparators must be “prima facie identical in all rel-
evant respects or directly comparable . . . in all material respects.”307  
Plaintiff also must show that there was no rational basis for the differ-
ential treatment.308  This second prong has generated confusion and 
conflicting opinions.  Some appellate panels have held that a plaintiff 
must show both that defendant acted irrationally and that defendant 
acted with illegitimate animus.309  Other appellate panels have held 
 
301 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam). 
302 553 U.S. 591 (2008). 
303 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). 
304 Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 888 (7th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
305 Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1043 
(10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Wil-
liam D. Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One/Failing Equal Protection, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
435, 441 (2013) (noting “extensive confusion in the lower courts” following Olech and 
Engquist, and concluding that “the Supreme Court continues to flunk the class-of-one”). 
306 See, e.g., Andy’s BP, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 605 F. App’x 617, 618 (9th Cir. 2015). 
307 United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Racine Charter One, 
Inc. v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2005)); accord Ruston v. 
Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clubside, Inc. 
v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006)) (“[C]lass-of-one plaintiffs must show an ex-
tremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they 
compare themselves.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
308 See, e.g., Andy’s BP, Inc., 605 F. App’x at 618. 
309 See Racine Charter One, Inc. v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677, 684 (7th Cir. 
2005) (citing collected Seventh Circuit cases requiring proof of illegitimate animus).  
Other circuits also have concluded that animus or impermissible motive is an element of 
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that plaintiff must prove that the differential treatment was either ir-
rational or motivated by illegitimate animus.310 
Notwithstanding the doctrinal confusion, the theory can be dis-
cussed with reference to Gupta.  Gupta probably was intentionally 
treated differently from others similarly situated.  Specifically, he was 
treated differently from the other twenty-eight individuals and enti-
ties accused of Galleon-related insider trading who were sued by the 
SEC in federal court.  These other defendants probably were directly 
comparable in all material respects.  But Gupta’s claim still was defec-
tive, and the SEC’s motion to dismiss should have been granted, for 
the reasons explained below. 
In Engquist, the Supreme Court noted that the class-of-one theory 
is a poor fit when the challenged governmental action is the product 
of a broadly discretionary decision-making process.311 The Court re-
fused to apply the theory to claims concerning public employment 
decisions.312 
The Supreme Court’s holding was limited to the employment 
context,313 but numerous courts have since extended Engquist by un-
derscoring that class-of-one claims are an especially poor fit in crimi-
nal justice cases involving the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, pa-
role board determinations, and police officers’ decisions to cite or 
arrest particular individuals.314  For example, in United States v. 
Moore,315 the Seventh Circuit noted that an exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion cannot be successfully challenged on the ground that it is 
arbitrary—in the realm of prosecutorial charging decisions, only in-
vidious discrimination is forbidden.316  The Seventh Circuit further 
noted that where a challenge to the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion is premised on irrationality, rather than invidious discrimination, 
 
the claim.  See Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam) (citing collected cases from First, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits). 
310 See Racine Charter One, 424 F.3d at 684 (citing collected Seventh Circuit cases requiring 
proof of irrationality or illegitimate animus). 
311 Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603–04 (2008). 
312 Id. at 607; see also Papas v. Leonard, 554 F. App’x 764, 764 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he ‘class-
of-one’ theory is not cognizable with regard to discretionary actions.”); Towery v. Brewer, 
672 F.3d 650, 660 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Engquist) (“The class-of-one doc-
trine does not apply to forms of state action that ‘by their nature involve discretionary de-
cisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments.’”). 
313 Cf. Alex M. Hagen, Mixed Motives Speak in Different Tongues: Doctrine, Discourse, and Judicial 
Function in Class-of-One Equal Protection Theory, 58 S.D. L. REV. 197, 226 (2013) (“Engquist 
was not so narrowly written, nor was it intended to be so narrowly read.”). 
314 Robert C. Farrell, The Equal Protection Class of One Claim: Olech, Engquist, and the Supreme 
Court’s Misadventure, 61 S.C. L. REV. 107, 131 (2009). 
315 543 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2008). 
316 Id. at 900. 
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the challenge is doomed to failure and a class-of-one equal protection 
claim is foreclosed for the same reason.317  Other courts have agreed 
and rejected class-of-one attacks on the exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion.318 
Cases holding that class-of-one claims are not cognizable with re-
spect to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion should have been fa-
tal to Gupta’s equal protection claim and should be fatal to subse-
quent similar equal protection claims asserted by respondents in SEC 
administrative proceedings.  A decision by the SEC (or CFTC) to 
proceed in an administrative forum rather than in a judicial forum is 
a clear analog to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in criminal 
cases.  Such decisions are based on a multiplicity of discretionary fac-
tors, many of which were formally identified by the Division in the 
guidance it released in May 2015 and informally acknowledged by the 
Division even earlier.319 
The specific facts concerning the SEC’s initial decision to issue an 
OIP against Gupta and utilize an administrative forum provide an ex-
cellent illustration of the broadly discretionary nature of that deci-
sion-making process.  It appears that the SEC was motivated in large 
part by the goal of investor protection when it decided to pursue an 
action against Gupta, who was serving on the boards of three public 
companies—including Procter & Gamble and American Airlines par-
ent AMR Corp.  Gupta resigned from these boards after the OIP was 
filed.320 
But why did the SEC initially file administratively against Gupta, 
rather than in federal court?  At the time that the SEC filed the OIP 
the criminal action against Gupta was in the pre-indictment stage.  
Parallel civil and criminal proceedings are common,321 and the SEC 
 
317 Id. 
318 See, e.g., Wade v. Collier, 783 F.3d 1081, 1089 n.5 (7th Cir. 2015) (remarking that plain-
tiff’s “class-of-one equal protection claim is not a good fit in the context of a harm caused 
by the State’s Attorney’s Office’s exercise of its prosecutorial discretion”); Donahoe v. Ar-
paio, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1073–74 (D. Ariz. 2012) (rejecting class-of-one challenge aris-
ing from discretionary prosecutorial decisions). 
319 See, e.g., Jenna Greene, The SEC’s on a Long Winning Streak; Criticism Rises over the Agency’s 
In-House Forum, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 19, 2015) (listing factors identified by Andrew Ceresney, 
Director, SEC Enforcement Division). 
320 Michael Rothfeld, Susan Pulliam & Jean Eaglesham, Focus on Goldman Ex-Director, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 21, 2011, at C1. 
321 Derelle Janey, Parallel Proceedings: Staying the Civil Action, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 2, 2014), 
http://www.gottliebgordon.com/site/files/parallel_proceedings.pdf; MORRISON & 
FOERSTER, LLP, A Primer on SEC Investigations and Enforcement Actions Relating to Financial 
Reporting and Accounting Cases, 11 (2014), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/
Images/140122-SEC-Investigation-Handbook.pdf (“In cases in which criminal activity has 
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and DOJ have a long history of cooperation with one another,322 but a 
parallel civil proceeding can jeopardize a criminal action.  Defend-
ants can obtain discovery in an SEC civil action that is not available 
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, while simultaneously 
denying the government reciprocal discovery by invoking the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and compromising 
cooperating witnesses in the criminal case.323  The U.S. Attorney’s Of-
fice can seek to stay a parallel civil action commenced by the SEC, but 
whereas such stay motions used to be regularly granted, in recent 
years they have been frequently denied.324  And Judge Rakoff has not 
been sympathetic to motions to stay SEC civil actions.325 
The factors noted above likely were dispositive in the SEC’s deci-
sion to file an OIP against Gupta.  The SEC, simultaneously sensitive 
to investor protection and the litigation strategy of the U.S. Attorney 
for the Southern District of New York, opted for the proceeding that 
posed the least risk of interference with the criminal trial of Raja-
ratnam, as well as any future criminal case against Gupta.326  An ad-
ministrative proceeding would have involved significantly less discov-
ery than would have a civil action in federal court, and thus it would 
have been considerably less likely to jeopardize the criminal prosecu-
tions.  In short, as noted by Professor J. Robert Brown, Jr., “the deci-
sion to bring an administrative proceeding rather than an injunctive 
proceeding was eminently reasonable and entirely appropriate given 
the competing pressures.”327 
 
occurred, the SEC will often work in parallel with the Department of Justice or, less fre-
quently, state criminal authorities.”). 
322 Eli J. Richardson, Patterns in Parallel Proceedings: SEC Actions, DOJ Tools, LAW360 (Jan. 17, 
2012, 1:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/298489/patterns-in-parallel-
proceedings-sec-actions-doj-tools. 
323 Walter P. Loughlin, Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, PRACTICAL LITIGATOR, Mar. 
2011, at 19, 22–23; Zweifach & Creizman, supra note 288, at 9.  See also Braden Campbell, 
Discovery Halted in SEC Hacking Suit Amid Criminal Case, LAW360 (Feb. 1, 2016, 8:08 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/753300/discovery-halted-in-sec-hacking-suit-amid-
criminal-casee (reporting that New Jersey federal judge stayed discovery in SEC civil ac-
tion because such discovery could have undermined two related criminal cases). 
324 Zweifach & Creizman, supra note 288, at 9. See also Stewart Bishop, Once Assured, An SEC 
Stay as DOJ Acts is No Longer A Lock, LAW360 (Oct. 31, 2016, 5:08 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/857032/once-assured-an-sec-stay-as-doj-acts-is-no-longer-
a-lock (noting that some federal judges “are increasingly eschewing blanket civil discovery 
stays”). 
325 See, e.g., SEC v. Saad, 229 F.R.D. 90, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Rakoff, J.) (denying government 
application for stay of discovery in SEC enforcement action which had been filed in tan-
dem with parallel criminal case). 
326 Rothfeld, Pulliam & Eaglesham, supra note 320. 
327 J. Robert Brown, Jr., Gupta, Business Roundtable, and the Need for a New Approach at the SEC, 
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Sept. 27, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
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The foregoing discussion demonstrates why class-of-one equal 
protection claims asserted by defendants in SEC administrative pro-
ceedings should fail.  Choices by the SEC (or CFTC) to proceed ad-
ministratively are the product of broadly discretionary decision-
making and as such should be insulated from attack, absent a show-
ing of invidious discrimination.  Gupta’s case, which no doubt in-
spired subsequent defendants to assert equal protection claims, is a 
very good example of why such claims are defective. 
C.  Seventh Amendment 
A third common line of attack is that SEC and CFTC administra-
tive proceedings deny the right to a jury trial in violation of the Sev-
enth Amendment.328  Gupta asserted this claim in his federal action 
against the SEC329 and numerous respondents in SEC proceedings 
have followed his lead.330  It is true that respondents in such proceed-
ings are denied the right to a jury trial,331 and the availability of a jury 
can be particularly beneficial to a defendant in a complex securities 
fraud case.332  Nevertheless, this denial does not violate the Seventh 
Amendment, for the reasons explained below. 
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of congressional 
power to provide for non-jury trials in a series of cases that split into 
two categories.  In the first category, Congress has created a statutory 
cause of action and provided that assertion of the claim must proceed 
in a specialized statutory proceeding or in a specialized tribunal, such 
as an administrative tribunal utilizing ALJs.  The Supreme Court has 
never held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a ju-
 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/securities-issues/gupta-business-roundtable-and-the-
need-for-a-new-approach-at.html.  But see Michael Dvorak, Note, SEC Administrative Pro-
ceedings and Equal Protection “Class of One” Challenges: Evaluating Concerns About SEC Forum 
Choices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1195, 1218 (2015) (arguing that defendants like Gupta 
should be able to challenge the SEC’s choice of forum under a class-of-one equal protec-
tion argument). 
328 The Seventh Amendment provides: “In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. . . .”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. VII. 
329 Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
330 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, 3, 18–20, Ironridge Global 
IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-02512-LMM) (alleging 
that administrative proceedings violate the constitutional right to a trial by jury). 
331 See, e.g., Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a respondent 
“has no right to a jury trial before the SEC”). 
332 Peter J. Henning, The S.E.C.’s Use of the “Rocket Docket” is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Aug. 25, 2014, 11:48 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/the-s-e-c-s-use-of-
the-rocket-docket-is-challenged/?_r=0. 
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ry trial in a proceeding conducted by an administrative tribunal.333  In 
the second category, which is of minimal concern here, Congress has 
provided for the statutory right to be enforced in federal district 
court.334 
The leading case controlling the first category is Atlas Roofing Co. 
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission.335  In Atlas Roofing 
petitioners alleged that the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (“OSH Act”)336 violates the Seventh Amendment because it pro-
vides for civil penalties for OSH Act violations to be levied by the Sec-
retary of Labor and contested assessed penalties to be adjudicated by 
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
(“OSHRC”).337  The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this argu-
ment.  The Court held: 
At least in cases in which “public rights” are being litigated—e.g. cases in 
which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public 
rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact—the 
Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the fact 
finding function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum in 
which the jury would be incompatible.338 
Atlas Roofing relied on National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp.,339 a New Deal-era case in which the Supreme 
Court first encountered a Seventh Amendment objection to adminis-
trative adjudication.  In Jones & Laughlin the Court upheld a provi-
sion of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)340 empowering the 
NLRB to award back pay as a remedy for unfair labor practices.341  At-
las Roofing also relied on Curtis v. Loether,342 decided in 1974, in which 
the Supreme Court explained that Jones & Laughlin “stands for the 
proposition that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable to 
administrative proceedings . . . .”343  Collectively, the three cases estab-
lish that Congress has wide latitude in creating administrative mech-
anisms for adjudicating statutory or public rights, and the Seventh 
 
333 Paul K. Sun, Jr., Note, Congressional Delegation of Adjudicatory Power to Federal Agencies and the 
Right to Trial by Jury, 1988 DUKE L.J. 539, 545. 
334 See text accompanying notes 366–373 infra. 
335 430 U.S. 442 (1977). 
336 Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (1970). 
337 Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450. 
338 Id. 
339 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
340 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-52 (2012). 
341 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 21. 
342 415 U.S. 189 (1974). 
343 Id. at 194. 
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Amendment does not compel a jury trial in these situations.344  The 
Supreme Court’s resolution of the three cases—particularly Atlas 
Roofing—has drawn criticism,345 but the Court has never retreated 
from their primary holdings. 
Atlas Roofing strongly suggested—but did not hold—that Congress 
is free to assign fact finding and initial adjudication to an administra-
tive forum only where a public right is involved.346  In a subsequent 
case, Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,347 the Court defined a public 
right as a right arising between the federal government and others, or 
one where Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to 
its constitutional powers under Article I, has created a “seemingly 
‘private right’ that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory 
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with lim-
ited involvement by the Article III judiciary.”348 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the public-private distinc-
tion has been described as a “confusing morass”349 and the precise 
contours of the two categories remain in dispute.350  The enforcement 
of federal securities laws would appear to be an obvious example of 
the enforcement of public rights,351 but the absence of a bright divid-
 
344 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 9 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2302.2 (3d ed. database up-
dated Apr. 2016). 
345 See, e.g., Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court’s Assault 
on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1338 (1978) (“The attempt in Atlas to 
carve out a new exception to the [S]eventh [A]mendment to permit administrative fact-
finding in public rights cases poses a serious threat to a fundamental guarantee of the Bill 
of Rights.”). 
346 Cf. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 458 
(1977) (“Our prior cases support administrative factfinding in only those situations in-
volving ‘public rights,’ e.g., where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity 
under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights.”). 
347 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
348 Id. at 54 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586, 593–94 
(1985)).  See also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011) (“[W]hat makes a right 
‘public’ rather than private is that the right is integrally related to particular federal gov-
ernment action.”). 
349 Mila Sohoni, Agency Adjudication and Judicial Nondelegation: An Article III Canon, 107 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1569, 1584 (2013). 
350 Id. at 1587.  See also Mark I. Greenberg, The Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Courts and 
Administrative Agencies After Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 479, 481 
(1990) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never provided a workable definition of public 
rights.”); Paul K. Sun, Jr., Note, Congressional Delegation of Adjudicatory Power to Federal Agen-
cies and the Right to Trial by Jury, 1988 DUKE L.J. 539, 553 (“[T]he Court has offered no 
firm definition of public rights . . . .”). 
351 See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1314 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 
825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Because the SEC is acting as a sovereign in the perfor-
mance of its executive duties when it pursues an enforcement action, the Court also 
agrees that this is a public rights case.”); SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 958, 960 
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ing line has provided some ammunition for parties asserting Seventh 
Amendment challenges to SEC and CFTC administrative enforce-
ment.  To date, those challenges have failed, whether asserted in 
court or in administrative proceedings. 
One of the earliest cases to consider the Seventh Amendment ar-
gument in the context of CFTC administrative enforcement was My-
ron v. Hauser.352  In that case, decided in 1982, the Eighth Circuit re-
lied on Atlas Roofing to reject an argument that the award by the 
CFTC of reparations following an administrative hearing by a CFTC 
ALJ violated the Seventh Amendment.353  In the course of holding 
that no Seventh Amendment violation had occurred, the Eighth Cir-
cuit rejected the argument that the CFTC’s reparations procedures—
which provide a simplified mechanism for the resolution of customer 
claims against commodity brokers354—do not involve public rights.  
The court noted that even though it was the customer who was 
awarded reparations, the case in a functional sense was between the 
government and the regulated commodity options broker.355  One 
year later, in Swiers v. Rosenthal & Co.,356 a CFTC ALJ also rejected a 
claim that CFTC reparations proceedings violate the Seventh 
Amendment. 
Arguments that administrative enforcement by the SEC violates 
respondents’ Seventh Amendment rights have been similarly unsuc-
cessful.  Both the SEC (acting as the first level of appeal from an ALJ 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“Indeed, the entire purpose and thrust of an SEC enforcement action is 
expeditiously to safeguard the public interest by enjoining recurrent or continued viola-
tions of the securities acts.”).  In Petrofunds, the federal district court granted the SEC’s 
motion to strike defendant’s demand for a jury trial.  Id.  Cf. SEC v. Kopsky, 537 F. Supp. 
2d 1023, 1028 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (denying defendants’ motion to strike SEC’s demand for a 
jury trial). 
352 673 F.2d 994 (8th Cir. 1982).  The same argument was raised four years earlier in Rosen-
thal & Co. v. Bagley, 581 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1978), but in that case the Seventh Circuit 
declined to decide the issue because plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative rem-
edies by appealing from an adverse order of the CFTC in the reparations proceeding be-
ing challenged.  Id. at 1259, 1261. 
353 Myron, 673 F.2d at 1003 (“Atlas Roofing refutes [plaintiff’s] seventh amendment chal-
lenge.”). 
354 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Reparations Program, 
http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/ReparationsProgram/index.htm (explaining 
the reparations procedures). 
355 Myron, 673 F.2d at 1004–05.  But see Jerry W. Markham, The Seventh Amendment and the 
CFTC Reparations Proceedings, 68 IOWA L. REV. 87, 120–22 (1982) (arguing that CFTC repa-
rations proceedings involve disputes between private parties). 
356 Commod. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶21,817, at 27,396 (C.F.T.C. 1983). 
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decision)357 and Article III judges358 have cited Atlas Roofing and re-
jected Seventh Amendment arguments. 
In Hill v. SEC,359 Charles Hill—the respondent in an SEC adminis-
trative proceeding—sued the SEC in federal district court in 2015 al-
leging constitutional violations, including the denial of his Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial.  Hill conceded that the SEC’s en-
forcement action against him involved a public right,360 but he argued 
that under Atlas Roofing and Granfinanciera the public right must be 
new or novel to be excluded from the Seventh Amendment’s ambit 
and the SEC’s claims against him were neither.  According to Hill, 
Dodd-Frank did not create any cause of action.  Rather, it simply au-
thorized the SEC to institute in an administrative forum a pre-existing 
type of enforcement action that previously had been the exclusive 
province of Article III courts.361  Additional respondents in SEC ad-
ministrative proceedings have advanced the same argument.362 
Both Atlas Roofing and Granfinanciera contain language that at first 
glance appears to support the foregoing argument.  In Atlas Roofing 
the Supreme Court stated that when Congress creates new statutory 
public rights it may assign their adjudication to an administrative 
agency without violating the Seventh Amendment.363  And in Granfi-
nanciera the Court stated that Congress may devise novel causes of ac-
tion involving public rights free from the strictures of the Seventh 
Amendment if it assigns their adjudication to administrative tribu-
nals.364  Nevertheless, the district court in Hill properly rejected plain-
tiff’s argument on the basis that it elevates form over substance and 
misconstrues the Supreme Court’s language.  The district court stat-
ed: “Congress does not tie its hands when it initially creates a cause of 
action.  Plaintiff cites no authority which specifically holds that Con-
gress may not change its mind and reassign public rights to adminis-
trative proceedings.”365 
 
357 Vladlen “Larry” Vindman, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11247, Rel. No. 8679, at *11 (Apr. 14, 
2006). 
358 Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1315–16 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 825 
F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). 
359 Id. 
360 Id. at 1314. 
361 Id. 
362 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 19, Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. 
v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-02512-LMM)  (alleging that 
Dodd-Frank did not create a new cause of action). 
363 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 
(1977). 
364 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51 (1989). 
365 Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1315. 
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As noted above, there is a second Supreme Court line of Seventh 
Amendment jurisprudence, covering situations where Congress has 
provided for a statutory right to be enforced in federal court.  Some 
respondents in SEC administrative proceedings have erroneously re-
lied on this line of cases to bolster their Seventh Amendment claims.  
In particular, respondents have erroneously relied on Tull v. United 
States.366  In that case the government successfully sued a real estate 
developer for violations of the Clean Water Act367 in federal court.  
The developer alleged a violation of his Seventh Amendment rights 
after the district judge denied his timely demand for a jury trial.368  
On appeal the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment 
grants the right to a jury trial on all issues relating to liability for civil 
penalties, but not on the amount of penalties, when the federal gov-
ernment seeks relief in federal court under the Clean Water Act.369 
Tull is inapposite to the use by the SEC and CFTC of administra-
tive enforcement, because it sets forth a rule applicable only in the 
second line of Supreme Court cases.  That is, Tull merely stands for 
the proposition that when the federal government seeks to impose 
penalties under the Clean Water Act in a judicial forum, rather than 
in an administrative forum, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial on 
the issue of liability.  Tull does not stand for the proposition that the 
Seventh Amendment prohibits the federal government from seeking 
the imposition of penalties under the Clean Water Act in an adminis-
trative forum, or the imposition of penalties under any other federal 
statute in an administrative forum.370  The Clean Water Act expressly 
authorizes the imposition of administrative penalties,371 that provision 
has never been deemed unconstitutional, and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) annually files exponentially more admin-
 
366 481 U.S. 412 (1987).  See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18–19, 
Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-
02512-LMM) (citing Tull). 
367 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376 (2012). 
368 Tull, 481 U.S. at 415. 
369 Id. at 425–27. 
370 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce recently issued a report criticizing the SEC’s expanded 
use of APs and asserting that “[t]he Supreme Court has held that a defendant is entitled 
to a jury every time the government demands a civil penalty.”  See U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 17.  Whether or not 
this is true, it has no bearing on the imposition of penalties in an administrative forum, 
for the reasons explained above. 
371 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2012); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake 
Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57–58 n.2 (1987) (“[T]he most recent Clean Water Act 
amendments permit EPA to assess administrative penalties without judicial process on any 
person who ‘has violated’ the provisions of the Act.”). 
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istrative order penalty actions than it does civil judicial complaints.  
In fiscal year 2015 the EPA filed 108 civil judicial complaints and 
1400 administrative penalty complaints.372 
In short, nothing about Tull supports a Seventh Amendment chal-
lenge to the use by the SEC and CFTC of administrative enforcement.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court, citing Atlas Roofing, reaffirmed in a foot-
note in Tull that “the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to ad-
ministrative proceedings.”373 
D.  Article II 
Respondents asserting constitutional challenges to the SEC’s use 
of administrative proceedings have made their best arguments under 
Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  The arguments take two forms.  
First, respondents argue that SEC ALJs are protected by at least two 
layers of removal protection, in violation of Article II.  Second, re-
spondents argue that SEC ALJs are not appointed by the President, 
the courts, or department heads, in violation of the Appointments 
Clause of Article II.  Those two arguments are examined below.  As 
will be seen, while the arguments are applicable to CFTC administra-
tive proceedings,374 there are important differences between the SEC 
RoP and CFTC RoP which render the constitutional analysis some-
what different for the two agencies. 
1.  Multiple Layers of Removal Protection 
The first argument based on Article II stems from the Supreme 
Court’s 2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Account-
ing Oversight Board (“Free Enterprise”).375  In that case the Court held 
that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) 
was improperly constituted because its members, although acting 
with the powers of executive officers, were insulated by statute from 
the President by two layers of limitations on removal.  There were two 
layers because PCAOB members could only be removed for cause376 
 
372 ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL RESULTS NUMBERS AT A GLANCE FOR FISCAL 
YEAR (FY) 2015, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-annual-results-numbers
-glance-fiscal-year-fy-2015. 
373 Tull, 481 U.S. at 418 n.4.  See also Gregory T. Bolan, Jr. & Joseph C. Ruggieri, Exchange 
Act Release No. 877, at *4 (ALJ Sept. 14, 2015) (citing Tull in rejecting Seventh Amend-
ment challenge to SEC administrative proceeding). 
374 Kaufman & Forero, supra note 98 (“The same challenge [regarding two layers of protec-
tion] can be made regarding a CFTC administrative proceeding.”). 
375 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
376 Id. at 486. 
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and those individuals who could remove the members—the SEC 
Commissioners—could also only be removed for cause.377  The Su-
preme Court had previously held that one level of for-cause removal 
protection was constitutional,378 but in Free Enterprise it held that a se-
cond layer was one too many for the PCAOB.379 
Respondents in SEC administrative proceedings have seized on 
the holding of Free Enterprise to argue that such proceedings are un-
constitutional because SEC ALJs are insulated from removal by the 
President by at least two layers of protection.380  ALJs can only be re-
moved for cause by SEC Commissioners,381 with the consent of the 
Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”),382 and, as noted above, the 
Supreme Court stated in Free Enterprise that SEC Commissioners can 
only be removed for cause.  Respondents’ argument is superficially 
appealing but ultimately unpersuasive.  To date, those federal district 
courts which have examined the argument have either expressly re-
jected it383 or stated in dicta that the argument is defective.384 
Respondents’ argument is defective for multiple reasons and 
those courts which have rejected it have been correct.385  First, the 
Supreme Court did not decide in Free Enterprise that SEC Commis-
 
377 Id. at 487. 
378 See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
379 Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 492. 
380 See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 
No. 15-2732 (2d Cir. June 13, 2016). 
381 Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), abrogated on other grounds by Tilton 
v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“All ALJs, including SEC ALJs, are removable from 
employment by their respective agency heads (in this case, the [SEC]), but only for ‘good 
cause.’”).  The removal of federal ALJs is rare; between 1946 and 1992 only five ALJs were 
removed from federal agencies.  VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW 9 (2010).  In contrast, fifteen Article III judg-
es were impeached during the period 1803–2010.  Impeachments of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. 
CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html (last visit-
ed June 15, 2016).  Three of the impeached judges resigned before the Senate’s im-
peachment trials concluded.  Id.  Four of the impeached judges were acquitted by the 
Senate.  Id. 
382 Barnett, supra note 18, at 800.  The MSPB is an independent federal agency which han-
dles appeals by federal employees of adverse employment actions.  Id.  Pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. § 7521, such an action may be taken against an ALJ only for good cause estab-
lished and determined by the MSPB.  Id. at 814–15. 
383 See, e.g., Duka, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 289–90 (declining to reconsider its previous holding 
that there is no basis for concluding the restrictions on SEC ALJ removal infringes presi-
dential authority). 
384 See Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1354 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated 
on other grounds by Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (expressing serious doubts 
that two-layer removal protection for SEC ALJs is unconstitutional). 
385 Cf. David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1191 (2016) (iden-
tifying the Free Enterprise argument as respondents’ best constitutional argument). 
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sioners enjoy for-cause removal protection.  Rather, the Court simply 
accepted the parties’ stipulation that Commissioners can be removed 
only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,386 just 
as lower courts have implied such protection.387  The foregoing impli-
cation is dubious.  There is no for-cause removal provision in the fed-
eral securities laws and there is very good reason to think this was a 
deliberate choice by Congress. 
The constitutional status of independent federal agencies stems 
from the 1935 case of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.388  That case 
arose when President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to remove an 
FTC Commissioner based on policy disagreements between the two 
men.389  The Court rejected this attempt and held that Congress can, 
under certain circumstances, create independent agencies run by 
principal officers appointed by the President, whom the President 
may remove only for good cause.390  In so holding, the Court en-
dorsed the idea that when Congress creates an agency—such as the 
FTC—with for-cause removal protection it “intends for the agency to 
be totally free from presidential influence, aside from the President’s 
role in appointments.”391 
The SEC was established in 1934 by Section 4 of the Securities Ex-
change Act (“Exchange Act”),392 one year before Humphrey’s Executor 
was decided.  When it was established, it would have been unconstitu-
tional to make SEC Commissioners removable only for cause, under 
the Supreme Court’s pre-Humphrey’s Executor precedent.393  But at no 
time since Humphrey’s Executor was decided has Congress amended 
the Exchange Act to create a for-cause removal provision, even 
though the statute has been amended twelve times since then.394  
Moreover, in the years since Humphrey’s Executor was decided Con-
 
386 See Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 487; Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 15 (2013) (“[T]he Court followed the parties’ briefs in assuming that SEC members 
could be removed by the President only for cause.”); Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abol-
ishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 
2560 (2011) (“The parties stipulated that Commissioners could be removed only [for 
cause].”). 
387 See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agen-
cies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 833 (2013) (noting that lower courts have assumed that 
SEC enjoys for-cause removal protection). 
388 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
389 See id. at 618–19. 
390 Id. at 630–32. 
391 Datla & Revesz, supra note 387, at 779. 
392 See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1934). 
393 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 547 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
394 Datla & Revesz, supra note 387, at 834. 
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gress has created multiple agencies, some with express for-cause re-
moval protection (such as the NLRB and the FERC) and some with-
out such protection (such as the CFTC, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (“EEOC”), and the Federal Election 
Commission).395  One recent review concluded: “When properly 
viewed in context, the presence or absence of a removal provision 
looks more like a deliberate choice than a drafting error.”396 
Overall, the reliance by respondents in SEC proceedings on Free 
Enterprise is misplaced for the initial reason that the Supreme Court 
did not decide that SEC Commissioners cannot be removed by the 
President without a judicially reviewable showing of good cause, and 
its acceptance of a stipulation concerning such removal protection is 
dubious.  Justice Stephen Breyer asked in dissent: “How can the 
Court simply assume without deciding that the SEC Commissioners 
themselves are removable only ‘for cause?’”397  There is no satisfactory 
answer to this question, and as Professor Laurence Tribe observed, 
absent acceptance of the parties’ stipulation, the “majority’s entire 
house of cards collapses.”398 
The second reason that respondents’ reliance on Free Enterprise is 
misplaced is that, assuming arguendo that SEC ALJs are protected by 
two layers of protection from removal, the Supreme Court did not es-
tablish a bright-line rule that two layers are always unconstitutional.399  
Rather, as stated by the majority, the only issue in the case was 
“whether Congress may deprive the President of adequate control 
over the [PCAOB] . . . .”400  The Court held that two layers were un-
constitutional in the case of the PCAOB because its members exer-
 
395 Id. 
396 Id.; accord David Moon, Note, When Does Dual For-Cause Removal Protection Become Unconsti-
tutional? Exploring the Scope of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 875, 889–90 (“[T]here is a strong historical argument that 
Congress specifically intended that SEC members be removable at will by the President.”). 
397 Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 545 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
398 Laurence H. Tribe, Peek-A-Boo: Justice Breyer, Dissenting, 128 HARV. L. REV. 498, 505 (2014) 
(“[T]he majority went out of its way to decide the case on the artificial assumption that 
the Commissioners of the SEC cannot be removed by the President without a judicially 
reviewable showing of good cause.  Without that assumption, the majority’s entire house 
of cards collapses.”). 
399 See, e.g., Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court fails to create a 
bright-line rule because of considerable uncertainty about the scope of its holding . . . .”); 
Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), abrogated by Tilton v. SEC, 824 
F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Free Enterprise clearly did not establish, as Duka suggests, a cate-
gorical rule forbidding ‘two levels of “good-cause” tenure protection.’”). 
400 Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 508. 
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cised expansive enforcement,401 regulatory,402 and adjudicative author-
ity,403 and two layers of protection deprived the President of control 
over the non-adjudicatory functions.404  The Court refused to consider 
the applicability of its holding to other federal employees because 
none of them were similarly situated to the members of the 
PCAOB.405 
In Free Enterprise, the Supreme Court discussed the impact of its 
decision on ALJs.  The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer 
and joined by three other Justices, noted that ALJs are insulated from 
removal by two layers of protection406 and asked: “Does every losing 
party before an ALJ now have grounds to appeal on the basis that the 
decision entered against him is unconstitutional?”407  The majority re-
sponded that its opinion did not decide whether federal ALJs are 
constitutional, for two reasons: (1) it is not clear that ALJs are officers 
of the United States, so as to raise the Article II issue, and (2) many 
ALJs perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking 
functions, or possess purely recommendatory powers.408 
The Appointments Clause of Article II governs the appointment 
of all officers of the United States, who fall into two categories—
principal and inferior.  The former, most likely those who report di-
rectly to the President, must be nominated by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate.409  The latter are those whose work is directed 
and supervised by principal officers or officers of lesser importance.410  
Very few federal government personnel are either principal or inferi-
or officers.  Rather, almost all personnel are mere employees whose 
 
401 Id. at 485 (“The Board is charged with enforcing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the securities 
laws, the Commission’s rules, its own rules, and professional accounting standards.”). 
402 Id. (“[T]he Board may regulate every detail of an accounting firm’s practice . . . .”). 
403 Id. (“[T]he Board itself can issue severe sanctions in its disciplinary proceedings . . . .”). 
404 Id. at 508 (“The only issue in this case is whether Congress may deprive the President of 
adequate control over the Board, which is the regulator of first resort and the primary law 
enforcement authority for a vital sector of our economy.  We hold that it cannot.”). 
405 Id. at 506–08. 
406 Id. at 542 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
407 Id. at 543 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
408 Id. at 507 n.10 (majority opinion); see also Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015), abrogated by Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he majority specifically 
excluded ALJs from the reach of its holding.”); Patricia L. Bellia, PCAOB and the Persis-
tence of the Removal Puzzle, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1371, 1411 (2012) (“The PCAOB Court 
took pains to emphasize the narrowness of its holding—in particular, that the holding 
carried no implications for the civil service or for ALJs.”). 
409 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) 
(per curiam). 
410 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997) (“‘[I]nferior officers’ are officers 
whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by 
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”). 
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appointments are not controlled by the Appointments Clause.411  The 
SEC has consistently and vociferously argued in litigation concerning 
the constitutionality of its administrative proceedings that its ALJs are 
mere employees, rather than officers of the United States.  As to this 
issue the SEC probably is fighting a losing battle. 
The Supreme Court has never articulated a bright-line test for de-
termining who can be properly identified as an inferior officer.412  In 
Buckley v. Valeo413 the Court noted that inferior officers exercise signif-
icant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.414  In Morri-
son v. Olson415 the Court applied a functional test based on multiple 
criteria, including removal by a higher executive branch official, limi-
tations on duties, and limited jurisdiction.416  More recently, in Free 
Enterprise, the Court endorsed the view that inferior officers have su-
periors who direct and supervise their work and who are appointed 
by the President with the Senate’s consent.417  But these are not defin-
itive tests. 
SEC ALJs probably are inferior officers, as opposed to mere em-
ployees.  By September 2016 at least five federal district court deci-
sions had so held,418 on multiple grounds.  First, SEC ALJs exercise 
significant authority.  While they lack contempt power, they conduct 
trials—taking testimony and ruling on the admissibility of evidence, 
among other tasks—and are empowered to enforce compliance with 
discovery orders.419  Second, the authority of SEC ALJs is at least equal 
 
411 Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 75837, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 31806, at 29 (Sept. 3, 2015), pet. denied, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. 
v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016). 
412 See Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 
1205, 1244 (2014) (“The Court has struggled with articulating a test for who can be 
properly identified as an inferior officer.”). 
413 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
414 Id. at 126. 
415 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
416 Id. at 671–72 (identifying potential removal by a higher executive branch official, limited 
duties, and limited jurisdiction as factors leading to conclusion that independent counsel 
is an inferior officer). 
417 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010). 
418 Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2015); Duka v. 
SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other grounds, No. 15-2732 (2d 
Cir. June 13, 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on 
other grounds, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 
1335, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds by Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th 
Cir. 2016); Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 WL 7597428, at *11 
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015). 
419 Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015); Duka v. SEC, 124 
F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other grounds, No. 15-2732 (2d Cir. June 
13, 2016) (“SEC ALJs are ‘inferior officers’ because they exercise ‘significant authority 
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to that of thousands of other individuals who have been deemed to 
be inferior officers by the Supreme Court.  As noted by Professor 
Kent Barnett, “[t]he Court has held that district-court clerks, thou-
sands of clerks within the Treasury and Interior Departments, an as-
sistant surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election monitors, federal mar-
shals, military judges, Article I judges, and the general counsel for the 
Transportation Department are inferior officers.”420  Third, SEC ALJs’ 
positions are established by law, and their duties, salary, and means of 
appointment are specified by statute.421 
In August 2016, in Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC,422 the D.C. Circuit 
became the first federal appellate court to hold that SEC ALJs are 
employees, rather than inferior officers, and therefore their ap-
pointments are constitutional.423  In reaching its decision the D.C. 
Circuit relied heavily on the logic of its 2000 decision in Landry v. 
FDIC.424  In Landry the D.C. Circuit held that ALJs appointed by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) were employees de-
spite exercising significant authority, because they had no statutory 
authority to issue final opinions.425  According to the court, a prior 
Supreme Court case, Freytag v. Commissioner,426 was not dispositive.  In 
Freytag the Supreme Court held that special trial judges (“STJs”) for 
the U.S. Tax Court were inferior officers at least in part because they 
had authority to issue final decisions.427  Landry distinguished Freytag 
on the basis that whereas STJs had such authority, FDIC ALJs did 
not.428  There was a concurring opinion in Landry, which joined the 
court’s opinion except with regard to petitioner’s claim made under 
 
pursuant to the laws of the United States.’”).  See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 
(1978) (“There can be little doubt that the role of the . . . administrative law judge . . . is 
‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge.  His powers are often, if not generally, com-
parable to those of a trial judge: He may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, 
regulate the course of the hearing, and make or recommend decisions.”). 
420 Barnett, supra note 18, at 812. 
421 Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015). 
422 No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016). 
423 Id. at *3–7. 
424 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
425 204 F.3d at 1134.  Cf. Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 37 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (holding that arbitrator appointed by Surface Transportation Board qualified as of-
ficer of the United States because it was the arbitrator’s responsibility to render a final 
decision in disputes between Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration); Jody Go-
doy, SEC Says Amtrak Ruling Doesn’t Apply in ALJ Challenge, LAW360 (May 11, 2016, 4:03 
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/795151/sec-says-amtrak-ruling-doesn-t-apply-in-alj-
challenge. 
426 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
427 Id. at 882. 
428 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133–34. 
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the Appointments Clause.  The concurrence argued that Freytag’s dis-
cussion of the importance of the STJs’ authority to issue final deci-
sions was part of an alternative holding that was unnecessary to the 
outcome in Freytag.429  According to Professor Barnett, the concur-
rence in Landry had the better argument,430 and it is difficult to disa-
gree with that assessment.  The discussion of finality was part of an al-
ternative holding.431 
Those post-Landry district courts which have held that SEC ALJs 
are inferior officers have found Freytag’s primary holding to be con-
trolling.432  In Lucia, however, the D.C. Circuit followed Landry433 and 
applied Freytag’s alternative holding to determine the status of SEC 
ALJs.  The Lucia court noted that its analysis of Landry’s applicability 
to SEC ALJs began and ended with ALJs’ authority to issue final deci-
sions.434  Because the initial decisions of SEC ALJs become final only 
when the SEC issues an order of finality,435 the D.C. Circuit concluded 
that the ALJs are mere employees.436 
Lucia was wrongly decided for the same reason that Landry was 
mistaken.  Both cases erroneously rely on Freytag’s alternative hold-
ing.  But even if SEC ALJs are inferior officers who are protected by 
two layers of for-cause removal protection, Free Enterprise still does not 
render them unconstitutional.  As noted, in Free Enterprise the Su-
preme Court distinguished ALJs because many of them perform ad-
judicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions, or be-
cause they possess recommendatory powers.  The use of such a 
 
429 Id. at 1142. 
430 Barnett, supra note 18, at 813.  See also Giles D. Beal IV, Note, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: 
SEC Administrative Law Judges Post-Dodd Frank, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 413, 426 (2016) 
(“SEC ALJs perform almost identical duties to those performed by the STJs in Freytag 
. . . .”).  Cf. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 71, at 11 (“It is not clear how the Supreme Court 
would interpret Freytag in the context of the SEC’s ALJs.”). 
431 See Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“Only 
after it concluded STJs were inferior officers did Freytag address the STJ’s ability to issue a 
final order: the STJ’s limited authority to issue final orders was only an additional reason, 
not the reason.”). 
432 See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 
No. 15-2732 (2d Cir. June 13, 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1317 (N.D. Ga. 
2015), vacated on other grounds, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). (“The Court finds that 
based upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Freytag, SEC ALJs are inferior officers.”). 
433 Thomas J. Krysa, A Key Victory for SEC in Battle Over Administrative Courts, LAW360 (Aug. 15, 
2016, 4:14 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/828028/a-key-victory-for-sec-in-battle-
over-administrative-courts (“The panel noted they were bound by the circuit’s prior prec-
edent, [Landry] . . . .”). 
434 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 WL 4191191 at *4 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 
2016). 
435 Id. at *5. 
436 Id. at *3–7. 
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functional test is supported by Supreme Court precedent.437  And, in 
fact, SEC ALJs perform only adjudicative functions and they possess 
only the power to recommend a case disposition.  While the SEC itself 
combines functions, SEC ALJs do not engage in enforcement or 
rulemaking.  They only adjudicate.438  Likewise, the initial decision by 
an SEC ALJ is only a recommendation.  The initial decision does not 
become final until the Commission acts, either by (1) conducting de 
novo review and issuing its own decision, or (2) issuing an order of fi-
nality because no party has appealed and the Commission has not 
decided to review sua sponte the ALJ’s initial decision.439  Upon review, 
the Commission may affirm, reverse, modify, set aside, or remand for 
further proceedings, in whole or in part, any initial decision by an 
ALJ.440  And when the SEC conducts its de novo review it may hear ad-
ditional evidence.441 
In the foregoing respects SEC ALJs are very different from the 
PCAOB members considered by the Supreme Court in Free Enter-
prise.442  These differences suffice to remove SEC ALJs from any po-
tential application of Free Enterprise’s holding that PCAOB members 
cannot constitutionally be protected by dual layers of removal protec-
 
437 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–90 (1988) (“The analysis contained in our 
removal cases is designed not to define rigid categories of those officials who may or may 
not be removed at will by the President, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere 
with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed 
duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’ under Article II.”). 
438 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699 n.8 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“ALJs perform only adjudicatory functions 
. . . .”), rev’d, 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), 
abrogated on other grounds by Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“SEC ALJs per-
form solely adjudicatory functions, and are not engaged in policymaking or enforce-
ment.”).  But cf. Barnett, supra note 18, at 816 n.125 (“ALJs for a handful of agencies may 
(but rarely do) preside over formal rulemaking proceedings . . . .”). 
439 See, e.g., Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2016) (“A presiding ALJ has authority to 
issue an initial decision, which may become final only by order of the Commission.”); 
Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15006, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 
75837, at 31 n.109 (Sept. 3, 2015), pet. denied, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 
2016 WL 4191191 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016) (noting that SEC ALJs’ initial decisions “do 
not become the final and effective decision of the agency without affirmative action on 
our part—specifically, our issuance of a finality order.”); Timbervest v. SEC, Civ. Action 
No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 WL 7599428, at *9 n.8 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015) (“Because 
the regulations specify that the SEC itself must issue the final order essentially ‘confirm-
ing’ the initial order, the Court finds that SEC ALJs do not have final order authority.”). 
440 Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15006, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 
75837, at 31 (Sept. 3, 2015), pet. denied, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 
WL 4191191 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016). 
441 Id. 
442 See Beal, supra note 430, at 434 (“SEC ALJs do not exercise the broad executive powers 
that the PCAOB exercised, but, instead, act in a quasi-judicial role within the SEC.”). 
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tion.443  Several district courts have correctly used a functional ap-
proach to reach this conclusion, albeit some of them in dicta.444  
However, the analysis might be different with regard to CFTC ALJs.  
Under the CFTC RoP, no Commission order is necessary for an ALJ’s 
initial decision to become a final decision of the CFTC.  Instead, if no 
appeal is taken and the Commission does not take a case for review 
on its own initiative, the initial decision becomes the decision of the 
Commission thirty days after service.445  In this respect, the initial de-
cision by a CFTC is not a mere recommendation.  Still, CFTC ALJs 
perform only adjudicative functions, and this characteristic alone 
should suffice to remove them from the ambit of Free Enterprise’s hold-
ing. 
2.  Appointment by a Department Head 
The second and much more persuasive argument advanced by re-
spondents under Article II concerns the method of appointment for 
SEC ALJs.  The Appointments Clause provides the exclusive means by 
which all officers of the United States may be appointed.446  The 
 
443 See Jerome Nelson, Administrative Law Judges’ Removal ”Only for Cause”: Is that Administrative 
Procedure Act Protection Now Unconstitutional?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 401, 412 (2011) (“The dis-
tinctions between PCAOB members and ALJs suggest that Free Enterprise should be inap-
plicable to the ALJs.”).  In the unlikely event that Free Enterprise is applicable to SEC ALJs 
and their tenure protection is unconstitutional, the most likely consequence would be 
undesirable—ALJs would become terminable at will.  This was the outcome in Free Enter-
prise, where the Supreme Court saved the PCAOB by deeming the offending tenure pro-
visions severable from the remainder of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002—which had cre-
ated the board—and holding that PCAOB members could be removable at will going 
forward.  See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 
(2010); Stephen M. Juris & Barrett Johnson, Forum over Substance?  Respondent Rights and 
the SEC, LAW360 (July 14, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/678526/
forum-over-substance-respondent-rights-and-the-sec (arguing that if ALJs become termi-
nable at will they will “wind up with even less insulation from institutional pressure”). 
444 See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other 
grounds, No. 15-2732 (2d Cir. June 13, 2016) (rejecting claim that two layers of removal 
protection for SEC ALJs violates Article II); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 394 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), abrogated on other grounds by Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(adopting functional test); Gray Fin. Grp. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1354 n.10 (N.D. 
Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds by Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 
Court declines to decide at this time whether the ALJs’ two-layer tenure protections also 
violate Article II’s removal protections.  However, the Court has serious doubts that it 
does, as ALJs likely occupy ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘adjudicatory’ positions, and thus these two-
layer protections likely do not interfere with the President’s ability to perform his du-
ties.”). 
445 CFTC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 10.84(c) (2010). 
446 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138–39 (1976); Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other grounds, No. 15-2732 (2d Cir. June 13, 2016). 
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Clause requires that inferior officers be appointed in one of three 
ways: by (1) the President, (2) the courts of law, or (3) heads of de-
partments.447  The constitutional argument advanced by respondents 
in SEC proceedings is that SEC ALJs are inferior officers who have 
not been appointed in any of the three prescribed ways. 
The second prong of the argument is uncontested—SEC ALJs are 
not appointed by the SEC Commissioners.448  The SEC has publicly 
conceded that its ALJs are hired by the SEC’s Office of Administrative 
Law Judges, with input from the Chief Administrative Law Judge, 
human resource functions, and the OPM,449 with a possible exception 
for current Chief ALJ Brenda Murray, who may have been hired with 
input from the Commissioners.450 
In contrast, the first prong of the argument has been vigorously 
contested by the SEC, which asserts that ALJs are mere employees, ra-
ther than inferior officers, and therefore the Appointments Clause 
does not apply at all.  The SEC is correct that the Appointments 
Clause does not apply to employees.451  Nevertheless, for the reasons 
explained above, the SEC probably is fighting a losing battle on the 
broader issue.  By September 2016 at least five federal district court 
decisions—four of them by the same judge in Georgia—had expressly 
rejected the SEC’s position and held that SEC ALJs are inferior offic-
ers who were not appointed in any of the prescribed means, and 
therefore their appointments are unconstitutional.452  By September 
 
447 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
448 Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1299 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
449 See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015) (“There 
appears to be no dispute between Duka and the SEC that the ALJs in this matter are not 
appointed by the President or the SEC Commissioners.”); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 
1297, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (not-
ing concession by SEC that ALJ in plaintiff Hill’s administrative proceeding was not ap-
pointed by an SEC Commissioner).  OPM screens the candidates and must approve a se-
lection or provide a list of candidates, but it does not hire ALJs for other agencies.  See 5 
C.F.R. §§ 930.203a, 930.201 (2016). 
450 See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Duka v. SEC and the Constitutionality of Administrative Law Judges 
(Part 7), THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Aug. 27, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/duka-v-sec-and-the-constitutionality-of-
administrative-law-j-5.html. 
451 See, e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991) (“If we . . .  conclude that a 
special trial judge is only an employee, petitioners’ challenge fails, for such ‘lesser func-
tionaries’ need not be selected in compliance with the strict requirements of Article II.”). 
452 Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1316–17 (N.D. Ga. 2015); Duka v. 
SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated on other grounds, No. 15-2732 (2d 
Cir. June 13, 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on 
other grounds, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); Gray Fin. Grp. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 
1354 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds by Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 
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2016 no district court had accepted the SEC’s argument.  As noted, in 
August 2016 in Lucia the D.C. Circuit became the first appellate court 
to consider the merits of the SEC’s argument, and the agency had a 
decisive victory.  For the reasons explained above, the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision probably is erroneous, and might carry little weight in other 
circuits.453 
What are the likely consequences if the SEC’s current appoint-
ment of its ALJs is determined to be unconstitutional?  The SEC 
could solve its Article II problem by having the Commission reap-
point its ALJs, because the Supreme Court held in Free Enterprise that 
the SEC is a department.454  Reappointment of the ALJs by the Com-
missioners as the head of the department would thus appear to pro-
vide an easy fix.455  Congress is not required to take any legislative ac-
tion, because the SEC already has authority under Section 4(b) of the 
Exchange Act to appoint “officers . . . and other employees.”456  In 
September 2015, the FTC, in In re LabMD,457 no doubt concerned 
about constitutional challenges to SEC ALJs, opted to ratify the ap-
pointment of an ALJ as both its chief ALJ and as the presiding ALJ in 
the LabMD AP, even though the FTC, like the SEC, maintains that its 
ALJs are mere employees.458  But to date the SEC has refused to 
 
2016); Timbervest v. SEC, Civ. Action No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 WL 7597428, at *12 
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015). 
453 See, e.g., Carmen Germaine, SEC’s Big DC Circ. Win Won’t End In-House Clash, LAW360 
(Aug. 9, 2016, 10:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/826675/sec-s-big-dc-circ-win-won-t-
end-in-house-clash (concluding that Lucia will not resolve on-going debate about SEC APs).  
But cf. Mark Lanpher et al., D.C. Circuit Upholds Constitutionality of SEC Administrative Pro-
ceedings, SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.shearman.com/~/
media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2016/08/DC-Circuit-Upholds-Constitutionality-
of-SEC-Administrative-Proceedings-LIT-081616.pdf (“[T]he D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Lu-
cia has the potential to be an important precedent-setting decision.”). 
454 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 511 (2010). 
455 Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 825 F.3d 
1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he ALJ’s appointment could easily be cured by having the SEC 
Commissioners issue an appointment or preside over the matter themselves.”); DAVIS 
POLK & WARDWELL, LLP, Securities Litigation Update: Constitutional Challenges to SEC’s Ad-
ministrative Courts Gain Momentum (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.davispolk.com/
publications/securities-litigation-update-constitutional-challenges-sec%E2%80%99s-
administrative-courts-gain/ (“[T]he SEC may cure the deficiency by having the SEC 
commissioners ratify the ALJs’ appointments.”). 
456 See Kent Barnett, The SEC’s Inferiority Complex, YALEJREG.COM (June 11, 2015), 
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/the-secs-inferiority-complex-by-kent-barnett/. 
457 LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 5608167, at *2 (F.T.C. Sept. 14, 2015). 
458 Lawrence Elbaum, Survey of Recent Motions to Enjoin SEC Administrative Proceedings, N.Y. L.J. 
(Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202744911476/Survey-of-
Recent-Motions-to-Enjoin-SEC-Administrative-Proceedings?slreturn=20160024165027 
(noting that ratification “is perhaps a proactive step to moot any Appointments Clause 
challenges by respondents in the FTC’s administrative forum”); Alison Frankel, Unlike 
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acknowledge either that there is a constitutional problem or that re-
appointment should be the solution.459 
The SEC’s refusal to bend on the issue of whether its ALJs are in-
ferior officers is understandable, because the potential ramifications 
of a concession (or appellate finding) of unconstitutionality are quite 
significant, both for the SEC and for other agencies.  With respect to 
the latter, whereas most ALJs utilized by other federal agencies prob-
ably have been appointed by department heads, many—especially 
those utilized by agencies that are not departments (such as the CFPB 
and FERC)—likely have not been, and thus they too could be uncon-
stitutional.460 
With respect to the SEC, the potential ramifications can be ana-
lyzed in two major categories.  The first category includes parties 
whose APs are final.  It is unlikely that these parties will be able to 
successfully assert collateral attacks, pursuant to the principle of final-
ity.  Once a judgment becomes final, it typically cannot be attacked 
collaterally, absent extraordinary circumstances outweighing the pre-
sumption in favor of finality.461  The absence of an adjudicator’s au-
thority to decide a case does not outweigh the presumption,462 which 
 
SEC, FTC Makes a Quick Fix to Ward Off ALJ Constitutional Challenges, ON THE CASE, 
REUTERS.COM (Sept. 16, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/09/16/
unlike-sec-ftc-makes-quick-fix-to-ward-off-alj-constitutional-challenges/. 
459 See Alison Frankel, Why the SEC Can’t Easily Solve Its Appointments Clause Problem with ALJs, 
REUTERS: ON THE CASE  (June 17, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/
06/17/why-the-sec-cant-easily-solve-appointments-clause-problem-with-aljs/ (noting that 
the SEC has avoided addressing potential consequences of proposed quick fix). 
460 See Barnett, supra note 456; Aaron R. Crane & Justin A. Savage, Securities: The Next Hot Top-
ic in Environmental Law, LAW360 (June 10, 2016, 4:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/805744/securities-the-next-hot-topic-in-environmental-law (“EPA ALJs, for in-
stance, do not seem to be appointed by a ‘head of department’ any more than are those 
at the SEC.”). 
461 See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 114 (1963) (“To be sure, the general rule of finality of 
jurisdictional determinations is not without exceptions.”). 
462 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 152 (2009) (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdic-
tion . . . may not be attacked collaterally.”); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 n.9 (2004) 
(same); Evans v. Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., 506 F. App’x 741, at *3 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating 
that once an order has become final on direct review, “the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the court issuing the order can almost never be successfully raised.”).  The RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1980) describes three exceptional circumstances in which 
a collateral attack on subject matter jurisdiction is permitted: “(1) The subject matter of 
the action was so plainly beyond the court’s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action 
was a manifest abuse of authority; or (2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substan-
tially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or (3) The 
judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to make an adequately informed de-
termination of a question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural 
fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to at-
tack the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”  The Supreme Court has not decided wheth-
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suggests that “parties whose SEC ALJ-issued judgments are final will 
be unable to successfully attack them collaterally based on a determi-
nation that the ALJs’ appointments were unconstitutional.”463 
The second category includes parties whose administrative deter-
minations are not yet final.  As of June 2015, the SEC had more than 
100 contested proceedings open at various stages of the administra-
tive process.464  These parties likely could successfully attack their 
eventual adjudications, based on a determination that their ALJs’ ap-
pointments were unconstitutional.  Pursuant to a long line of Su-
preme Court precedent, a judgment entered by an improperly ap-
pointed adjudicator is void and should be set aside by any court 
having authority to review it.  In Ryder v. United States,465 for example, 
the Court vacated several decisions by the Coast Guard Court of Mili-
tary Review because the appointments of two of the court’s officers 
violated the Appointments Clause.466  Other cases are similar.467  In 
the foregoing cases, the Supreme Court remanded for re-trial by a 
properly appointed adjudicatory body.  In the case of the SEC, there 
will be no such body, unless the SEC reappoints its ALJs.  If the SEC 
does not make valid reappointments, its non-final prior decisions will 
likely be vacated and dismissed without prejudice.  There will be no 
prejudice because the dismissals will not be adjudications on the mer-
its.468  This would permit the SEC to re-try the cases, subject to any 
 
er to adopt these exceptions.  See Bailey, 557 U.S. at 154 n.6 (“This is no occasion to ad-
dress whether we adopt all of these exceptions.”).  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4) provides that 
the court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding if the judgment 
is void,  but a jurisdictional error must be egregious in order for a final judgment to be 
treated as void.  To be egregious, and thus void under Rule 60(b)(4), “the error must in-
volve a clear usurpation of judicial power, where the court wrongfully extends its jurisdic-
tion beyond the scope of its authority.”  United States v. Tittjung, 235 F.3d 330, 335 (7th 
Cir. 2000). 
463 Peter D. Hardy, Carolyn H. Kendall & Abraham J. Rein, The Appointment of SEC Administra-
tive Law Judges: Constitutional Questions and Consequences for Enforcement Actions, 47 
BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP 1238 (June 22, 2015).  But see Peter J. Henning, 
S.E.C. Finds Itself in a Constitutional Conundrum, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 15, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/1MFZEVD (suggesting possibility that penalties in every SEC AP that took 
place before an ALJ whose appointment was unconstitutional may be improper). 
464 Stephanie Russell-Kraft, SEC to Appeal District Judge’s Admin Court Injunction, LAW360 (June 
15, 2015, 6:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/667995/sec-to-appeal-district-judge-
s-admin-court-injunction. 
465 Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995). 
466 Id. at 180–88. 
467 See, e.g., Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 83 (2003) (vacating a Ninth Circuit deci-
sion by a three-judge panel that included an ineligible Article IV territorial judge). 
468 See, e.g., Havens v. Mabus, 759 F.3d 91, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that a jurisdictional 
dismissal is not on the merits). 
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statute of limitations bar, in federal district court or before a proper-
ly-appointed ALJ. 
The SEC can try to avoid invalidation of decisions rendered in 
administrative proceedings under one of two primary theories, but 
neither is likely to succeed.  The SEC can argue either that applica-
tion of the de facto officer doctrine precludes invalidation of decisions 
by its ALJs, or that such decisions are valid because they were ratified 
by the Commission. 
The de facto officer doctrine confers validity upon acts performed 
by a person acting under the color of title even though it is later dis-
covered that that person’s appointment or election to office was inva-
lid.469  The doctrine at first glance appears to be a perfect fit for SEC 
ALJs who were not properly appointed.  But in Ryder, the Supreme 
Court rejected application of the doctrine to the improperly consti-
tuted Coast Guard Court of Military Review.  According to the Su-
preme Court, application of the doctrine would create a disincentive 
to raise Appointments Clause challenges to questionable judicial ap-
pointments.470  The same  may be true with regard to SEC ALJs. 
Alternatively, the SEC could invoke the theory of ratification, un-
der general principles of agency law.  The Restatement (Third) of 
Agency specifies that “ratification is the affirmance of an act by one 
for or on behalf of another at a time when he had no authority to do 
the act for the one in whose name it was done.”471  As noted, SEC 
ALJs’ decisions do not become final until the Commission approves 
them, either expressly or tacitly.  The SEC could argue that the deci-
sions by its ALJs, who are its agents, were ratified by the Commission.  
However, this argument is unlikely to prevail.  If the argument could 
succeed, it “essentially would make the Appointments Clause a nullity 
for inferior officers, since there would be no need to follow the 
Clause’s requirements so long as a principal officer was prepared to 
ratify the unconstitutionally-appointed officer’s acts.”472 
 
469 Ryder, 515 U.S. at 180.  See also Kathryn A. Clokey, Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine: The 
Case for Continued Application, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1126 (1985) (noting gradual ero-
sion of the doctrine). 
470 Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182–83.  See also United States v. Jones, 74 M.J. 95, 96–97 (Armed Forces 
Crim. App. 2015) (rejecting the application of de facto officer doctrine to retired judge 
advocate colonel’s participation in judgment of United States Air Force Court of Criminal 
Appeals).  However, in Buckley the Court invoked the de facto officer doctrine to uphold 
the acts of an improperly constituted Federal Election Commission.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 142 (1976). 
471 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.02 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 2006). 
472 See Hardy, Kendall & Rein, supra note 463. 
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Overall, the SEC is confronted with the prospect that many of the 
decisions by its ALJs could be vacated.  How much of an administra-
tive burden would this create for the SEC? In order to answer this 
question it may be helpful to look at some prior situations in which 
the appointments of members of an administrative agency were ruled 
invalid.  In New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB,473 decided in 2010, the Su-
preme Court invalidated 595 decisions made by a two-member NLRB 
board.  Most of these matters settled, and ultimately only 112 were re-
decided.  Disposing of all 112 cases took more than three years.474 The 
vast majority of the original decisions in these cases were affirmed.475 
In Noel Canning v. NLRB,476 decided in 2014, the Supreme Court 
invalidated more than 700 reported and unreported decisions477 by an 
NLRB that included three members selected by invalid recess ap-
pointments.  These 700 decisions included “a significant number of 
highly controversial decisions that either modified or overruled past 
Board precedent.”478  In addition, several NLRB regional directors 
whose appointments were approved by the improperly-constituted 
Board were confronted with possible collateral attacks on enforce-
ment actions taken by them.479  Subsequently, the NLRB unanimously 
ratified nunc pro tunc the appointments of three of its regional direc-
tors and five of its ALJs,480 and those regional directors ratified all ac-
tions taken by them or on their behalf from the dates of their initial 
 
473 560 U.S. 674, 674–75 (2010).  The case is discussed in Julia Di Vito, Note, The New Mean-
ing of New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 330 (2011). 
474 Abigail Caplovitz Field, Possible Impacts of the Noel Canning Decision, CORP. SECRETARY 
(Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/regulation-and-legal/
12682/possible-impacts-noel-canning-decision/. 
475 Francis L. Van Dusen, Jr. & Wayne Landsverk,  Employment Law Half-Day Seminar, Lost 
in Space: The NLRB After Noel Canning, MILLER NASH LLP (2014), 
http://www.millernash.com/files/Event/76543c0f-49af-406b-bb54-bfd6bb0fd26f/
Presentation/EventAttachment/b590f9d3-6320-4146-89b0-c0225f59fa1a/The%20NLRB
%20After%20Noel%20Canning.pdf. 
476 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 134 U.S. 2550 (2014). 
477 See Bryan J. Leitch, NLRB v. Noel Canning: The Separation-of-Powers Dialogue Continues, 
2013–14 CATO SUPREME COURT REV. 221, 252–53 (“Between January 2012 and August 
2013, the NLRB ‘recess’ appointments issued roughly 700 reported and unreported deci-
sions while sitting on quorum-less boards.”). 
478 G. Roger King & Bryan J. Leitch, The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Noel Canning Decision—
Years of Litigation Challenges on the Horizon for the NLRB, BLOOMBERG BNA LAW (June 27, 
2014), http://www.bna.com/impact-supreme-courts-n17179891624. 
479 Leitch, supra note 477, at 253. 
480 NLRB OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, NLRB OFFICIALS RATIFY AGENCY ACTIONS TAKEN 
DURING PERIOD WHEN SUPREME COURT HELD BOARD MEMBERS WERE NOT VALIDLY 
APPOINTED (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-
officials-ratify-agency-actions-taken-during-period-when-supreme-court. 
Oct. 2016] ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 115 
 
appointments.481  The impact of these ratifications is unclear.482  The 
NLRB ultimately identified approximately 100 decisions that re-
quired review483 after being invalidated by Noel Canning, and in 2015 
the board was reported to be moving through this backlog of cases, 
“generally ‘rubber-stamping’ its prior opinions, even when controver-
sial.”484 
One final example is of interest.  In 2008, Congress passed legisla-
tion which attempted to cure on a prospective basis the invalid ap-
pointments of administrative patent judges of the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”).485  The appointments were un-
constitutional because they were made by the Director of the Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”), who was not a head of a depart-
ment.486  Instead, he was subordinate to the Secretary of Commerce.487  
The legislation, signed by President George W. Bush, provides for 
appointments to be made by the Secretary.488  It also offers two alter-
native mechanisms to address the problem of prior decisions.  First, 
the statute authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to make new ap-
pointments of existing administrative patent judges that take effect at 
the time when the Director of the PTO had previously purported to 
make the appointments.489  Professor John Duffy, who first discovered 
the BPAI appointment problem, has described the statute’s retroac-
tive appointments as “unprecedented in constitutional history.”490  Se-
cond, the statute states that the de facto officer doctrine shall be a de-
fense to a challenge to the appointment of an administrative patent 
judge on the basis that the judge was originally appointed by the PTO 
Director.491  It is unclear what effect, if any, Congress’s alternative ret-
roactive fixes had in this situation, because the issue has not been ful-
 
481 Seth Borden, Does the National Labor Relations Board’s Recent Ratification Announcement Have 
Any Impact on Actions Invalidated by Noel Canning?, LABOR RELATIONS TODAY (Aug. 6, 
2014), http://www.laborrelationstoday.com/2014/08/articles/uncategorized/does-the-
national-labor-relations-boards-recent-ratification-announcement-have-any-impact-on-
actions-invalidated-by-noel-canning/. 
482 Id. 
483 Paul Kind, Putting the Rabbit Back in the Hat: Noel Canning’s Impact on Eighteen Months of 
NLRB Decisions and Future Presidential Appointments, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 493, 502 (2015). 
484 Christine Holst, Ripples of Noel Canning Continue, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 20, 2015), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ripples-noel-canning-continue. 
485  See Pub. L. No. 110-313, 122 Stat. 3014 (2008) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012)). 
486  John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904, 
910-11 (2009). 
487 Id. at 911. 
488  35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). 
489 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2012). 
490 Duffy, supra note 486, at 920. 
491 35 U.S.C. § 6(d) (2012). 
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ly litigated.492  But insofar as the statute has not been deemed uncon-
stitutional, it might serve as a model in some respects for a solution to 
the SEC’s ALJ problem. 
III.  NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS 
For the reasons set forth above, the bulk of the constitutional ar-
guments advanced in opposition to use by the SEC and CFTC of ad-
ministrative proceedings are defective.  The sole exception is that the 
SEC’s appointment of its ALJs may be unconstitutional.  The SEC 
should revise its appointments process so that its ALJs are appointed 
by the Commission.  But this is not the end of the debate, because 
there are strong normative arguments in favor of reforming the AP 
process.493  The next Part of this Article examines the normative de-
bate. 
A.  Impaired Development of Federal Securities Law 
An initial normative argument against the use of administrative 
enforcement is that such use impairs the development of federal se-
curities laws, insofar as the cases are adjudicated by ALJs rather than 
federal district judges.  Judge Rakoff has forcefully advanced this ar-
gument.  He stated: “[T]he judiciary and the public should be con-
cerned about any trend toward preferring the S.E.C.’s internal ad-
ministrative forum to the federal courts [because] it hinders the 
balanced development of the securities laws.”494  Rakoff has noted that 
most of the significant SEC enforcement actions are brought under 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act495 and Section 17(a) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”),496 and the development of the law 
under these provisions has been mostly judge-made.497 
Judge Rakoff provided the example of insider trading: “[A]lmost 
all the major advances in the development of the law of insider trad-
 
492 See, e.g., In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e take no position on the 
constitutionality of the [de facto officer] defense.”); Stryker Spine v. Biederman Motech 
GmbH, 684 F. Supp. 2d 68, 84 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting issue but not deciding it). 
493 See Cox, supra note 24, at 2 (“The most interesting and practical questions about APs are 
not constitutional in nature, however, but normative.”). 
494 Rakoff, supra note 16, at 7.  Others share Judge Rakoff’s concern.  See, e.g., William F. 
Johnson, Is it Time to Reconsider “Chevron” Deference for SEC Proceedings?, N.Y. L.J., July 2, 
2015, at 1 (“[O]ne consequence of bringing more administrative cases is that the SEC can 
have a greater influence than federal judges in interpreting the securities laws.”). 
495 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
496 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012). 
497 Rakoff, supra note 16, at 8. 
Oct. 2016] ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 117 
 
ing . . . have occurred in federal courts, usually either the Supreme 
Court or the Second Circuit.”498  Judge Rakoff’s concern is that as 
administrative creep continues at the SEC, federal courts will have 
fewer and fewer opportunities to shape the law of insider trading and 
other aspects of federal securities law.  He noted that while federal 
courts review decisions of SEC ALJs, those decisions on otherwise un-
decided issues of statutory interpretation are entitled to Chevron def-
erence and thus are unlikely to be reversed.499  According to Judge 
Rakoff, this is unfair in the short-run to litigants who are given less 
balanced, careful, and impartial decisions than they would receive in 
federal court, and it is unfair in the long-run to the SEC, whose repu-
tation for impartiality will continue to decline.500 
Judge Rakoff’s argument is compelling, but it has some flaws.  
First, the argument ignores the countervailing benefit of administra-
tive adjudication by agency ALJs who develop an expertise in the fed-
eral securities laws and subsequent de novo review by SEC and CFTC 
commissioners who are widely regarded as subject matter experts.501 
Second, Judge Rakoff’s selection of insider trading to illustrate his 
argument is questionable, in a couple of respects.  To begin, SEC APs 
have made a major positive contribution to the development of insid-
er trading law.  As Professor Donald Langevoort has noted, “a sizable 
number of well-known insider trading cases . . . have arisen through 
administrative proceedings.”502  These include the seminal cases of 
 
498 Id. 
499 Id. at 10–11. 
500 Id. at 11.  Cf. Alexander I. Platt, SEC Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and Reform, 71 BUS. 
LAWYER 1, 44 (2015–16) (“APs hinder balanced development of the securities laws not 
because of Chevron deference, but because they too often keep respondents out of the 
process, thereby depriving adjudicators of input from the regulated industry.”). 
501 See, e.g., Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19, at 5 (noting that the SEC’s expanded use of APs  
“furthers the balanced and informed development of the federal securities laws,” because 
“SEC commissioners have great expertise” in this field).  But see Elliott v. CFTC, 202 F.3d 
926, 940 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“Ever since Congress began to es-
tablish independent agencies in 1887, it has been customary to refer to a commission’s 
‘expertise.’  This is a figure of speech, an honorific, rather than a description of commis-
sioners’ backgrounds and skills.  It would be more accurate to call commissioners of the 
CFTC (and other agencies) ‘specialists.’”).  In this case, only one of the four commission-
ers who participated in the order under review had any trading experience, and he dis-
sented.  Id. 
502 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & 
PREVENTION § 8:17 (2012).  See also Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Ceresney Rebuts Rakoff’s Critique 
of SEC Admin. Actions, LAW 360 (Nov. 7, 2014, 3:30 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/
articles/594489/ceresney-rebuts-rakoff-s-critique-of-sec-admin-actions (citing SEC En-
forcement Director for proposition that SEC’s ALJs have contributed their expertise to 
develop various areas of securities law, “including the prosecution of insider trading”). 
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Dirks v. SEC503 and In re Cady, Roberts & Co.504  Indeed, Cady, decided 
more than fifty years ago, was the first insider trading decision ever 
issued under the federal securities laws and the “vast majority” of in-
sider trading cases decided in the decades since then have adhered to 
its basic analysis.505 
In any event, it is certainly debatable whether the post-Cady judi-
cial development of federal insider trading law has been a net posi-
tive.  A recent analysis of the law began with this observation: “Federal 
insider trading law seems to be a ‘theoretical mess.’  According to the 
consensus view among experts, it is ‘seriously flawed,’ ‘ill-defined,’ 
‘inconsistent,’ ‘astonishingly dysfunctional,’ ‘enigma[tic],’ and even 
‘an ass.’”506  The generally poor performance by federal courts in de-
veloping insider trading law undermines the argument that adminis-
trative creep at the SEC is disadvantageous because it impedes the 
development of such law by Article III judges. 
Third, the extent to which the SEC and CFTC should or do obtain 
Chevron deference from the federal circuit courts with regard to in-
terpretations presented in the course of adjudications—as opposed to 
rulemaking—is a matter of some dispute.  The Second Circuit has 
noted that Chevron deference typically has not been afforded where 
“the agency’s interpretation is presented in the course of litigation 
and has not been ‘articulated before in a rule or regulation.’”507  
Moreover, it is doubtful whether issues addressed in dicta in agency 
decisions that were not briefed by the parties are entitled to Chevron 
deference.  This situation arose in In the Matter of John P. Flannery & 
James D. Hopkins,508 decided by the Commission in 2014 and subse-
quently appealed to the First Circuit.  In Flannery the Commission—
in a 3-2 decision effectively reversing the decision of the ALJ—made 
 
503 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
504 Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
505 Crimmins, supra note 35, at 332. 
506 Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 931 (2014) (ci-
tations omitted). 
507 SEC v. Rosenthal, 650 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Chau v. 
SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that the Second Circuit has not de-
finitively stated whether SEC interpretations made during adjudicatory proceedings are 
entitled to deference), aff’d, No. 15-461, 2016 WL 7036830 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2016); Bradley 
George Hubbard, Comment, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First Advanced in Lit-
igation?  The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 448 (2013) 
(noting that five federal circuits deny deference to agency statutory interpretations first 
advanced during litigation). 
508 Securities Act Release No. 9689, Exchange Act No. 73840, Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 31374, 2014 WL 7145625 (Dec. 15, 2014), vacated sub nom. Flannery v. SEC, 810 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015). 
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an “overt bid for Chevron deference”509 by offering a fifteen-page 
commentary on the proper interpretation of Section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act, companion Rule 10b-5,510 and Section 17(a) of the Secu-
rities Act in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus Capital 
Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders.511  Janus held that a person is lia-
ble under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for making a false or mis-
leading statement only if he had “ultimate authority” for that state-
ment.512  Janus left numerous unanswered questions, and the 
Commission, in Flannery, attempted to answer many of them, even as 
to issues not briefed by the parties.  On appeal, the First Circuit va-
cated the Commission’s Order in 2015,513 although it did not address 
the Commission’s Janus interpretation.  A recent review expressed 
doubt that the CFTC “will continue to be afforded Chevron deference 
in cases involving aggressive interpretations or applications of [Dodd-
Frank] made in the course of agency adjudications.”514  The same 
doubt may apply to the SEC and the Exchange and Securities Acts.515 
Fourth, and more broadly, the extent to which Chevron has any 
impact on the judiciary has been widely debated.  Many scholars have 
concluded that Chevron, the most-cited decision in administrative 
law,516 has had no substantial effect.  One recent review noted: 
“[E]mpiricists have had difficulty determining whether Chevron has 
actually had an impact in the real world.”517  To the extent that Chev-
ron deference is a principle more often honored in the breach than 
the observance, once again Judge Rakoff’s concern seems unwarrant-
ed. 
 
509 Andrew Vollmer, The SEC’s Expansion of Primary Liability Under Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5, 
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 9, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/09/09/
the-secs-expansion-of-primary-liability-under-section-17a-and-rule-10b-5/. 
510 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
511 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
512 Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
513 Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2015). 
514 Berkovitz, supra note 85, at 10. 
515 See Matthew Martens et al., “We Intend to Resolve the Ambiguities”: The SEC Issues Some Surpris-
ing Guidance on Fraud Liability in the Wake of Janus, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 220, 220 
n.12 (Feb. 2, 2015) (expressing skepticism that Flannery’s dicta, issued in the absence of 
briefing by the parties,  “is the type of ‘formal adjudication’ the Chevron Court intended 
would be afforded deference from the courts”). 
516 Michael Herz, Essay, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1870 
n.19 (2015). 
517 Id. at 1878; see also Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a 
Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1727, 1817 (2010) (“Academics and practitioners alike frequently assume that 
federal judges faithfully defer to agency interpretations of statutes.  This untested as-
sumption has underpinned much of the debate over the scope and extent of deference 
doctrine.  Our analysis finds that this assumption is unfounded.”). 
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Finally, Justice Clarence Thomas and the late Justice Antonin Scal-
ia recently suggested, in an opinion denying a petition for a writ of 
certiorari, that agency interpretations of laws that are subject to both 
criminal and administrative enforcement are not entitled to defer-
ence.518  Their suggestion, if ultimately accepted by the Court, would 
encompass interpretations by the SEC of the laws it administers, be-
cause most of those laws can give rise to either civil or criminal liabil-
ity.519  Given that Justices Scalia and Thomas have “led major shifts in 
criminal law jurisprudence”520 during the past decade, the Court’s 
eventual acceptance of the position staked out by them is not far-
fetched. 
Overall, to the extent that courts decline to grant deference to 
statutory interpretations made during the course of SEC and CFTC 
adjudications, concerns about impaired development of the federal 
securities laws should dissipate.  On the other hand, if the SEC loses 
Chevron deference, it simultaneously will lose a key advantage of its 
plan to pursue enforcement in-house.  Recall that the fourth factor of 
the Division guidance issued in May 2015 concerning choice of ven-
ue—which refers to the Commission’s “expertise” in securities mat-
ters—is a clear allusion to the SEC’s expectation that its rulings in-
terpreting the federal securities laws are entitled to Chevron 
deference.  That expectation would be dashed if the late Justice Scal-
ia’s views about laws subject to both criminal and administrative en-
forcement ultimately prevail.521 
 
518 Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014). 
519 Joseph Boryshansky et al., SEC’s Authority to Interpret the Securities Laws Comes Under Fire in 
Criminal Enforcement, 16 J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 41, 42 (2015), 
https://www.akingump.com/images/content/3/7/v2/37892/110887713-1.pdf  (“Since 
many of the laws the SEC enforces can give rise to criminal sanctions, the SEC could be 
denied deference in a wide range of cases, leaving its rules subject to frequent chal-
lenge.”). 
520 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, Whitman v. United States: U.S. Supreme Court Considers Defer-
ence to Agencies’ Interpretations of Criminal Statutes, 3 (Nov. 13, 2014), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Whitman_v_United_
States_US_Supreme_Court_Considers_Deference_to_Agencies_Interpretations_of_
Criminal_Statutes.pdf. 
521 See Matthew T. Martens et al., Scalia’s Deference Argument Could Have Dramatic Effects, 
LAW360 (Nov. 18, 2014, 11:57 AM), http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/
Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/Scalias-Deference-Argument-Could-
Have-Dramatic-Effects-Law360.pdf (“[W]ere Justice Scalia’s position to become the law, it 
would eliminate one of the major tactical advantages for the SEC when it brings an en-
forcement action in an administrative proceeding, rather than in district court.”). 
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B.  Perception of Unfairness and Absence of Independence 
A second normative argument is that the SEC’s administrative 
process is unfair or creates a perception of unfairness, even if it does 
not result in a statutory violation or a denial of due process or equal 
protection.  Closely related is the argument that SEC ALJs lack the 
requisite degree of independence.  Allegations of bias in APs are 
common, but federal courts have consistently rejected such allega-
tions by respondents in CFTC APs.522  Other observers have had dif-
fering opinions.  More than twenty years ago an American Bar Asso-
ciation Task Force (“ABA Task Force”) concluded that the 
combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in the SEC 
“adversely affects in a fundamental way the perceived and actual fair-
ness of the process . . . .”523  This concern may be even more salient 
today, in light of the SEC’s greatly expanded use of APs.  But the crit-
icism is not universal.  For example, the ACUS examined the amal-
gamation of functions of federal agencies and concluded that the 
model “appears, on the whole, to have worked satisfactorily in provid-
ing fair and impartial factfinding . . . . ”524 
An examination of the fairness argument requires an understand-
ing of the ALJ selection process.  The SEC currently employs five 
ALJs.  As noted, most or all of them were hired by the SEC’s Office of 
Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief Administrative 
Law Judge, human resource functions, and the OPM.  Each of the 
current ALJs served as a law judge at another agency before transfer-
ring to the SEC staff.  None of the current SEC ALJs were part of the 
SEC staff in any capacity or had practiced securities law extensively 
prior to becoming an ALJ.525  This situation differs from historical 
practice.  During the period 1964–1994 a majority of the SEC’s ALJs 
were members of the agency’s staff prior to becoming ALJs.526  Prior 
service produced the benefits of expertise concerning both federal 
securities laws and the securities industry.  But prior service came at a 
potential cost, which was bias in favor of the SEC. 
 
522 See JERRY W. MARKHAM, 13A COMMODITIES REG. § 20:32, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 
2016) (collecting cases). 
523 Task Force Report, supra note 111, at 1733. 
524 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 86-4: THE SPLIT-ENF’T MODEL FOR 
AGENCY ADJUDICATION 1, (Dec. 4, 1986) https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/split-
enforcement-model-agency-adjudication. 
525 DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(1); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for 
Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 17 (“During the past 30 years, the SEC 
has not hired a single ALJ who had directly relevant experience or expertise related to 
the federal securities laws.”). 
526 DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at § 19.04(1). 
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What has the elimination of prior service accomplished?  One ob-
vious effect is that the ALJs’ collective expertise has been significantly 
reduced, at least with respect to new judges.  Two of the five ALJs 
employed by the SEC in 2016 began service in 2014, and whatever se-
curities expertise they now have has been acquired only since then.  
But this does not necessarily mean the SEC ALJs’ overall competence 
is less than it was when they always had prior staff service.  Prominent 
defense counsel acknowledge that they “have no reason to believe 
these [current SEC] ALJs are anything other than capable, fair, and 
evenhanded jurists.”527  Moreover, the elimination of prior service and 
the commensurate reduction in expertise may merely mean that re-
spondents’ counsel have been placed on a more even playing field 
with SEC staff in their interactions with SEC ALJs.528 
Has the reduction of prior service solved the problem of actual or 
perceived bias?  One SEC ALJ, in office from 1995–2007, alleged that 
she was pressured by Chief ALJ Brenda Murray to find more often in 
favor of the SEC.529  In June 2015 the SEC’s Office of Inspector Gen-
eral (“OIG”) launched an investigation at the request of SEC Chair 
Mary Jo White concerning claims that SEC ALJs are biased.530  The 
OIG issued an Interim Report of Investigation in August 2015 which 
advised that the Inspector General “has not developed any evidence 
to support the allegations of bias in ALJs’ decisions in the Commis-
sion’s administrative proceedings.”531  The OIG issued a final Report 
of Investigation in January 2016 which confirmed the interim find-
ings.  The Report noted, inter alia, that the OIG did not develop any 
evidence to support the allegations of improper influence or the al-
 
527 Davison et al., supra note 20, at 106–07; see also U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for 
Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 58 n.60 (“[A]ttorneys in private prac-
tice uniformly praise[] the expertise, experience, professionalism, and integrity of the 
two [SEC] ALJs who have served for an extended period of time . . . .”). 
528 See DORFMAN & WINER, supra note 22, at  § 19.04(1) (noting the more level playing field). 
529 Eaglesham, supra note 11 (discussing allegations of pressure by Chief Judge Murray). 
530 Ed Beeson, SEC Inspector General Probes in-House Judge Bias Charges, LAW360 (Aug. 10, 2015, 
1:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/689115/sec-inspector-general-probes-in-
house-judge-bias-charges. 
531 SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INTERIM REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, Case #15-ALJ-0482-1, 
at 4 (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/oig-sec-interim-report-
investigation-admin-law-judges.pdf.  See also William McLucas & Matthew Martens, How to 
Rein in the SEC, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-
rein-in-the-sec-1433285747 (“Whatever the complaints about the administrative process, 
there is no evidence that the ALJs harbor bias.”); Cox, supra note 24, at 6 (concluding 
that SEC ALJs “unfailingly strive to be independent”); Walfish, supra note 10 (noting that 
SEC ALJs “strive to be fair to all parties”). 
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legation that SEC ALJs were pressured to shift the burden of proof to 
respondents.532 
Even in the absence of actual bias the perception problem re-
mains, and it extends to appeals.  Recall that the Commissioners au-
thorize all enforcement actions and subsequently act as the first level 
of appeal.  The Commission’s decision to proceed with an enforce-
ment action reflects a substantive judgment about the strength and 
merit of a case.  If the Commissioners ultimately side with the Divi-
sion on appeal, they may “not have done so with the disinterestedness 
required for credibility and legitimacy.”533  Many respondents in SEC 
APs believe they do not receive fair hearings or appeals,534 and that 
this unfairness manifests in the SEC’s record of home court success.  
Indeed, the Commissioners almost never dismiss a case after they 
have authorized issuance of an OIP.535  In this context the perception 
of bias or unfairness may be almost as important as the presence of 
bias.536  And the perception is magnified by the adverse SEC and 
CFTC procedures described above. 
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A number of solutions to the problems identified above have been 
proposed.  The next part of this Article considers the merits and dis-
advantages of some of the most common proposals. 
A.  Establishment of a Federal ALJ Corps 
One proposal is that the federal government should establish and 
utilize for agency adjudication a corps of independent ALJs who are 
 
532 SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, Case #15-ALJ-0482-1, at 21–22 
(Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/Final-Report-of-Investigation.pdf. 
533 Walfish, supra note 10. 
534 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 24 (“At a minimum, it appears to [respondents] and to the out-
side world that the process is much less fair.”). 
535 David Zornow, Comment Letter on Proposed Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of 
Practice (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-6.pdf (“[I]f it 
has ever occurred, it is extremely rare for a Commissioner to dismiss a case after having 
already been persuaded to approve the very institution of those proceedings.”). 
536 See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 111, at 1734 (“Even if the inference of bias from the 
number of cases decided for the [SEC] Staff is not warranted in fact, the public percep-
tion to this effect may be every bit as damaging to the public confidence in the integrity 
and fairness of the process.”); Henning, supra note 213 (“[T]his battle is more about the 
perception that the administrative process is flawed, not whether there is actually a signif-
icant home court advantage.”); Olson, supra note 129 (“The perception that administra-
tive proceedings are fundamentally unfair has damaged the credibility of the SEC’s en-
forcement system.”). 
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not employees of any specific agency.  Such a corps has been widely 
used at the state level—and to a much lesser extent at the local lev-
el537—in the form of central panels.  Central panels vary greatly in 
their organization,538 but in general a panel is an agency of ALJs estab-
lished to conduct administrative adjudications for other agencies.539  
These ALJs are independent of, and not subject to control or influ-
ence by, the agencies for which they conduct administrative hearings.  
Instead, the ALJs report to a chief ALJ or central panel director.540 
Central panels have existed since the 1940s.  A Model Act for their 
adoption has been drafted,541 at least twenty-seven states and three 
major cities have established such panels,542 and at least eleven states 
have adopted them since 1990.543  No state that has adopted a central 
panel has returned to decentralization.544  The adoption of central 
panels has been described as the most significant development in 
U.S. administrative law545 and a substantial body of research and 
commentary on many aspects of this development has been pub-
lished.  Central ALJ panels offer several advantages, including an en-
hanced perception of fairness,546 improved efficiency,547 and lower 
costs.548 
 
537 Allen C. Hoberg, Ten Years Later: The Progress of State Central Panels, 21 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. LAW JUDICIARY 235, 246 (2001) (“The central panel system is slowly gaining popu-
larity amongst large cities too.”). 
538 See Moliterno, supra note 162, at 1230. 
539 Barnett, supra note 18, at 828 (“Perhaps the most popular remedial proposal is for a uni-
fied ALJ corps (sometimes referred to as an ALJ central panel) appointed and supervised 
by an existing or newly created independent agency.”). 
540 Larry J. Craddock, Final Decision Authority and the Central Panel ALJ, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 471, 477 (2013). 
541 See House of Delegates of American Bar Ass’n, Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing 
Agency, 17 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. LAW JUDICIARY 313 (1997) (reprinting the Model Act). 
542 John Hardwicke & Thomas E. Ewing, The Central Panel: A Response to Critics, 24 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. LAW JUDGES 231 (2004). 
543 James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in Central Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority, 
38 IND. L. REV. 401, 402–04, 403 nn.13–14 (2005) (listing states and municipalities which 
have adopted central panels). 
544 Id. at 404–05 (noting that no state had decentralized at least up until 2005). 
545 Michael Asimow, The Fourth Reform: Introduction to the Administrative Law Symposium on State 
Administrative Law, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 395, 396–99 (2001). 
546 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary: ALJs in Historical Perspective, 20 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. LAW JUDICIARY 157, 164 (2000) (“Central panels have some very im-
portant advantages, particularly in giving private parties the sense their cases are being 
heard by an independent judge.”); Ryan Jones, Comment, The Fight Over Home Court: An 
Analysis of the SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings, 68 SMU L. REV. 507, 536 
(2015) (“[T]he SEC could remove a perception of in-house bias . . . by using independ-
ent ALJs who work from outside of the agency.”). 
547 See, e.g., Moliterno, supra note 162, at 1228 (“There is, in fact, significant evidence in sup-
port of the proposal of many administrative judges that a central panel would increase 
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Is the central panel model suitable for the federal government?  
Congress considered but rejected central panels when the APA was 
drafted in the 1940s549 and an ALJ corps option was proposed repeat-
edly in Congress between 1983 and 1995.550  The ACUS examined the 
issue during this latter period and recommended against a central-
ized approach at the federal level.551  The published recommendation 
of the ACUS did not explain its rationale, but there are clear poten-
tial disadvantages to establishing and operating a federal central ALJ 
panel. 
Perhaps the major potential disadvantage to operation of a federal 
central panel—and its use as a source of ALJs for SEC and CFTC ad-
ministrative proceedings—is the loss of agency expertise that the cur-
rent decentralized approach provides.552  As noted, none of the cur-
rent SEC ALJs have prior SEC staff experience and two of them have 
served at the SEC only since 2014.553  In addition, the CFTC has no 
ALJs of its own, and it is likely to borrow from other agencies when it 
resumes contested administrative enforcement.  Nevertheless, SEC 
ALJs develop substantial securities law and industry expertise as their 
tenure continues at the agency,554 and this expertise is likely to be 
transferable to CFTC cases.  The acquired expertise might be lost if 
 
the efficiency of administrative adjudication as well as the impartiality of administrative 
adjudicators.”). 
548 Hardwicke & Ewing, supra note 542, at 233 (“Experience has shown that a central panel is 
inherently more cost-effective than separate, independent hearing units.”). 
549 Moliterno, supra note 162, at 1227. 
550 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-14, RESULTS-ORIENTED CULTURES: OFFICE OF 
PERS. MGMT. SHOULD REVIEW ADMIN. LAW JUDGE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE HIRING AND 
PERFORMANCE MGMT. 22 (2010), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-14.  One bill 
passed the Senate in 1993 but never came to a vote in the House of Representatives.  Id. 
at 23. 
551 Moliterno, supra note 162, at 1228. See also Paul R. Verkuil et al., ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 92-7: THE FED. ADMIN. JUDICIARY (Dec. 10, 1992), 
https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/federal-administrative-judiciary (“Congress 
should not at this time make structural changes more extensive than those proposed 
here, such as those in recent legislative proposals to establish a centralized corps of 
ALJs.”). 
552 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 18, at 829 n.20 (“[A] common criticism of the ALJ corps is 
that agencies lose the efficiency and specialized knowledge that exists when ALJs are 
housed within individual agencies.”). 
553 The five ALJs employed by the SEC in 2016 were Brenda Murray, Carol Foelak, Cameron 
Elliott, James Grimes, and Jason Patil.  Murray has served as an SEC ALJ since 1988, Foe-
lak since 1996, Elliott since 2011, Grimes since June 2014, and Patil since September 
2014.  Murray has served as the Chief ALJ since 1994.  See Davison et al., supra note 20, at 
106–07 n.29 (listing the five SEC ALJs and their experience at the SEC). 
554 See, e.g., Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19 (“[SEC] ALJs are focused on hearing and deciding 
securities cases, year after year.  They develop expert knowledge of the securities laws, 
and the types of entities, instruments and practices that frequently appear in our cases.”). 
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SEC and CFTC administrative proceedings were to be staffed by ALJs 
sourced from a central panel at the federal level. 
The foregoing argument concerning loss of expertise has been 
rebutted—at least with regard to state central panels—by state ALJs 
and other observers.  The rebuttal notes the following: (1) the chief 
ALJs in states using central panels endeavor to make ALJ assignments 
based on the expertise of particular judges, (2) in many cases subject 
matter expertise is non-essential, and (3) empirical evidence from 
some states where central panel ALJs have no authority to make final 
decisions without agency review shows that the decisions by ALJs are 
overwhelmingly affirmed on review, which suggests that the theorized 
crippling loss of expertise is a false assumption.555 
The foregoing rebuttal may be valid with regard to central panels 
at the state level.  But it is not at all clear that the rebuttal retains its 
validity with regard to a federal central panel.  Cases at the federal 
level are likely to be more complex556—perhaps considerably more 
so—and this increased complexity may very well render a federal cen-
tral panel unfeasible.  In any event, as noted by Professor Barnett, 
“Given the ACUS’s lack of support for an ALJ corps and the pro-
posal’s failure to gain political traction after more than sixty years, 
the proposal to create a federal ALJ corps appears moribund.”557 
B.  Adoption of the NLRB Model or a Split-Enforcement Model 
The ABA Task Force recommended more than twenty years ago 
that the SEC’s authority to initiate an administrative enforcement 
proceeding be vested in an independent General Counsel’s office, in 
conformity with the long-standing practice at the NLRB.558  This rec-
ommendation was recently revived.559 
The NLRB’s current enforcement structure has been in place 
since 1947.  That year Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act,560 which 
amended the NLRA and, among other things, restructured the NLRB 
by creating the office of the General Counsel.  Before Taft-Hartley, 
 
555 Hardwicke & Ewing, supra note 542, at 23–39. 
556 See, e.g., Ceresney Remarks, supra note 19 (noting that many cases decided by SEC ALJs in-
volve complex and novel legal issues); Stephanie Russell-Kraft, CFTC Whistleblower Head 
Forecasts Big Things to Come, LAW360 (May 1, 2015, 2:35 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/649672/cftc-whistleblower-head-forecasts-big-things-to-come (noting highly tech-
nical nature of cases brought by CFTC). 
557 Barnett, supra note 18, at 830. 
558 Task Force Report, supra note 111, at 1737. 
559 See, e.g., Walfish, supra note 10 (recommending adoption by SEC of NLRB enforcement 
model). 
560 Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166). 
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the NLRB simultaneously occupied the roles of investigator, prosecu-
tor, jury, and judge.561  This amalgamation of functions was widely 
criticized on the basis that it was unfair to defendants.562  Since Taft-
Hartley the NLRB’s functions have been split, with the General 
Counsel acting independently of the NLRB, but in its name and on 
its behalf, in the pre-filing investigation, issuance, and prosecution of 
unfair labor practice complaints.563  The five members of the NLRB 
retain only adjudicative and policy-making functions.564  This bifur-
cated structure reflects the intent of Congress to differentiate be-
tween the final authority of the General Counsel and the NLRB along 
a prosecutorial versus adjudicative line.565 
A similar but non-identical model is the split function or split-
enforcement model, wherein Congress splits a major area of regula-
tory activity between two separate and independent agencies, grant-
ing rulemaking and prosecutorial authority to one of them and adju-
dicatory authority to the other.566 
One example of this model is the OSH Act, which splits enforce-
ment by assigning responsibility for setting and enforcing health and 
safety standards to the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion and responsibility for adjudicating alleged violations of those 
standards to the  OSHRC.567  The OSHRC employed twelve ALJs in 
2016568 and they decide cases at the trial level.  The three-member 
OSHRC, appointed by the President, provides administrative appel-
late review on a discretionary basis.569 
 
561 Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, Local 415–75, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 823, 
828, 828 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
562 Id. at 828. 
563 Id. 
564 See Innovative Commc’ns Corp. v. NLRB, 39 F. App’x 715, 719 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“[T]here is a clear division between the [NLRB’s] adjudicative functions and the Gen-
eral Counsel’s prosecutorial functions . . . .”); Francis M. Dougherty et al., 22 FED. PROC., 
L. ED. § 52:251 (database updated Mar. 2015) (“The General Counsel . . . functions in in-
vestigative and prosecutory roles, and in so doing acts as an independent unit, with the 
NLRB itself retaining only its adjudicative and policymaking functions.”). 
565 NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 124 (1987); 
NLRB v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 613 F.3d 275, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
566 32 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
JUDICIAL REVIEW § 8217 (1st ed. database updated Apr. 2015). 
567 George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA 
and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 315 (1987); Amanda Shami, Note, Three 
Steps Forward: Shared Regulatory Space, Deference, and the Role of the Court, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1577, 1594 (2014). 
568 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, Administrative Law Judges, 
http://www.oshrc.gov/about/ALJ_bios.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2016). 
569 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, Fiscal Year 2017 Performance Budget 
and Justification 1 (Feb. 2016) (noting trial function of ALJs, as well as Presidential ap-
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A second example of split-enforcement at the federal level is the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (“Mine Act”),570 which 
amended prior statutes concerning coal, metal, and non-metal mine 
safety and health and is modeled closely on the OSH Act’s adminis-
trative structure.571  The Mine Act requires the Secretary of Labor to 
develop, promulgate, and enforce safety and health standards for the 
nation’s mining industry through the Mine Safety and Health Admin-
istration (“MSHA”)572 and assigns the adjudication of contested en-
forcement actions to the independent Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Review Commission (“FMSHRC”).573  The FMSHRC employed 
fifteen ALJs in 2016574 and they decide cases at the trial level.  The 
five-member FMSHRC provides administrative appellate review.575 
The administrative structure of both the OSH Act and the Mine 
Act is similar to the NLRA’s, insofar as all three reflect an internal 
separation of function beyond what the APA mandates.  Recall that 
while the APA prohibits agency staff from combining prosecutorial 
and adjudicative functions in the same case, it expressly exempts both 
the agency and agency members from this prohibited combination.  
The NLRA, OSH Act, and Mine Act administrative models all exceed 
the APA parameters.  But the NLRA model differs from the other 
two.  Whereas the General Counsel’s role at the NLRB is limited by 
Taft-Hartley to the investigation and prosecution of cases, Congress 
assigned to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration broad 
policy-making authority, which is implemented through the promul-
gation of occupational health and safety standards and the making of 
prosecutorial decisions.576  The Mine Act is similar to the OSH Act in 
this regard. 
 
pointment of, and discretionary review by, OSHRC Commissioners), 
http://www.oshrc.gov/budget/fy17_budget.pdf. 
570 Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-961 
(2012)). 
571 Benjamin W. Mintz, Administrative Separation of Functions: OHSA and the NLRB, 47 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 877, 886 (1998). 
572 Johnson, supra note 567, at 316. 
573 Patrick R. Baker, Stuck Between a Lump of Coal and a Hard Place: The Mine Safety and Health 
Administration’s Struggle with Due Process and America’s Coal Industry, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 625, 
626, 633 (2014) (noting that the Mine Act’s split-enforcement model was “designed to 
prevent regulatory capture”); Johnson, supra note 567, at 316. 
574 FED. MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, Administrative Law Judges,  
https://www.fmshrc.gov/about/aljs (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
575 FED MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, JUSTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATION 
ESTIMATES FOR CONG. APPROPRIATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2016, 1 (Feb. 2, 2015), 
https://www.fmshrc.gov/plans/FMSHRC%20FY2016%20CBJ.pdf. 
576 Mintz, supra note 571, at 886–87. 
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Are the NLRB or split-enforcement models more equitable than 
the enforcement models used by the SEC and CFTC?  The ACUS ex-
amined the split-enforcement model of the OSH Act and the Mine 
Act but was “unable to conclude whether this model achieves greater 
fairness in adjudication than does the traditional structural model.”577  
The ACUS therefore took no position on whether the split-
enforcement model is preferable to a structure in which responsibili-
ties for rulemaking, enforcement and adjudication are combined 
within a single agency,578 as they are at the SEC and CFTC.  Similarly, 
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) assessed whether the FTC 
should continue to both prosecute and adjudicate antitrust cases. 
The ABA concluded that the benefits and safeguards inherent in the 
FTC’s adjudicatory process outweigh any need to separate its prose-
cutorial and adjudicative functions.579 
Another perspective is provided by Canada, which lacks a national 
securities regulator.580  Each Canadian province and territory has its 
own securities regulator, which takes one of two forms.  The regula-
tor is either a self-funded commission or an entity housed and fi-
nanced within a larger government department.581  These securities 
commissions have traditionally been structured as multifunctional 
administrative agencies, in which they act as regulator, investigator, 
prosecutor, and adjudicator.  This is the SEC’s model.  In 2004 Que-
bec opted for a bifurcated or split-enforcement model when it estab-
lished the Bureau de décision et de révision en valeurs mobilières 
(“the Bureau”).  The Bureau, an independent adjudicative tribunal, 
rendered ninety decisions between the time it began exercising juris-
diction on February 1, 2004 and June 30, 2008.582  Appeals were filed 
 
577 The Split-Enforcement Model for Agency Adjudication (Recommendation No. 86-4), 51 
Fed. Reg. 46986 (Dec. 30, 1986). 
578 Id. 
579 Miles W. Kirkpatrick et al., 1989 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY 
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 118 (“[T]he current unity of functions, 
although troubling, is superior to the alternatives . . . .”). 
580 See Poonam Puri, Securities Litigation and Enforcement: The Canadian Perspective, 37 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 967, 975 (2012) (“Securities experts in Canada have been deliberating over the 
transition to a national regulator for approximately forty years, with no success to date.”). 
581 Thomas Hockin et al., Final Report and Recommendations, EXPERT PANEL ON SEC. REG., 
DEP’T OF FIN. CAN. 39 (2009), http://www.expertpanel.ca/eng/documents/Expert_
Panel_Final_Report_And_Recommendations.pdf. 
582 Stéphane Rousseau, The Québec Experience with an Independent Administrative Tribunal Spe-
cialized in Securities: A Study of the Bureau de décision et de révision en valeurs mobilières, EXPERT 
PANEL ON SEC. REG. IN CAN. 24 (2009), http://www.expertpanel.ca/documents/research-
studies/Quebec%20Independent%20Adjudicative%20Tribunal%20-
%20Rousseau.English.pdf. 
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with respect to only five of these decisions,583 which certainly suggests 
that the parties believe the Bureau’s process is fair.  Quebec’s model 
has been widely endorsed by securities experts in Canada.584 
At a minimum, the split-enforcement model probably enhances 
the appearance of fairness.585  Balanced against this enhanced ap-
pearance is the likely diminution of agency efficiency.  Efficiency de-
pends in significant measure on both the existence of a single inter-
nal policy-making authority and access by agency decision-makers to 
the agency’s collective expertise and experience.586  One study of the 
OSH Act split-enforcement model concluded that “there is little evi-
dence that these perceived benefits [of increased fairness] outweigh 
problems with efficiency and policy coordination.”587  And one indica-
tor of FMSHRC’s inefficiency is that it began fiscal year 2016 with a 
backlog of 4452 undecided cases.588 
In light of the OSH Act and Mine Act experiences, adoption by 
the SEC and CFTC of a split-enforcement model likely would incur 
the cost of reduced efficiency.  This is especially undesirable given 
the sharp constraints on resources confronted by both the SEC589 and 
CFTC.  But this conclusion has little or no applicability to the NLRB 
model, which hinges on a General Counsel acting independently of 
the NLRB, but in its name and on its behalf, in the pre-filing investi-
gation, issuance, and prosecution of unfair labor practice complaints.  
 
583 Id. at 26. 
584 See, e.g., Hockin et al., supra note 581, at 30 (“We believe that an independent adjudica-
tive tribunal should be established within a framework of a single securities act adminis-
tered by a single securities regulator for Canada.”); Rousseau, supra note 582, at 35 (“To 
summarize, the experience of the Bureau underscores the potential of an independent 
securities tribunal.  It lends support to those who advocate the bifurcated model for secu-
rities commissions.”). 
585 See Mintz, supra note 571, at 916 (“Is OSHA’s split-enforcement arrangement more ‘fair’?  
It would be difficult to say.  Does it appear more fair?  It seems likely.”) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
586 See id. at 885–86 (describing the split enforcement-model as “a political compromise de-
signed to accommodate the need for effective administration and unified policymaking 
with concerns about fairness in that administration”). 
587 Thomas McGarity et al., Workers at Risk: Regulatory Dysfunction at OSHA, 2010 CTR. FOR 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM 20,  http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/osha_1003.pdf. 
588 FED. MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, JUSTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATION 
ESTIMATES FOR CONG. APPROPRIATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2017, 11 (Feb. 9. 2016), 
https://www.fmshrc.gov/plans/FMSHRC_FY%202017%20Congressional%20Justification
%202-09-2017.pdf.  See also Baker, supra note 573, at 646 (“MHSA’s policies consistently 
fail to address the underlying problem—inconsistency and inefficiency within the admin-
istrative structure.”). 
589 See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical 
Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 757 (2003) (“The resource limitations faced by the SEC are a 
much studied and well understood problem.”). 
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The NLRB model—which has been copied by the EEOC590—has been 
proposed intermittently for decades as an appropriate model for the 
SEC.591  It is time to revisit that proposal.  Congress should seriously 
consider separating the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in 
the SEC, not by creating separate agencies, but by vesting prosecuto-
rial authority in a General Counsel whose decisions are not subject to 
Commission review. 
C.  Creation of a Right of Removal 
Some federal administrative agencies permit respondents to elect 
whether to proceed administratively or in federal court.  The FERC, 
for example, provides this option if the alleged violations occurred 
under Part II of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).592  Before issuing an 
order assessing a civil penalty against any person under FPA Part II, 
the FERC issues such person notice of the proposed penalty and a 
statement of the material facts constituting the violation.  The notice 
gives the person the option to choose between (a) an administrative 
hearing before a FERC ALJ or (b) an immediate penalty assessment 
by the FERC which a U.S. district court is authorized to review de no-
vo.593 
Analogously, the ABA Task Force recommended more than twen-
ty years ago that respondents in SEC administrative disciplinary pro-
ceedings be granted the right to remove most such actions to the 
United States district court for the district in which the respondent’s 
principal place of business is located or to the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia.594  This recommendation has been revived 
as criticism of the SEC has recently intensified.  In October 2015 the 
 
590 See EEOC, Structure of Office of General Counsel,   http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/
manual/1-2-a_structure_of_ogc.cfm (last visited Aug. 4, 2016) (describing the functions 
of the EEOC’s Office of General Counsel).  The EEOC General Counsel recommends 
cases for litigation to the Commission and approves other cases for filing.  Id. 
591 See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 111, at 1737 (“This approach preserves the agency’s 
important role in ensuring that the law develops and is applied uniformly, while at the 
same time avoiding the combination of functions that raises serious questions of fair-
ness.”); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 
267 (“The experience of the NLRB with a general counsel who is separately subject to 
presidential appointment might be a model worth emulating by agencies like the FTC 
and SEC.”). 
592 Regulation of Electric Utility Companies Engaged in Interstate Commerce, 16 U.S.C. §§ 
824-824v (2012). 
593 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2012); William J. Scherman, Brandon C. Johnson & Jason 
J. Fleischer, The FERC Enforcement Process: Time for Structural Due Process and Substantive Re-
forms, 35 ENERGY L.J. 101, 110 (2014). 
594 Task Force Report, supra note 111, at 1736. 
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Due Process Restoration Act of 2015 was introduced in Congress.595  
The bill—written as an amendment to the Exchange Act—allows re-
spondents to terminate APs (thereby forcing the SEC to either re-file 
the claims in an Article III court or dismiss them) and raises the bur-
den of proof for the SEC in administrative proceedings to require 
clear and convincing evidence that a respondent has violated the se-
curities laws.596 
A number of observers have endorsed a right of removal, includ-
ing former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox.597  According to Cox, 
adoption by Congress of a right of removal likely would result in a 
middle ground between the pre-Section 929P(a) world and the cur-
rent environment of significantly expanded use by the SEC of APs.598  
Cox is wrong.  Creating a right of removal is unlikely to result in a 
middle ground.  Rather, vesting respondents with the option to re-
move would create a situation in which most of them, when con-
fronted with the prospect of administrative enforcement, probably 
would threaten to exercise the option as leverage in settlement dis-
cussions with the SEC and CFTC.599  And given the resource con-
straints faced by the agencies, that threat would be powerful enough 
to disrupt the settlement calculus in hundreds of cases every year.  
Granting a right of removal also is likely to have the unintended neg-
ative consequence of multiplying the already taxing case load burden 
on the federal judiciary.  Overall, removal is ill-advised. 
 
595 H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. (2015); Cara Salvatore, Bill Aims to Cut In-House Proceedings for SEC 
Violations, LAW360 (Oct. 22, 2015, 8:38 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/717392/
print?section=assetmanagement. 
596 H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. (2015). 
597 See Cox, supra note 24, at 8 (recommending adoption of right of removal).  Accord U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, at 20 
(recommending adoption of right of removal); Joseph Quincy Patterson, Note, Many Key 
Issues Left Unaddressed in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Attempt to Modernize its Rules 
of Practice, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1702 (2016) (same). 
598 Cox, supra note 24, at 8. 
599 See Henning, supra note 213 (“The Chamber of Commerce’s suggestion that defendants 
be allowed to take a case to federal court is unlikely to gain any support from the S.E.C. 
Virtually every defendant facing potential administrative charges would threaten to use 
that option as a lever to gain a more favorable settlement.”).  See also Fair or Foul?  SEC 
Administrative Proceedings and Prosepcts for Reform Through Removal Legislation: Hearing on 
H.R. 3798 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises of the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 7 (2015) (statement of Joseph A. Grundfest, William A. 
Franke Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-ba16-wstate-jgrundfest-
20151202.pdf (noting that Due Process Restoration Act of 2015 could effectively elimi-
nate APs as a mechanism for resolving significant securities fraud cases); Platt, supra note 
500, at 47 (concluding that if respondents are granted a right of removal they “would 
likely opt out of the AP system very widely”). 
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D.  Amendment of the SEC and CFTC Rules of Practice 
In June 2014 the SEC’s General Counsel acknowledged that the 
agency’s RoP were last revised “quite some time ago,” and indicated 
the agency may be open to modernizing them.600  In fact, prior to 
2016 the SEC RoP were last amended in 2006601—four years before 
Dodd-Frank greatly expanded the SEC’s authority to use administra-
tive enforcement—and they were last materially updated in the mid-
1990s.602  The last material update occurred long before the modern 
explosion of electronically-stored information (“ESI”).  The SEC’s 
failure to revise the RoP to reflect the harsher aspects of the current 
enforcement regime has placed respondents at a significant litigation 
disadvantage.  The same is true with regard to the CFTC RoP.  The 
litigation disadvantage is not unconstitutional but it is unfair.  A 
number of critics have called for reform603 and these critics are cor-
rect. 
In September 2015 the SEC announced that it had voted to pro-
pose amendments to its RoP.604  After receiving thirteen comment let-
ters in response to the proposal,605 the SEC made minor revisions and 
adopted amendments in July 2016.606  The amendments—which took 
effect on September 27, 2016 and apply to all APs initiated on or af-
 
600 Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Attys Ready to Pounce on SEC’s Outdated Admin Rules, LAW360 (June 
18, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/549549/attys-ready-to-pounce-on-
sec-s-outdated-admin-rules. 
601 See SEC, ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND RELATED PROVISIONS 
AND DELEGATIONS OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMM’N, Release Nos. 34-52846, File No. S7-
05-05 (Nov. 29, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-52846.pdf (indicating effec-
tive date of Jan. 4, 2006); William F. Johnson, SEC Behind Times in ”Modernizing” Adminis-
trative Proceedings, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 5, 2015) (“Indeed, the SEC’s Rules of Practice were last 
updated almost ten years ago, in 2006, before the Dodd-Frank Act broadened the SEC’s 
ability to bring more cases in the administrative forum.”). 
602 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 26, 
at 16 (noting that the SEC completed its most recent “material update” of the RoP in 
1994). 
603 See, e.g., McLucas & Martens, supra note 531 (“[T]he agency should move swiftly to mod-
ernize the rules of procedure governing its in-house proceedings.”). 
604 See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules Gov-
erning Administrative Proceedings (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/
2015-209.html. 
605 The comment letters are located at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s718
15.shtml. 
606 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release 2016-142, SEC Adopts Amendments 
to Rules of Practice for Administrative Proceedings (July 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2016-142.html. 
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ter that date607—are an incremental step in the right direction, but 
they fail to cure the fundamental defects in the SEC’s administrative 
process.  The SEC and CFTC should revise their respective Rules of 
Practice in the following respects. 
First, both sets of rules should be amended to permit expanded 
discovery.  In particular, the rules should be amended to permit addi-
tional fact and expert depositions.  As noted, the CFTC currently 
permits depositions only to preserve the testimony of witnesses un-
likely to be available for hearing, and this was the SEC’s rule prior to 
the September 2016 amendments.  Expanding the scope of permissi-
ble depositions to permit respondents in SEC and CFTC administra-
tive proceedings to cross-examine the agencies’ witnesses prior to tri-
al could accomplish multiple goals: (1) respondents could better 
assess the merits of the agencies’ cases, (2) both sides could better 
evaluate settlement prospects, and (3) respondents could better for-
mulate their own trial strategy.  Expanding the scope of permissible 
depositions to encompass potential witnesses the SEC and CFTC may 
not have identified or pursued during their investigations could fur-
ther accomplish the foregoing goals. 
The SEC’s 2015 announcement included a proposed amendment 
to Rule 233.  The proposal provided that in matters with one re-
spondent, each side may notice for deposition a maximum of three 
persons and in matters where there are multiple respondents each 
side may depose up to five persons.608  The Division is one side and 
the group of all respondents is the other side.  The limitations en-
compassed both fact and expert witnesses.  Each deposition was lim-
ited to one day of six hours, including cross-examination,609 although 
this time could be expanded by the ALJ or Commission upon a show-
ing—among other reasons—that more time is required to fairly ex-
amine the deponent. 
After receiving comments, the SEC modified its proposed 
amendment in minor respects.  In the revised version, the maximum 
length of each deposition was extended by one hour and each side 
 
607 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, The SEC Retains its House Advantage During Adminis-
trative Proceedings, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/sec
-retains-its-house-advantage-during-administrative-proceedings. 
608 Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091, 60,102 (pro-
posed Oct. 5, 2015). 
609 Id. at 60,103. 
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can seek leave from the ALJ to take two additional depositions upon a 
showing of compelling need.610 
The SEC’s new rule is much too restrictive, in several respects.  To 
begin, the core limit of three depositions in single respondent cases 
and five depositions in multiple respondent cases is too low, especial-
ly in complex cases.611  One obvious aspect of the inadequacy con-
cerns the mix of fact and expert witnesses.  Experts can play a central 
role in complex cases.  If the Enforcement Division discloses two ex-
pert witnesses in a single respondent case, the respondent effectively 
is limited to a single fact witness,612 assuming the ALJ fails to grant 
leave.  The inadequacy is further underscored by comparing amend-
ed Rule 233 to the number of depositions available in federal district 
court and to the number of witnesses the Enforcement Division typi-
cally calls in administrative hearings.  Parties are granted ten deposi-
tions by the FRCP613 and often take many more in complex cases, pur-
suant to leave of court.614  The Division calls an average of eight or 
nine witnesses in APs,615 and this number likely reflects a subset of the 
 
610 See Daniel V. Ward, Jon A. Daniels & Alexandria Perrin, Inside SEC’s New In-House Court 
Rules, LAW360 (Aug. 1, 2016, 11:54 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/823479/inside
-sec-s-new-in-house-court-rules (describing the new provisions). 
611 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, A Small Step in Changing S.E.C. Administrative Proceedings, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/business/
dealbook/a-small-step-in-changing-sec-administrative-proceedings.html?_r=0 (“[A]llowing 
only three—or at most five—depositions seems like an artificially low limit that will not do 
much to aid those accused of a violation in a complex case.”); GIBSON DUNN & 
CRUTCHER, SEC Moves in the Right Direction with Proposed Amendments to Rules Governing Ad-
ministrative Proceedings, but the Changes Do Not Go Far Enough (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/SEC-Proposed-Amendments-to-Rules-
Governing-Administrative-Proceedings.aspx (“[I]n complex cases, which the Commission 
has increasingly authorized to proceed in its in-house courts, three or five depositions per 
side could be woefully inadequate, especially in proceedings against multiple respond-
ents, who may have widely divergent interests and significant differences of opinion as to 
which witnesses should be deposed.”). 
612 Navistar International Corporation, Comments on Proposed Rule: Amendments to the 
Commission’s Rules of Practice [Release No. 34-75976; File No. S7-18-15], 2015 WL 
8489929, at *3 (S.E.C. Misc. Dec. 3, 2015). 
613 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (providing that leave of court is necessary when taking a 
deposition would result in more than ten depositions being taken). 
614 Why the SEC’s Proposed Changes to its Rules of Practice are Woefully Inadequate—Part II, SEC. 
DIARY (Nov. 5, 2015), http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/11/05/why-the-secs-proposed-
changes-to-its-rules-of-practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-ii/ (“[I]n factually challeng-
ing cases, it would not be unusual to have ten to thirty fact depositions in a federal court 
case, followed by at least two expert depositions per side.”). 
615 Johnson, supra note 601 (“[A] look at the administrative hearings held over the past year 
reveals an average of eight witnesses called by the Enforcement Division.”); Richard Fos-
ter, Senior V.P. and Senior Counsel for Regulatory and Legal Affairs, Financial Services 
Roundtable, Comment Letter on Proposed Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of 
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much larger universe of witnesses who were deposed or interviewed 
by the Division before the OIP was filed.616 
Creating symmetry by giving the Division and respondents an 
equal number of deposition slots will do little or nothing to even the 
playing field, because prior to filing of the OIP there is great asym-
metry—the Division, with unlimited authority to subpoena witnesses 
and documents, is not unlikely to take dozens of examinations under 
oath.617  The Division can do this without the participation or even 
knowledge of future respondents.  Moreover, where there are multi-
ple respondents they may have widely divergent interests and views 
about who should be deposed under the new rule.618  Finally, amend-
ed Rule 233 does not contemplate that SEC investigative personnel 
can be deposed, or that SEC files previously not subject to discovery 
could be discoverable. 
At a minimum, Rule 233 should be further modified to signifi-
cantly increase the capped number of deposition slots, grant SEC 
ALJs the discretion to consider the complexity of a proceeding in de-
termining the appropriate number of depositions, or treat expert 
witnesses as a separate category.619  In addition, the SEC should con-
 
Practice (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815.shtml (“The 
Division regularly calls nine or more witnesses in administrative proceedings.”). 
616 See Tom Quaadman, Senior V.P., Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, Comment Letter 
on Proposed Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 7–8 (Dec. 4, 2015), 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/2015-12.4-rules-of-
practice-comment-letter.pdf  (“Anecdotally, it is common for the staff to interview or de-
pose literally dozens of witnesses in a typical investigation.”); Why the SEC’s Proposed Chang-
es to its Rules of Practice are Woefully Inadequate—Part II, SEC. DIARY 2 (Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/11/05/why-the-secs-proposed-changes-to-its-rules-of-
practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-ii/ (stating that it would not be unusual for the En-
forcement Division to take testimony from fifteen to thirty witnesses during the course of 
an investigation). 
617 See Peter K.M. Chan & Amy C. Greer, Tweaking the “Home Court” Rules for SEC Administra-
tive Proceedings, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/tweaking-the-home-court-rules-for-sec-administrative
-proceedings  (“The effect will be to leave the playing field tilted in favor of the Divi-
sion.”). 
618 Barry R. Goldsmith, SEC Proposed Amendments to Rules for Administrative Proceedings, HARV. 
LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 2 (Oct. 15, 2015), 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/15/sec-proposes-amendments-to-rules-for-
administrative-proceedings/ (noting woeful inadequacy of allowing a maximum of five 
depositions per side in complex cases, especially those involving multiple respondents). 
619 See COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, The SEC’s Proposed Modernization of its Rules for Administra-
tive Proceedings 2 (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/
publications/2015/09/the_secs_proposed_modernization_of_its_rules_for_
administrative_proceedings.pdf  (“[T]here will inevitably be cases in which arbitrary lim-
its to the number of depositions and hearing preparation time will deprive respondents 
of a fair opportunity to defend themselves.”). 
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sider allowing the limited use of interrogatories and requests for ad-
missions. 
Second, both agencies should amend their rules to expressly 
adopt the full version of the Brady rule.  As noted, whereas SEC RoP 
230(b)(2) prohibits the Division from withholding documents that 
contain material exculpatory evidence, the rule does not impose an 
affirmative duty to identify or disclose such evidence.620  Both the SEC 
and CFTC should expressly impose such an obligation on their staffs 
during the course of administrative proceedings.  The SEC’s new 
amendments do not address the Brady rule. 
Third, the compressed timelines adopted by the SEC should be 
further relaxed.  As noted, most SEC APs proceed under the 300-day 
timeline, which provides for a hearing to occur 120 days from filing 
of the OIP.  This timeline, and the two alternatives, were adopted in 
2003, prior to the dramatic expansion under Dodd-Frank of the 
SEC’s administrative enforcement authority.  These timelines are 
anachronistic and should be extended to reflect both the sea-change 
wrought by Dodd-Frank and the modern explosion of ESI. 
The SEC’s September 2015 announcement included a proposed 
amendment to Rule 360 that would expand the foregoing timeline, 
but not by much.  For example, proposed amended Rule 360 would 
permit an administrative hearing in a 300-day case to be scheduled 
up to eight months following the service of the OIP, thereby dou-
bling the former deadline of four months.621  This proposed expan-
sion was insufficient to reduce the advantage currently enjoyed by the 
SEC,622  particularly when compared with the schedules in comparably 
complex federal district court cases.623  For the twelve month period 
ending June 30, 2015, the median time in federal civil cases from the 
 
620 Goetz, supra note 243, at 1436–37. 
621 Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, SEC Rel. No. 34-75976, at 54 (Sept. 24, 
2015), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34-75976.pdf. 
622 See GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER, supra note 611, at 2 (“While these amendments com-
mendably would provide respondents with additional time to prepare for their hearings, 
they do not adequately remedy the discrepancy between the far longer time period the 
Division of Enforcement allows itself to investigate and prepare its case, which frequently 
is measured in years rather than months.”). 
623 See Olson, supra note 129, at 3–4 (“[T]he proposed increase from four to eight months in 
trial preparation time for complex matters is still far short of what is needed for the most 
complicated proceedings.”). See also Breon Peace & Lisa Vicens, Fighting the SEC on its 
Home Turf, LAW360 (Oct. 28, 2016, 11:42 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/assetmanagement/articles/854404/fighting-the-sec-on-its-home-
turf (noting that longer pre-hearing period under amended SEC RoP “is still much 
shorter than it would be in a federal civil court”).  
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time of filing a complaint to trial was twenty-six and a half months,624 
and the SEC’s five jury trials in fiscal year 2015 took between thirty-
four and sixty-six months from the time of filing the complaint to the 
verdict.625 
In response to comments received after the amendment was pro-
posed the SEC made slight revisions.  The revised rule extends the 
length of the pre-hearing period to a maximum of ten months in 300-
day cases, six months in 210-day cases, and four months in 120-day 
cases.626  This extension remains inadequate.627  At a minimum, Rule 
360 should be further amended to permit either longer or more flex-
ible time periods.  Rule 16 of the FRCP vests federal district judges 
with the discretion to issue scheduling orders that reflect the com-
plexity of cases and the scheduling needs of the parties,628 and Rule 
360 of the RoP should include an analogous provision. 
Fourth, the RoP amendments fail to assure respondents in SEC 
APs timely access to the Division’s investigative file.  As noted, under 
Rule 230(a), the Division must commence making its file available to 
respondents no later than seven days after service of the OIP.  There 
is no deadline for completion, and in theory full disclosure could 
take much longer.  Indeed, “the Division’s production can be and of-
ten is accomplished piecemeal over time, further reducing prepara-
tion for the respondent.”629  Whether or not a piecemeal production 
is common, the Division’s file should be made available to respond-
ents before the OIP is filed.  Such earlier disclosure could render 
Wells submissions more useful, provide respondents with an en-
hanced ability to evaluate their case at an earlier stage of the proceed-
ings, and prompt earlier and possibly more fruitful settlement discus-
sions.630  Amended Rule 221(c) adds to the list of subjects to be 
discussed at an AP’s pre-hearing conference the timing for comple-
tion of the disclosure required by Rule 230,631 but it does not mandate 
either prompt disclosure or disclosure before the OIP is filed. 
 
624 Foster, supra note 615, at 5. 
625 Id. 
626 Margaret A. Dale & Mark D. Harris, SEC Adopts Amendments to Rules for Administrative Pro-
ceedings, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 10, 2016). 
627 Id. (“[T]he disparity between the parties is still large.  Ten months is a relatively short 
time for respondents to prepare for a complex trial, particularly where the SEC has had 
years to investigate, collect documentary evidence, and take testimony.”). 
628 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
629 Olson, supra note 129, at 5. 
630 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, supra note 611, at 2. 
631 JONES DAY, SEC Publishes Final Rules Amending the Rules of Practice for Administrative Proceed-
ings 2 (July 2016), http://www.jonesday.com/sec-publishes-final-rules-amending-the-rules-
of-practice-for-administrative-proceedings-07-19-2016/. 
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Overall, the Commission’s September 2016 amendments to its 
RoP fail to mitigate to any appreciable degree the unfairness inher-
ent in the current rules.632 
CONCLUSION 
Dodd-Frank authorized the SEC to impose civil penalties in pro-
ceedings before an ALJ against any person who violated any provision 
of the federal securities laws or any rule promulgated under those 
statutes.  This authorization has resulted in a classic case of adminis-
trative creep at the SEC.  More than 80% of the SEC’s new enforce-
ment actions in the first three quarters of fiscal year 2016 were filed 
as administrative proceedings, and the CFTC plans to follow suit. 
SEC ALJs are SEC employees and are paid by the agency.  They 
are not appointed by the President, a court of law, or the head of a 
federal department, and they arguably are insulated from the Presi-
dent by dual layers of for-cause removal protection.  If an SEC en-
forcement action is assigned to an ALJ, rather than to a federal judge, 
there are major adverse procedural consequences for respondents.  
There is very limited discovery, neither the FRE nor the FRCP apply, 
there is no opportunity to assert counterclaims, there is no right to a 
jury trial on any issue, and the time frame for completion of the ad-
ministrative proceeding is both rigid and truncated. 
The SEC has been much more successful in APs conducted on its 
home court than it has been in federal court.  During the time period 
October 2010 to September 2015, the SEC prevailed against 86% of 
respondents in contested cases heard by ALJs, whereas during the 
same period the SEC had a considerably lower success rate of 70% in 
federal court.  The statistics concerning appeals are even starker. 
The foregoing picture has prompted a number of respondents to 
file constitutional challenges to SEC administrative proceedings.  Five 
of the most common constitutional arguments asserted by respond-
ents are denial of due process, denial of equal protection, violation of 
the Seventh Amendment, and two distinct violations of Article II of 
the Constitution.  Virtually none of these arguments has merit.  The 
only meritorious constitutional argument is that SEC ALJs have been 
 
632 See Carmen Germaine, SEC Faces Long Road Ahead on Admin Court Reforms, LAW 360 (July 
13, 2016, 9:54 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/816979/sec-faces-long-road-ahead-on-
admin-court-reforms (quoting Baker Botts, LLP partner Jonathan Shapiro for the proposi-
tion that amendments to SEC RoP represent non-comprehensive “textbook incremental-
ism”); Elizabeth P. Gray et al., Will the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Proposed Changes 
to Administrative Proceedings Quiet Critics?, 22 THE INVESTMENT LAWYER 1, 6 (Dec. 2015) 
(“[T]he changes will not eliminate the due process concerns that have been raised.”). 
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appointed in violation of Article II.  The SEC should cure that defect 
by having its Commissioners reappoint its ALJs.  In addition to the 
constitutional arguments, there are some core normative argu-
ments—the process impedes the development of the federal securi-
ties laws and even if the process is constitutional it is unfair, or at least 
raises a substantial perception of unfairness.  The fairness argument 
is much more compelling than the developmental argument.  The 
SEC AP process is fundamentally unfair.  Congress should seriously 
consider adopting the NLRB model for the SEC, whereby an inde-
pendent General Counsel would make investigative and prosecutorial 
decisions, and the SEC and CFTC should revise their respective Rules 
of Practice. 
